Also known as: color blind · colorblind · colour-blind · race-neutral
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional principle requiring that government classifications and actions remain neutral with respect to race. The principle bars official recognition of racial categories in the distribution of benefits or burdens unless the classification survives strict scrutiny. It rests on the view that the Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens when civil rights are at stake.
Cody Callahan, a criminal defendant, noticed that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove every Black venire member. Callahan made a prima facie showing of racial motivation. The prosecutor then had to supply a race-neutral reason for each strike, and the trial court evaluated whether purposeful discrimination had occurred.
Cassandra Cooper and other voters challenged a congressional district drawn with highly irregular boundaries that grouped residents almost exclusively by race. They argued the map violated their right to a color-blind electoral process. The court examined whether race had been the predominant factor in the districting decision.
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Charlotte Chung's children were denied transfer to a preferred public school because the district used race as a tiebreaker to achieve demographic balance. Chung sued, claiming the assignment plan treated students differently solely on the basis of race. The court required the district to justify the explicit racial classification under strict scrutiny.
Christian Coleman, a white defendant, objected when the prosecutor struck Black prospective jurors. Coleman asserted that the race-based strikes violated the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors themselves. The court recognized his standing to raise the claim even though he did not share the jurors' race.
Christopher Collins, a Black passenger, refused to move to a designated rail car under a state law requiring racial separation. He argued that the statute imposed a racial classification forbidden by the Constitution. The court upheld the law, treating it as a reasonable regulation of civil rights rather than a violation of equality.
Charles Cunningham and other firefighters passed a promotional exam, but the city discarded the results because too few minority candidates had scored high enough. Cunningham sued, claiming the decision to disregard the test constituted an impermissible racial classification. The court required the city to show a strong basis in evidence of its own past discrimination before discarding race-neutral test outcomes.
No. The principle subjects every explicit racial classification to strict scrutiny, but it does not impose an absolute bar. A classification survives only if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest, such as remedying the government's own proven past discrimination.
The principle treats a private litigant's use of peremptory strikes in a civil jury trial as state action because jury selection is a traditional governmental function performed under court supervision. Race-based strikes therefore violate equal protection and must be disallowed once a prima facie case is shown.
The government must produce a strong basis in evidence of its own identified past discrimination in the relevant industry or program. Generalized assertions of societal discrimination or statistical underrepresentation alone are insufficient to justify a racial classification.
…to this case necessarily be incompatible with our equal protection cases. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge , 458 U. S. 613, 618 (1982) (race-neutral law that “‘bears more heavily on one race than another’” may violate equal protection) (citation omitted); Castaneda v. Partida , 430 U. S. 482, 492-495 (1977) (grand jury selection). We…