Also known as: fighting word · Chaplinsky doctrine
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A category of speech falling outside First Amendment protection that consists of personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to an ordinary citizen, are inherently likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation.
Frank Fisher stood inches from a city marshal on a public sidewalk and called him a God-damned racketeer and a damned Fascist. The marshal arrested Fisher under a statute punishing offensive or derisive words likely to cause a breach of the peace. The words qualified as fighting words because they were personally abusive epithets directed at an individual and inherently likely to provoke immediate retaliation.
Fabian Flynn shouted racial epithets at a passerby inside a store. The city ordinance punished only fighting words that insulted on the basis of race, religion, or gender. Flynn's conviction was reversed because the ordinance engaged in viewpoint discrimination by criminalizing only a subset of fighting words while leaving other equally provocative insults untouched.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Francisco Frost yelled fighting words at a victim before striking him. Prosecutors sought an enhanced sentence under a hate-crime statute that increased penalties when the underlying conduct was motivated by bias. The enhancement was upheld because it punished the conduct of assault rather than the content of the speech itself.
Fumiko Fujimoto called a police officer a corrupt liar during a traffic stop. The officer sued for defamation. The claim failed because the statement concerned a public official and lacked actual malice, even though the words might otherwise have qualified as fighting words in a private context.
Felipe Figueroa displayed a sign in his store window containing personally abusive epithets aimed at a competitor. Regulators banned the sign under a commercial-speech rule. The ban was evaluated under intermediate scrutiny because the speech was commercial rather than pure fighting words directed at provoking immediate violence.
Fatima Flores stood across the street from a funeral and shouted personally abusive epithets at the family of the deceased. The family sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claim was barred because the speech occurred in a public forum on a matter of public concern and did not constitute fighting words directed at the listeners.
Fighting words are personally abusive epithets addressed to an individual that are inherently likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation from an ordinary citizen. The words must be directed at a particular person rather than expressing a general idea or political view. Words that merely offend or provoke anger without tending to incite an immediate breach of the peace do not qualify.
Supporting sources
No. Even within the fighting words category, the government may not enact viewpoint-based or subject-matter-based regulations. An ordinance that punishes only fighting words insulting on the basis of race, religion, or gender while leaving other abusive epithets untouched is unconstitutional. The First Amendment forbids content discrimination inside an unprotected category.
Supporting sources
No. Speech that is offensive, vulgar, or expresses unpopular ideas remains protected unless it falls into the narrow fighting words category or another unprotected class. Words must be personally abusive epithets likely to cause an immediate violent response from the addressee. General political protest or symbolic expression does not qualify.
Supporting sources
Fighting words are face-to-face insults likely to provoke the listener to violence against the speaker. True threats convey a serious intent to commit violence against the target. Incitement urges imminent lawless action by third parties. Each category has its own test, but all fall outside First Amendment protection.
Supporting sources
…While our Court has held that some kinds of speech and writings, such as "obscenity," Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, and "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, are not expression within the protection of the First Amendment, freedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is unquestionably, as…