Also known as: class certifications · class-certification · class action certification
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court order approving the treatment of a civil action as a class action. The order is issued after the court determines that the proposed class satisfies the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and fits within one of the categories in Rule 23(b).
Chloe Chen, an independent pharmacy owner, filed a diversity action in federal court against a drug manufacturer seeking only statutory interest on late rebate payments. A state statute barred class actions for such interest claims. The court applied Rule 23 to decide certification and disregarded the state prohibition because the federal rule controlled the procedural question.
Craig Caldwell and other female employees sued their retail employer alleging that local managers' discretionary pay and promotion decisions produced a pattern of sex discrimination. The court denied certification because the plaintiffs could not show a common question of law or fact that could be resolved for the class as a whole.
In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
View caseCorinne Cho filed a class action challenging a state durational residency requirement for divorce. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court her individual claim had become moot, yet the Court held that the class action could proceed because certification had already occurred and the class retained a live controversy.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
View caseCassandra Cooper purchased stock after the company issued statements denying merger talks. When talks later surfaced and the stock price dropped, she sought class certification. The court applied the fraud-on-the-market presumption to find that reliance was common to the class, supporting certification.
Basic Incorporated was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in manufacturing chemical refractories for the steel industry. As early as 1965 or 1966 Combustion Engineering expressed interest in acquiring Basic but was deterred by antitrust concerns. In 1976 regulatory action removed the antitrust barrier and Combustion's strategic plan listed an objective to acquire Basic for thirty million dollars. Beginning in September 1976 Combustion representatives met and spoke by telephone with Basic officers and directors about a possible merger. During 1977 and 1978 Basic issued three public statements denying that merger negotiations were under way. On December 18 1978 Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its shares and announced it had been approached by another company concerning a merger. The next day Basic's board endorsed Combustion's offer of forty-six dollars per share. On December 20 1978 Basic publicly announced approval of Combustion's tender offer for all outstanding shares. Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's October 21 1977 public statement and before the December 1978 trading suspension. Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors alleging that the three statements violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by misleading the market and causing sales at artificially depressed prices. The District Court certified the class under a presumption of reliance but granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that any misstatements were immaterial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseCecilia Cabrera alleged that telecommunications carriers conspired to allocate markets and avoid competition. The complaint contained only parallel conduct and no facts showing an agreement. The court denied class certification because the pleading failed to state a plausible claim that could be litigated on a classwide basis.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseCurtis Cannon and other older employees challenged workforce reductions that disproportionately affected workers over forty. The employer raised the reasonable-factor-other-than-age defense. The court addressed class certification only after confirming that the defense required individualized proof that could defeat predominance.
In January 1997 an opt-in class of plaintiffs filed complaints in the Northern District of New York against Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, its parent Lockheed Martin, Inc., and its president and general manager John J. Freeh alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact age discrimination under the ADEA and New York Human Rights Law arising from a 1996 involuntary reduction-in-force that terminated the employment of twenty-eight plaintiffs. Nine plaintiffs later settled their claims. After a bifurcated trial on liability and damages that began June 20, 2000, the jury returned verdicts for defendants on all disparate treatment claims, for twenty-six plaintiffs on their disparate impact claims under both statutes, and awarded a total of $5,077,285.33 in damages. The district court denied defendants' post-trial motions but granted remittitur, reducing the total award including interest to $4,172,547.89, and entered the Second Amended Judgment on March 28, 2002. Defendants appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment in August 2004. While defendants' petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. City of Jackson and then vacated the affirmance and remanded. On remand the Second Circuit in August 2006 vacated the judgment and directed entry of judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari; the Supreme Court granted the petition and in June 2008 vacated the Second Circuit's 2006 decision and remanded for further proceedings. On remand the Second Circuit in January 2009 directed the district court to address three questions concerning the reasonable-factors-other-than-age defense. The parties agreed no additional discovery was needed and the questions should be decided on the existing record. Defendants had pleaded the RFOA provision as their Second Defense in their February 1997 answer but never mentioned the defense again in their summary judgment papers, trial memorandum, opening or closing arguments, Rule 50 motions, proposed jury instructions, charge conference, or objections to the verdict form, and first raised the defense again on the second appeal in 2005.
View caseYes. A valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that directly addresses class certification governs in federal court even if a conflicting state statute would produce a different result. The Rules Enabling Act inquiry focuses on whether the federal rule regulates procedure without altering substantive rights.
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The plaintiff must demonstrate that there is at least one question of law or fact common to the class that is capable of classwide resolution. Discretionary decisions by individual supervisors do not automatically create commonality when the reasons for each decision may differ.
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Yes, provided the class has already been certified. Once certification occurs the class acquires an independent legal status that keeps the case alive even if the representative's personal stake ends.
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A court may alter or amend an order granting or denying class certification at any time before final judgment. The order is therefore tentative and does not bind the court or the parties on the merits.
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…certainty, to become a merger agreement in principle." The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the class certification, but reversed the District Court's summary judgment, and remanded the case. 786 F. 2d 741 (1986). The court reasoned that while petitioners were under no general duty to disclose their…