Also known as: FRCP 56 · Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 · Rule 56 · summary judgment rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural rule authorizing a court to enter judgment without a trial when the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule requires the court to examine cited record materials such as affidavits, documents, and discovery responses while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Floyd Franklin sued Freeman Engineering in federal court alleging breach of a supply contract. Freeman Engineering moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint and attached an email exchange showing Franklin had accepted substitute performance. The court considered the email and converted the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56, giving Franklin an opportunity to submit additional materials on whether the acceptance was knowing.
Freya Freeman, a public figure, sued Frostline Textiles for defamation over a newspaper article. Frostline moved for summary judgment after discovery. The court applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard to the record and granted the motion because no reasonable jury could find actual malice by that heightened measure.
In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.
View caseFlora Ford and other environmental advocates sued Fusion Power alleging violations of wildlife-protection statutes. Fusion Power moved for summary judgment on standing. The court examined the affidavits and denied the motion because the evidence created a genuine issue whether the plaintiffs faced imminent injury from the challenged conduct.
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas. Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad. Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseFrederick Ferguson sued Falcon Dynamics for product liability after a workplace injury. Falcon Dynamics moved for summary judgment, pointing to the absence of evidence on causation in the record. The court granted the motion because Ferguson produced no admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute on that required element.
In September 1980 respondent Catrett, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced a wrongful-death action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations including petitioner Celotex Corporation. The complaint alleged that her husband Louis H. Catrett died in 1979 from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on diversity grounds. After extensive discovery Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1981 asserting that respondent had failed to produce any evidence that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex asbestos products. In response respondent produced a transcript of the decedent's deposition taken in a separate California proceeding, a letter from an official of one of Celotex's former insurance companies, and a letter from one of Celotex's customers. In July 1982 the District Court granted summary judgment to Celotex on the ground that respondent had made no showing of exposure to Celotex products in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Respondent appealed only that ruling. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden because it made no effort to adduce affirmative evidence supporting its motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the proper standard under Rule 56.
View caseFiona Foster sued Freeman Engineering alleging an antitrust conspiracy. After discovery, Freeman Engineering moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion because the record showed only parallel conduct and no evidence supporting a plausible inference of an agreement.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseForrest Falconer sued Frostline Textiles for employment discrimination. Frostline moved for summary judgment after discovery. The court denied the motion because the record contained evidence from which a reasonable jury could disbelieve the employer's stated reason and infer discrimination.
Roger Reeves worked for Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. for forty years until his discharge in October 1995 at the age of fifty-seven. He supervised the regular line in the Hinge Room, where Joe Oswalt supervised the special line and Russell Caldwell managed the department. Reeves's duties included recording employee attendance and hours and reviewing weekly attendance reports. In the summer of 1995, after being told that production was down due to employee absences and tardiness, manufacturing director Powe Chesnut ordered an audit of the Hinge Room timesheets for July, August, and September. The audit uncovered numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut, along with vice presidents Dana Jester and Tom Whitaker, recommended to company president Sandra Sanderson that Reeves and Caldwell be fired, and Sanderson discharged both in October 1995. Reeves filed suit in June 1996 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired for failing to maintain accurate attendance records, while Reeves introduced evidence that his records were accurate and that Chesnut had shown age-based animus toward him. The jury found in Reeves's favor, awarding thirty-five thousand dollars in compensatory damages and determining that the discrimination was willful, resulting in a seventy-thousand-dollar judgment plus an award of front pay. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment, concluding that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated the employment decision even though he may have shown the company's explanation was pretextual. The court considered factors such as the context of Chesnut's comments, the ages of other decisionmakers, and the fact that multiple supervisors were accused of recordkeeping issues. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the evidentiary requirements in such discrimination cases.
View caseA party may move at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery unless the court or local rules set a different deadline.
The nonmovant must respond with specific facts supported by admissible evidence showing a genuine dispute on a material issue. Mere conclusory assertions or reliance on pleadings alone is insufficient.
The court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor while considering only cited materials unless it chooses to review the entire record.
The court may give the party an opportunity to cure the deficiency, consider the fact undisputed, grant summary judgment, or issue another appropriate order.
…respondents' evidentiary burden ( i. e. , affidavits asserting "specific facts") in withstanding a summary judgment motion under Rule 56(e) with the standard of proof ( i. e. , the existence of a "genuine issue" of "material fact") under Rule 56(c). 1 Were the Court to apply the proper standard for summary judgment,…