/fuh-DISH-ee-air-ee DOO-teez of KAIR, LOY-uhl-tee and GOOD FAITH/·doctrine
Also known as:fiduciary duty of care · fiduciary duty of loyalty · fiduciary duty of good faith · fiduciary duty · duties of care and loyalty
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
Duties that a fiduciary owes to the beneficiary. The duty of care requires the fiduciary to act with the skill and diligence that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances. The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to place the beneficiary's interests above the fiduciary's own and to account for any profits derived from the relationship. The duty of good faith requires the fiduciary to act honestly and without self-dealing.
Sources & Authorities· 13 primary sources
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Cases
Uniform Acts
Common Law
Restatements
Casebooks
How it applies
Common Examples
6
LLC Member Self-Dealing Profit
Fatou Fall, a member of a member-managed LLC, used her position to secure a contract that funneled a side payment to her personal account. The company discovered the payment and demanded an accounting. Fall must turn over the profit because the duty of loyalty requires her to hold as trustee any benefit derived from the conduct of the company's affairs.
General Partner Secret Commission
Fumiko Fujimoto, a general partner in a limited partnership, arranged financing for the partnership and received an undisclosed commission from the lender. The limited partners sued to recover the commission. Fujimoto must account for the payment because the duty of loyalty requires her to hold as trustee any profit derived from the conduct of the partnership's affairs.
Partner Opportunity Diversion
Felicia Fuentes, a partner in a general partnership, learned of a business opportunity through partnership contacts and pursued it personally without disclosure. The partnership sued to recover the resulting profits. Fuentes must surrender the gains because the duty of loyalty requires her to account for any benefit derived from the conduct of the partnership's business.
Personal Representative Self-Purchase
Francesca Fiore, personal representative of an estate, sold estate property to a corporation in which she held a substantial interest without court approval. The beneficiaries sued for damages. Fiore is liable to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust because the exercise of her power was improper and breached her fiduciary duty.
Promoter Secret Land Sale
Frederick Ferguson, a promoter forming a corporation, sold his own land to the new entity at a markup without disclosing the profit to all contemplated initial investors. The corporation sued to rescind the transaction. Ferguson must disgorge the secret profit because promoters owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty that requires full disclosure and approval from all original investors.
Director Proxy Misstatement
Fabian Flynn, a director of a public corporation, circulated a proxy statement containing material misrepresentations to secure shareholder approval of a merger. A shareholder sued to set aside the merger. The directors' fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith support a private right of action for damages caused by the misleading solicitation.
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964)
Common questions
Frequently Asked
4
Does the duty of loyalty require a fiduciary to disclose all personal interests that could affect the beneficiary?+
Yes. The duty of loyalty requires full disclosure of any conflict so that the beneficiary can decide whether to consent or take other protective action. Failure to disclose prevents informed ratification and exposes the fiduciary to liability for resulting profits or losses.
Supporting sources
Can a fiduciary avoid liability by showing that the beneficiary suffered no financial loss?+
No. Liability for breach of the duty of loyalty turns on the fiduciary's improper conduct and the resulting benefit to the fiduciary, not on proof of loss to the beneficiary. The fiduciary must account for any secret profit even if the beneficiary is unharmed.
Supporting sources
Does the duty of care impose an objective standard or does it vary with the fiduciary's actual experience?+
The duty of care imposes an objective standard of ordinary experience and intelligence. A fiduciary is also held to any higher standard she purports to possess, so both the objective and subjective components must be satisfied.
Supporting sources
May a fiduciary compete with the principal during the relationship if the competition occurs only on personal time?+
No. The duty of loyalty prohibits competition concerning the subject matter of the agency even when the agent works only evenings and weekends. Secret formation of a competing venture while the relationship continues constitutes a breach regardless of the timing of the work.
Supporting sources
. In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell you that “these rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent,” given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers and…
under Rule 10b-5 by concluding that the Rule and § 10 (b) protected only those who had bought or had sold securities. Many cases applying the Birnbaum doctrine and continuing critical…
fiduciary duty
by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure." Id. , at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that it did not,…
in decisionmaking.”). [^maj-29]: See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. , 663 A.2d 1156 (Del.1995) (adopting a subjective standard for determining an individual director's financial…
Business Associations Agency and PartnershipFiduciary duties between principal and agent · Duty of careUBEFoundational