durational residency

California participates in the federal AFDC program under the Social Security Act. In 1992 California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. That statute limited the maximum AFDC benefits payable to any family that had resided in California for less than twelve months to the amount the family would have received in its state of prior residence. In one year the AFDC program served an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual state cost of $2.9 billion. The full monthly grant for a family of two was $456, compared with $275 in Arizona. Three California residents who had recently moved from Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado filed suit in the Eastern District of California. They alleged that their grants would be reduced from $641 or $504 to $190, $341, or $280 for the first year. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Anderson v. Green because the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not yet determined whether the statute complied with federal requirements. After the Secretary issued a waiver the case was dismissed. In 1996 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. That statute replaced AFDC with TANF and expressly authorized states to apply the benefit rules of a family’s prior state for the first twelve months of residence. California then announced that enforcement of section 11450.03 would begin April 1, 1997. On that date two new plaintiffs, one who had moved from Oklahoma and one from the District of Columbia, filed the present action in the Eastern District of California. They acted on behalf of a certified class of all present and future TANF applicants who would be denied full California benefits because they had not resided in the state for twelve consecutive months. The district court again issued a temporary restraining order and, after hearing evidence, a preliminary injunction. The evidence showed that California’s benefits ranked sixth highest in absolute terms but eighteenth when housing costs were considered. New residents from forty-three states would face higher living costs. The statute would save the state approximately $10.9 million annually. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction without finally deciding the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The All County Letter implementing the statute provided that even lifelong California residents who left the state for part of a year would have their benefits calculated under the law of the other state for that period. The lower benefit level applied regardless of whether the family had received welfare in the prior state or the motive for moving. Families arriving from another country were exempt. The district court noted that other programs such as homeless assistance and an extra food-stamp allowance partially offset the disparity. The state did not dispute that the statute created significant differences between newcomers and longer-term residents.

In 1972 the Alaska Legislature enacted the Local Hire Under State Leases Act, known as Alaska Hire, which directed that all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements, and any renegotiations of those instruments to which the state was a party must require the employment of qualified Alaska residents in preference to nonresidents. The Act was administered by issuing resident cards to persons who satisfied the statutory definition of resident, which at the time of suit included a one-year durational residency requirement together with maintenance of a state residence, establishment of voting residency, and an intent to remain permanently. Appellants, individuals who sought jobs covered by the Act but could not obtain the required resident cards, filed suit challenging the resident preference and the durational requirement. Although the statute had been on the books since 1972, it was not seriously enforced until 1975 when construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline reached its peak. On March 1, 1976, the Commissioner of Labor issued a cease-and-desist order to all unions supplying pipeline workers directing them to dispatch all qualified Alaska residents before dispatching any nonresidents. As a result, the appellants, all but one of whom had previously worked on the pipeline, were prevented from obtaining further pipeline-related employment. On April 28, 1976, appellants filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Anchorage seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Act. By agreement of the parties the motion for preliminary injunction was consolidated with the merits, and the case was submitted on affidavits, depositions, and memoranda of law without oral testimony. On July 21, 1976, the Superior Court upheld Alaska Hire in full and denied all relief. On appeal the Alaska Supreme Court unanimously held the one-year durational residency requirement unconstitutional under both state and federal equal protection guarantees and further held that any durational requirement exceeding thirty days was infirm. By a three-to-two vote, however, the court sustained the Act's general preference for Alaska residents. Appellants appealed only that portion of the judgment, and the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1977. Five of the appellants swore they were not residents of Alaska. They therefore could not satisfy the element of the residency definition that required an individual not to have claimed residency in another state during the period of required residency. This preserved a continuing controversy between those appellants and the state officials.

James Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employment as an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University in Nashville. With an eye toward voting in the upcoming August and November elections, he attempted to register to vote on July 1, 1970. The county registrar refused to register him on the ground that Tennessee law authorizes the registration of only those persons who, at the time of the next election, will have been residents of the State for a year and residents of the county for three months. After exhausting state administrative remedies, Blumstein brought this action challenging these residence requirements on federal constitutional grounds. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, concluded that Tennessee’s durational residence requirements were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Tennessee appeals from the decision by a three-judge federal court holding that Tennessee’s durational residence requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The issue arises in a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by appellee James Blumstein. Tennessee insists that, in addition to being a resident, a would-be voter must have been a resident for a year in the State and three months in the county. It is this additional durational residence requirement that appellee challenges.