Also known as: class suits · class-suit · class action
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A civil action brought by one or more representative plaintiffs on behalf of a larger group of persons who share common questions of law or fact. The representatives must satisfy the prerequisites of typicality and adequate representation while meeting one of the maintainability conditions that justify binding absent class members to the judgment.
Claire Campbell and other homeowners sue a developer for identical construction defects in a subdivision. Separate suits would risk conflicting rulings on the same warranty obligations. The court certifies the case as a class suit under the rule allowing collective resolution to avoid incompatible standards for the developer.
Cassandra Cooper brings a diversity suit in federal court seeking interest on late payments under New York law that bars class treatment. The court applies the federal class certification standard rather than the state prohibition. The action proceeds as a class suit because the federal rule governs procedure without altering substantive rights.
Chloe Chen sues a factory on behalf of nearby residents for interference with use of their land. The complaint alleges the emissions affect the entire neighborhood identically. The court permits the case to proceed as a class suit because the representative meets the standing requirements for collective public-nuisance claims.
Christopher Collins files suit against an employer for unpaid overtime on behalf of all hourly workers at multiple sites. Common proof of the pay policy outweighs individual damages calculations. The court certifies the case as a class suit after determining that collective adjudication is superior to thousands of separate actions.
Cody Callahan and other property owners challenge a prior judgment enforcing a racial covenant they never signed. The earlier suit had been treated as binding on all owners in the neighborhood. The court refuses to treat the prior proceeding as a class suit that can preclude their challenge.
In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement. The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race. It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race. The district included fifty-seven parcels of land. The signers held title to forty-seven parcels. At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882. On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction. On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title. The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement. In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy. The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions. The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots. By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court. The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseCaleb Chang, a physician, seeks to intervene in a challenge to state abortion restrictions. The complaint references similarly situated doctors and patients but does not assert a class suit. The court treats the case as an individual action because no class allegations were properly pleaded.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseThe plaintiff must first satisfy the four prerequisites in Rule 23(a). The action must then fit one of the three categories in Rule 23(b), such as a risk of inconsistent adjudications or predominance of common questions.
No. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class certification in federal court even when a conflicting state rule would deny class status. The rule is valid under the Rules Enabling Act because it regulates procedure without modifying substantive rights.
Rule 23(c)(4) permits certification with respect to particular issues when doing so would materially advance the litigation. The court may limit the class action to those issues while leaving remaining questions for individual proceedings.
In Rule 23(b)(3) actions, notice must be given so that class members may opt out. The form and cost of notice are subject to court supervision, and the judgment description must clearly identify who is bound.
…follow if Dr. Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and makes no reference to any class apart from an allegation that he "and others similarly situated" must necessarily guess at the meaning of Art. 1196. His application for leave to…