Also known as: second-degree felony · second degree felony · felony in the second degree · 2nd degree felony
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A classification of felony under the Model Penal Code that applies when a statute grades an offense as a felony of the second degree based on the presence of specified aggravating elements such as the time or place of the crime or the manner in which it is committed.
Felicia Fuentes piled newspapers against the wall of an insurance company's storage building and lit them at night. She intended the fire to spread and destroy records so she could collect on a doubled policy. The resulting blaze damaged the structure and endangered nearby occupied offices. Because she started the fire to collect insurance, the offense is graded as a felony of the second degree.
Farah Fox forced Fernando Farrell into a van at gunpoint and drove him across state lines to a remote cabin. She held him for ransom for two days but then released him unharmed at a highway rest stop before any trial. The initial removal and confinement satisfy the elements of kidnapping, yet the voluntary safe release reduces the grade to a felony of the second degree.
Fiona Foster compelled Faith Fitzgerald to submit to intercourse by threatening imminent serious bodily injury with a knife. The victim was not a voluntary social companion and had never permitted prior liberties. The use of force and the victim's status elevate the rape to a felony of the second degree.
Felix Franco used a retained key to enter a former client's home after dark while the occupants slept. He intended to steal jewelry from a bedroom safe. Because the entry occurred at night in the dwelling of another, the burglary is graded as a felony of the second degree even though no one was injured.
Foster Forge's employee drove the getaway car during an armed robbery at a jewelry store. A store clerk was killed by the employee's accomplice inside the store. The driver's participation in the underlying felony supports a first-degree murder conviction, but the grading analysis treats the underlying robbery as a felony of the second degree for sentencing purposes.
On April 1, 1975, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida. Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the back door of the Kersey house and asked for water for an overheated car. When Mr. Kersey came out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, and told Jeanette Armstrong to take his money. Mr. Kersey cried for help, and his wife came out of the house with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, then shot and killed both of the Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and fled. Two witnesses testified that they drove past the Kersey house between 7:30 and 7:40 a.m. They saw a large cream- or yellow-colored car parked beside the road about 200 yards from the house. A man was sitting in the car. Another witness testified that at approximately 6:45 a.m. he saw Ida Jean Shaw, petitioner's common-law wife and Jeanette Armstrong's mother, driving a yellow Buick with a vinyl top which belonged to her and petitioner Earl Enmund. Enmund was a passenger in the car along with an unidentified woman. At about 8 a.m. the same witness saw the car return at a high rate of speed. Enmund was driving, Ida Jean Shaw was in the front seat, and one of the other two people in the car was lying down across the back seat. Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong were indicted for the first-degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys. Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together. The prosecutor maintained in his closing argument that Sampson Armstrong killed the old people. The judge instructed the jury on felony murder, including that the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery. The jury found both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. A separate sentencing hearing was held and the jury recommended the death penalty for both defendants. The trial judge then sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of first-degree murder after finding four statutory aggravating circumstances and that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied. The Florida Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by statute. The trial judge reiterated the findings, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and sentences after rejecting two of the four aggravating circumstances but concluding that the remaining two outweighed the absence of mitigating circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court found that there was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob the elderly couple led to their being murdered. However, the jury could have concluded he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes waiting to help the robbers escape. We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.
Freeman Engineering's physician assisted a terminally ill patient by prescribing lethal medication after the patient requested help ending his life. The state statute classifies the conduct as a felony of the second degree when performed after the twenty-sixth week of pregnancy or under certain other conditions. The physician's actions trigger that grading under the applicable provision.
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters. The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
The Model Penal Code assigns the label "felony of the second degree" to certain enumerated offenses. The actual term of imprisonment is set by the sentencing article.
Supporting sources
…Code § 400 (T. Hittel ed. 1876)). : "A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony in the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.5(2)(Official Draft and Revised Comments…
…in the first degree even though there is no premeditated design or intent to kill." Id., at 1606. Distinguishing first- and second-degree felony
…would have extended Linda's life and significantly diminished her chances for a complete recovery. The Instruction on Second Degree Felony-Murder Defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court's instructions to the jury. [5] The court gave the following tripartite instruction on murder in the
…involuntary manslaughter, see, e.g., Heacock v. Commonwealth , 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Va. 1984) (cocaine dealer charged with second-degree felony murder); Napier v. State , 357 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Ala. 1978) (heroin dealer charged with first-
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case the offense is reduced to a felony of the second degree.
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Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
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Burglary is a felony of the second degree if it is perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night, or if, in the course of committing the offense, the actor purposely, knowingly, or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury or is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon.
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A structure qualifies as a dwelling when it is adapted for overnight habitation even if only occasional use occurs. The presence of a cot used for overnight stays during extended monitoring periods can support classifying the building as a dwelling, which elevates nighttime burglary to a felony of the second degree.
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