Also known as: exercising dominion or control · exercised dominion or control · exercises dominion or control · dominion and control
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An intentional assertion of rights over a chattel that is inconsistent with the owner's right of control. The assertion must be serious enough to justify requiring the actor to pay the full value of the chattel.
Enzo Eastwood borrowed a specialized welding machine from Eastern Electric for a one-day project. While moving the machine back to storage, Enzo's assistant accidentally left it on the loading dock overnight where it was damaged by rain. Eastern Electric sued for conversion. Because Enzo did not intentionally assert ownership or control over the machine, he is not liable even though the handling was careless.
Eduardo Enriquez was driving a car with two passengers when officers found a large quantity of cash and drugs in the center console. All three denied ownership. Because the contraband was in a common area accessible to all occupants and no one claimed it, each person exercised dominion or control sufficient to support probable cause for joint possession.
In the early morning hours of August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding at 3:16 a.m. The vehicle had three occupants: Donte Partlow, the driver and owner of the car; respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger; and Otis Smith, the back-seat passenger. When Partlow opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a large amount of rolled-up money inside. After the officer checked the computer system and issued an oral warning to Partlow, a second patrol car arrived. Partlow consented to a search of the vehicle, which yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer questioned all three men about the ownership of the drugs and money and informed them that if no one admitted ownership he would arrest them all. None of the men offered any information, so the officer placed all three under arrest and transported them to the police station. Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and provided an oral and written confession acknowledging that the cocaine belonged to him, that he and his friends were going to a party, and that he intended to sell the cocaine or use it for sex. Pringle stated that the other occupants did not know about the drugs, resulting in their release. A jury convicted Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. The trial court denied Pringle’s motion to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. A jury convicted Pringle, and he received a sentence of 10 years’ incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided vote, reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseEzra Eastman was a passenger in a car stopped by police. Officers found guns and drugs under the front seat within his reach. Because Ezra had the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over the items located in the passenger compartment, he could be found in constructive possession even without physically holding them.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View caseConversion requires only that the defendant intentionally exercise dominion or control over the chattel. The defendant need not intend to cause legal harm or permanently exclude the owner. The focus is on whether the intentional act seriously interferes with the owner's rights.
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Good faith is only one factor in determining whether the interference is serious enough to constitute conversion. An honest but mistaken belief that the chattel belongs to someone else does not excuse the actor when the conduct results in serious interference such as destruction or permanent deprivation.
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Brief or minor unauthorized handling usually supports only trespass to chattels. Conversion requires a serious interference such as pledging property as collateral for weeks, refusing to return it for years, or permanently disposing of it.
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Footnotes : Maryland law defines “possession” as “the exercise of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 277(s) (1996) (repealed 2002). : The Court of Appeals of Maryland…