Also known as:exercises of religion · exercised of religion · exercising of religion · free exercise · religious exercise · free exercise clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The practice or observance of religious beliefs and rituals. The Free Exercise Clause protects this activity from government interference that is not neutral and generally applicable or that fails strict scrutiny when exemptions are available on secular grounds.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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State Funding Exclusion Challenged
Ethan Evans sought to use a state tuition voucher at a religious nursing school that required chapel attendance. The program excluded schools with religious requirements. Ethan sued, claiming the exclusion burdened his religious exercise by denying equal access to a generally available benefit.
Animal Sacrifice Ordinance Targeted
Eva Espinosa planned a Santeria ritual involving animal slaughter at her home. The city enacted an ordinance banning that precise method while allowing other animal killings. Eva sued after enforcement, arguing the rule singled out her religious practice.
Evelyn Ellison was fired after using peyote in a Native American Church ceremony. The state denied her unemployment benefits under a neutral criminal prohibition on the drug. Evelyn claimed the denial infringed her religious exercise.
Foster Care Exemption Denied
Erika Echevarria's religious agency refused to certify same-sex couples. The city allowed case-by-case exemptions for secular reasons but denied her request. Erika sued, asserting the discretionary policy was not generally applicable.
Amish Schooling Exemption Sought
Eileen Epstein withdrew her children from school after eighth grade for religious reasons. The state enforced compulsory attendance until age sixteen. Eileen claimed the law burdened her family's faith-based educational practices.
Taxpayer Challenge to Religious Funding
Edith Eberhardt paid federal taxes used in part for religious school materials. She sued to enjoin the expenditures as violating her religious exercise rights. Edith asserted standing to challenge the funding on free exercise grounds.
Flast v. Cohen392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies.
Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities.
The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools.
The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
When does a law burden the exercise of religion enough to trigger strict scrutiny?
A law burdens the exercise of religion when it is not neutral or generally applicable, such as when it targets religious conduct or allows individualized exemptions that officials may grant or deny on secular grounds. Strict scrutiny then requires the government to show a compelling interest pursued by the least restrictive means.
Supporting sources
Does the Free Exercise Clause require exemptions from neutral criminal laws that incidentally burden religion?
No. Neutral and generally applicable criminal prohibitions do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even when they incidentally burden religious practices, so no constitutional exemption is required absent evidence of targeting.
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How does the presence of discretionary exemptions affect a policy's general applicability?
A policy that permits officials to grant individualized exemptions on secular grounds is not generally applicable. The availability of such discretion triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause because it creates a risk of discriminatory application against religious exercise.
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When must a compulsory education law yield to religious exercise claims?
A compulsory education law must yield when it substantially burdens the free exercise rights of parents whose religion forbids formal secondary schooling and the parents demonstrate a self-sufficient community whose alternative practices satisfy the state's interests.
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576 U.S. 644 (2015)
…the Obligation of Contracts,” denying “Full Faith and Credit” to the “public Acts” of other States, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing the right to keep and bear arms, authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures, and so forth. Aside from these limitations, those powers…