effectively unreviewable

In 2007 Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and Georgia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination followed an e-mail he sent to a member of Mohawk’s human resources department stating that the company was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time Carpenter sent the e-mail, he was unaware that Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit, Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., No. 4:04-cv-00003-HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004), of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with Mohawk’s retained counsel in the Williams case. Counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements about the company’s hiring practices. When Carpenter refused, Mohawk fired him under what he maintains were false pretenses. After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the Williams plaintiffs sought an evidentiary hearing to explore his allegations. In its response, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as pure fantasy and recounted the true facts of his dismissal, stating that Carpenter had attempted to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker, that retained counsel had interviewed him during an immediate investigation, and that the company had terminated him for blatantly violating company policy. While those events unfolded in the Williams case, discovery proceeded in Carpenter’s separate action. Carpenter moved to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The District Court agreed that the privilege applied but granted the motion to compel after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The court stayed the ruling to allow Mohawk to pursue other appellate avenues, including a petition for mandamus or an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. The Eleventh Circuit also denied the mandamus petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.

In 1970, the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned that members of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives had planned to blow up heating tunnels linking federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. The group had also discussed kidnapping National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. On November 6, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap on the telephone of William Davidon, a Haverford College physics professor and group member. The stated purpose was gathering intelligence in the interest of national security. The FBI installed the tap in late November 1970 and it remained in place until January 6, 1971. During that period the Government intercepted three conversations between Davidon and respondent Keith Forsyth. Forsyth learned of the wiretap in 1972 while facing unrelated criminal charges. He moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3504 for disclosure of any electronic surveillance to which he had been subjected. The Government's response revealed that Forsyth had participated in conversations overheard during surveillance expressly authorized by the President acting through the Attorney General. An affidavit from then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated the surveillance was authorized under the President's national security authority in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). Shortly after this Court decided United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), Forsyth filed suit against Mitchell and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. He sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages. Discovery and preliminary proceedings continued for five and a half years. By early 1978 both parties had filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court found no genuine dispute that the FBI had informed Mitchell of the ECCSL plots, that Mitchell had authorized the warrantless tap on Davidon's phone, and that the ostensible purpose was national-security intelligence gathering. The court rejected Mitchell's claim to absolute prosecutorial immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman but held that he could assert qualified immunity. Neither side had established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his good faith, so the court denied both summary-judgment motions. Mitchell appealed the denial of absolute immunity. The Third Circuit remanded for further factfinding on whether the authorization was necessary to a decision to initiate a criminal prosecution. On remand the District Court held a hearing and concluded that Mitchell's authorization was not intended to facilitate any prosecutorial decision. After this Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the District Court reconsidered qualified immunity, denied Mitchell's motion for summary judgment, granted Forsyth's motion on liability, and scheduled proceedings on damages. Mitchell again appealed. The Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the absolute-immunity denial but that the qualified-immunity denial was not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, and it remanded for further proceedings. Mitchell petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to an investigation that by September 18 had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public. In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks or to terrorism in general. Of those individuals, 762 were held on immigration charges, and a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be of high interest to the investigation and held under restrictive conditions designed to prevent communication with the general prison population or the outside world. Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim, was arrested in November 2001 by agents of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service on charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Pending trial, he was housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. In January 2002 he was designated a person of high interest and placed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit, where detainees were kept in lock-down 23 hours a day and spent the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort. Iqbal pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to Pakistan. He then filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and former federal officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, as well as 19 John Doe corrections officers. The complaint concentrated on his treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU and alleged that petitioners designated him a person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin. The complaint alleged that the FBI under Mueller’s direction arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the September 11 investigation, that the policy of holding post-September-11 detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared by the FBI was approved by Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after September 11, and that petitioners each knew of, condoned, and willfully agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions solely on account of his religion, race, and national origin. It named Ashcroft as the principal architect of the policy and identified Mueller as instrumental in its adoption, promulgation, and implementation. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations showing their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The District Court denied the motion. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal, and while the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over, but respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. Deputy Timothy Scott heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by police vehicles from the pursuing officers. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway. Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a Precision Intervention Technique maneuver. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to go ahead and take him out. Scott instead applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle. As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed, rendering respondent quadriplegic. Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow respondent's Fourth Amendment claim to proceed to trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The record includes a videotape capturing the events in question.

In July 1975, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, located in Greensboro, North Carolina, entered into a contract with Mercury Construction Corporation, whose principal place of business is in Alabama, for the construction of additions to the Hospital building. The contract included a broad arbitration clause requiring that all claims, disputes, and other matters arising out of or relating to the contract or its breach be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Construction began in July 1975 and was substantially completed in February 1979. At an October 1977 meeting during construction, Mercury agreed at the Architect's request to withhold its claims for delay and impact costs until the work was substantially completed. In January 1980, Mercury submitted its claims to the Architect, and the parties discussed them over several months. On August 12, 1980, Mercury gave a detailed presentation of its claims at a meeting attended by representatives and lawyers for both parties and the Architect. On October 6, 1980, the Hospital's counsel informed Mercury's counsel that the Hospital would pay nothing on the claim and intended to file a declaratory judgment action in North Carolina state court. On October 8, 1980, the Hospital filed an action in the Superior Court of Guilford County, North Carolina, naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants. The complaint sought a declaration that there was no right to arbitration, a stay of arbitration, and declarations regarding the Hospital's liability and potential indemnity from the Architect. The complaint was served on Mercury on October 9, 1980, the same day Mercury mailed a demand for arbitration. On October 15, 1980, the Hospital obtained an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding Mercury from taking steps toward arbitration, which was dissolved on October 27, 1980. Immediately after the injunction was lifted, Mercury filed an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, seeking an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. On the Hospital's motion, the District Court stayed Mercury's federal suit pending resolution of the state-court suit. Mercury sought review by notice of appeal and petition for mandamus. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, reversed the stay order, and remanded with instructions to enter an order to arbitrate. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.