Also known as:economic impacts of the regulation · economic impact of regulations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factor in regulatory takings analysis that examines the degree to which a government regulation diminishes the value or utility of the claimant's property. Courts weigh this factor together with interference with investment-backed expectations and the character of the governmental action. The factor focuses on the magnitude of any loss in economic use or return while leaving the owner with a reasonable beneficial use.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Landmark Height Limit on Air Rights
Grand Rail Trust bought air rights above a historic depot intending a sixty-story tower. The city then capped new construction at three stories to preserve the landmark. The trust can still build a profitable three-story office and retail project. The economic impact factor weighs against a taking because the regulation leaves a reasonable beneficial use and does not destroy all economic value.
Cable Installation on Apartment Building
A landlord owns a Manhattan apartment building. The city requires permanent installation of cable television equipment on the roof. The equipment occupies only a small portion of the building yet prevents the landlord from using that space for other purposes. The economic impact is minimal because the regulation affects only a tiny fraction of the property and leaves the building's primary rental use intact.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Lucas purchased two beachfront lots for residential development. The state then enacted a law barring all construction on the lots to protect the shoreline. The ban eliminated any economically beneficial use of the parcels. The economic impact factor supports a categorical taking because the regulation leaves the owner with no productive use of the land.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation.
Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures.
Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
A coal company owns subsurface rights and plans to extract coal that would cause surface subsidence. State law requires the company to leave fifty percent of the coal in place to prevent damage to surface structures. The company can still mine the remaining coal at a profit. The economic impact is not severe enough to constitute a taking because the regulation leaves a viable mining operation.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis480 U.S. 470 (1987)
In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act to address land subsidence caused by underground coal mining. The Act authorizes the Department of Environmental Resources to implement and enforce a comprehensive program preventing or minimizing subsidence and consequent damage to surface structures. Section 4 prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries, and generally requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath such structures remain in place to provide surface support.
Petitioners are an association of coal producers and several of its member corporations engaged in underground bituminous coal mining in western Pennsylvania. They own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and associated support estates beneath surface properties affected by the Subsidence Act. Many of these interests were severed from the surface estate between 1890 and 1920, and petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired waivers of liability for subsidence damage along with rights to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, and erect surface facilities.
In 1982 petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Resources and other officials. They sought to enjoin enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations, alleging that Section 4 and Section 6 effected a taking of their property without compensation and that Section 6 impaired their contractual obligations. The parties entered a stipulation of facts concerning the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department officials. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional challenges to the Subsidence Act.
Petitioners have never claimed that the Subsidence Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania, nor have they identified any specific mine rendered unprofitable by the statute. The evidence in the record shows that enforcement of the 50 percent rule has required petitioners to leave less than 27 million tons of coal in place. This applies across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons. It amounts to less than 2 percent of the total coal in those operations.
Eastern Enterprises previously operated coal mines but later sold its operations. A federal statute assigns Eastern liability for health benefits of miners it never employed. The liability reaches hundreds of millions of dollars with no corresponding benefit to Eastern. The economic impact factor weighs heavily toward finding the statute effects a taking.
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel524 U.S. 498, 557-58 (1998)
Eastern Enterprises was organized as a Massachusetts business trust in 1929 under the name Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates. Until 1965, Eastern conducted extensive coal mining operations centered in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. As a signatory to each National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement executed between 1947 and 1964, Eastern made contributions of over $60 million to the 1947 and 1950 Welfare and Retirement Funds.
In 1963, Eastern decided to transfer its coal-related operations to a subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. The transfer was completed by the end of 1965. It was described in Eastern's federal income tax return as an agreement by EACC to assume all of Eastern's liabilities arising out of coal mining and marketing operations in exchange for Eastern's receipt of EACC's stock. Eastern retained its stock interest in EACC through a subsidiary corporation, Coal Properties Corp., until 1987. It received dividends of more than $100 million from EACC during that period. In 1987, Eastern sold its interest in Coal Properties Corp. to Peabody Holding Company, Inc.
Following enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security assigned to Eastern the obligation for Combined Fund premiums respecting over 1,000 retired miners who had worked for the company before 1966. The assignment rested on Eastern's status as the pre-1978 signatory operator for whom the miners had worked for the longest period of time. Eastern's premium for a 12-month period exceeded $5 million.
Eastern responded by suing the Commissioner, as well as the Combined Fund and its trustees, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Eastern asserted that the Coal Act, either on its face or as applied, violates substantive due process and constitutes a taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Chevron owns gas stations in Hawaii and leases them to dealers. A state law caps the rent Chevron may charge dealers. Chevron continues to earn a reasonable return on its investment in the stations. The economic impact factor does not support a taking because the regulation leaves Chevron with profitable ongoing operations.
Lingle, et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)
In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers.
Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership.
Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.
How does the economic impact factor interact with the other Penn Central factors?
Courts weigh the economic impact of the regulation together with interference with investment-backed expectations and the character of the governmental action. A severe economic impact alone does not establish a taking when the regulation advances a legitimate public purpose and leaves reasonable beneficial use. The three factors are balanced on an ad hoc basis rather than applied as a rigid formula.
Supporting sources
Does a substantial reduction in potential profit always trigger the economic impact factor in favor of a taking?
No. A reduction in expected profit is relevant but not conclusive. Courts require that the regulation leave the owner without a reasonable beneficial use before the economic impact factor supports a taking. Many land-use regulations that lower profitability are upheld when viable economic use remains.
Supporting sources
What evidence shows that economic impact is not severe enough to support a taking?
Evidence that the owner can still operate the property profitably or lease it at a reasonable market return demonstrates that economic impact is not severe. Continued positive cash flow or a viable alternative use after the regulation weighs against finding a taking even when value declines substantially.
Supporting sources
438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
…they effect a taking. In deciding this question, we have identified several factors that are particularly significant. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action are all relevant. A The…