Also known as: standing doctrine · standing · locus standi
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional doctrine requiring a plaintiff to show a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Damian Decker sued a federal agency alleging that mental-health policies injured him and all citizens equally by failing to fund treatment programs. He could not identify any personal concrete harm distinct from the public at large. The court dismissed for lack of standing because no particularized injury was shown.
Diane Dawson sued a federal regulator claiming that lax oversight of inspectors caused her financial loss on a home purchase. She demonstrated a concrete personal injury traceable to the agency's inaction. The court found standing because a favorable ruling would likely redress the harm through damages.
Dakota Industries challenged a federal permitting decision affecting its business operations. The company alleged only a general policy disagreement shared by the industry. The court held that standing was absent because no concrete and particularized injury to the plaintiff was established.
Devon Drake sued federal officials whose policy allegedly caused his loss of professional license. Evidence showed the harm was directly traceable to the defendants' conduct. The court recognized standing because all three elements, including causation, were satisfied.
Duffy Construction alleged that a federal rule change would cause it direct competitive injury. The company showed that invalidating the rule would likely remedy its harm. The court upheld standing after confirming a redressable personal stake.
Dolores Diaz and other members of an advocacy group sued federal agencies over plans affecting overseas wildlife habitats. They alleged future harm from potential visits but could not show imminent injury to themselves. The court dismissed the action for lack of standing because no plaintiff demonstrated a redressable personal stake.
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas. Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad. Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA plaintiff must show a concrete and particularized injury, causation linking the injury to the defendant's conduct, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury.
No. The injury must be particularized to the plaintiff rather than a diffuse harm common to the public at large.
Yes. A plaintiff must maintain a personal interest throughout the litigation. If the case becomes moot, standing effectively disappears.
…District Court for the Northern District of Texas, to which the action was referred, held that the Does and Hallford had no standing to sue, but that Roe did have standing, and that the Texas abortion laws were unconstitutional. The court declared the laws void but refused to issue an injunction against their…