Chesapeake Corporation, a Virginia corporation, and Shorewood Packaging Corporation, a Delaware corporation, both operated in the specialty packaging industry. As of early 1999 each company had identified the other as an acquisition candidate. On October 26, 1999, Shorewood's board approved an all-cash $40 per share offer for Chesapeake representing a 41% premium to the then-depressed market price. Chesapeake's board rejected the offer as inadequate after a November 3 meeting.
On November 10, 1999, Chesapeake proposed to acquire all of Shorewood for $16.50 per share, a 40% premium. After telephone meetings on November 16 and 18, 1999, at which no written financial materials were provided, the Shorewood board rejected the offer. At the November 18 meeting the board adopted a package of defensive bylaws that eliminated stockholders' ability to call special meetings, removed directors without cause, and imposed a 66 2/3% supermajority requirement to amend the bylaws. The supermajority threshold was later lowered to 60% on January 5, 2000. Shorewood already had a poison pill in place and a classified board.
On November 26, 1999, Chesapeake entered into an agreement with Ariel Capital Management to purchase 14.9% of Shorewood's shares at $17.25 per share together with upside protection in any future majority transaction. On December 3, 1999, Chesapeake commenced a $17.25 all-cash tender offer, a consent solicitation to eliminate the classified board, remove the sitting directors, and elect a new board, and this lawsuit challenging the supermajority bylaw. Shorewood's board rejected the tender offer at December meetings and mounted a counter-solicitation.
Shorewood's nine-member board included six directors with substantial financial or personal ties to CEO Marc Shore that rendered them non-independent. The board invoked attorney-client and business-strategy privileges throughout the litigation and declined to have Marc Shore or other key insiders testify at the mid-January 2000 trial. Management insiders controlled nearly 24% of Shorewood's stock at all relevant times.
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