Also known as:descent & distribution · intestate succession
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The statutory rules that determine how a decedent's property passes to heirs when the decedent dies without a valid will that disposes of all assets. These rules historically distinguished descent of real property from distribution of personal property but now apply uniformly to both. The scheme identifies surviving spouses, descendants, and other relatives in a fixed order of priority and allocates shares by representation.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Class Gift Distributed by Intestacy Shares
Deborah Dunn's will created a class gift of farmland to her descendants without specifying shares. At her death the surviving descendants included two children and three grandchildren whose parent had predeceased. The court applied the governing statute and awarded each living descendant the share that would have passed under intestate succession had Deborah died owning the land at that moment.
Title Passes Without Deed on Intestacy
Diana Delgado died owning a warehouse and several vehicles. No will was found. Under the applicable statute the warehouse passed directly to her sole surviving child by operation of law. The personal representative later executed a deed only to perfect record title. The statute itself transferred ownership of both real and personal property.
Dwight Dorsey died owning land in a state whose probate statute required foreign heirs to appear personally or post bond. The statute's application to nonresident heirs triggered constitutional review because it interfered with federal foreign-relations authority while still operating as the state's default descent and distribution scheme.
Zschernig v. Miller389 U.S. 429, 88 S. Ct. 664, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1968)
An Oregon resident died intestate in 1962, leaving an estate that included both real and personal property. The decedent's sole heirs, who resided in East Germany, sought to inherit under Oregon probate proceedings. Members of the Oregon State Land Board petitioned the probate court for escheat of the net proceeds of the estate under Oregon Revised Statutes § 111.070.
The statute conditioned a nonresident alien's right to inherit on proof of three requirements. One requirement was the existence of a reciprocal right of United States citizens to take property on the same terms as citizens or inhabitants of the foreign country. Another was the right of United States citizens to receive payment within the United States of funds originating from estates in the foreign country. A third was the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds without confiscation in whole or in part by the foreign government. The burden rested on the nonresident alien to establish these facts. The provision concerning confiscation had been added to the statute in 1951, expanding upon earlier general reciprocity language.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that Article IV of the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany permitted the East German heirs to take the real property but, following Clark v. Allen, did not permit them to take the personal property. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
In applying the statute in this and related cases, Oregon courts examined the credibility of diplomatic statements from communist-controlled countries, the discretion exercised by foreign banking authorities in issuing licenses for fund transfers, and the political structures under which foreign inheritance laws operated. The Department of Justice appeared as amicus curiae and stated that it did not contend the application of the statute in this case unduly interfered with the United States' conduct of foreign relations.
David Dawson's will directed that his residence be destroyed after his death. The court refused to enforce the condition and instead allowed the property to pass under the state's descent and distribution statute to Dawson's heirs as though he had died intestate with respect to that asset.
Estate of Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences.
Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate.
Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community.
During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity.
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Demetrius Douglas died intestate survived by an acknowledged nonmarital child. The state's descent statute barred the child from inheriting. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and required that the child receive the same intestate share that a marital child would have taken under the same statute.
Trimble v. Gordon430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977)
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child.
Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
Dylan Duffy inherited fractional interests in allotted Indian land. A federal statute caused the interests to escheat to the tribe upon Duffy's death because they were too small to descend under ordinary rules. The Court held the statute effected a taking by eliminating the right to pass the property by descent and distribution.
Hodel v. Irving481 U.S. 704 (1987)
In the late 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land acts that divided communal Indian reservations into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. The Act of March 2, 1889, allotted 320 acres to each male Sioux head of household and 160 acres to most other individuals on the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation, with the allotted lands held in trust by the United States.
Ownership of these allotted lands fragmented over successive generations into numerous undivided interests, with some parcels having hundreds of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew over time.
This created administrative difficulties and economic waste. A 1928 report and comprehensive 1960 House and Senate studies indicated that one-half of approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated ownership. In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Section 207 provided that no undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to the tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat. The provision was signed into law on January 12, 1983, and became effective immediately, with no compensation provided to owners of escheated interests.
Four enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe died in 1983 while owning fractional interests subject to the escheat provision. Chester Irving died on March 18, Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross died on March 23, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed died on April 2, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed died on June 23. Collectively the four decedents owned 41 such interests whose values included approximately $100 for the two interests lost by the Irving estate, approximately $2,700 for the 26 interests in the Cross estate, and approximately $1,816 for the 13 interests in the Pumpkin Seed estates.
The three appellees are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who are or represent heirs or devisees of the decedents. Mary Irving is the daughter of Chester Irving, Eileen Bissonette is the guardian for the five minor children of Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed is the son of Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed and nephew of Edgar Pumpkin Seed. But for the escheat provision the fractional interests would have passed to the appellees or those they represent. Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota claiming that the escheat provision resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
How does descent and distribution differ from a will?
Descent and distribution supplies the default statutory order of heirs when a decedent dies without a will or when the will fails to dispose of all property. A will allows the decedent to choose beneficiaries and shares. Descent and distribution imposes a fixed hierarchy beginning with the surviving spouse and descendants.
Does real property descend differently from personal property?
Modern statutes apply the same intestate scheme to both real and personal property. Historically descent governed land while distribution governed chattels, but the Uniform Probate Code and most states now use a single set of rules for all probate assets.
What happens when a will is silent about some assets?
Any property not effectively disposed of by will passes under the descent and distribution statute to the decedent's heirs. The will controls only the assets it expressly addresses. The remainder is distributed according to the intestacy scheme.
Can a class gift be distributed according to descent and distribution rules?
Yes. When a class gift to descendants or issue does not specify shares, the property is divided among living class members in the proportions they would receive if the designated ancestor had died intestate owning the property at the time the gift takes effect.
Supporting sources
430 U.S. 762 (1977)
…this case is the constitutionality of § 12 of the Illinois Probate Act which allows illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Under Illinois law, legitimate children are allowed to inherit by intestate succession from both their mothers and their fathers. I Appellant Deta…