Also known as: class-action certification · class certification · certification of a class action · Rule 23 certification
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A judicial determination that a lawsuit satisfies the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and may proceed on behalf of a class. The order identifies the class, appoints class counsel, and defines the claims and defenses subject to class treatment. An order granting or denying certification may be altered before final judgment.
Cody Callahan, a New York resident, files a diversity action in federal court seeking recovery of interest on consumer claims against a national bank. A New York statute would deny class status for such interest-recovery suits. The district court applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to evaluate the motion and certifies the class because the federal rule controls and does not abridge any substantive right.
Christopher Collins and other parents sue a school district alleging that a moment-of-silence policy violates the Establishment Clause. They move to certify a class of all similarly situated families in the district. The court examines the Rule 23 requirements and grants certification, allowing the named plaintiffs to litigate the constitutional claim on behalf of the defined class.
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View caseCynthia Cortez and other female employees sue Cascade Manufacturing alleging gender discrimination in promotion decisions. They seek class certification for all female employees nationwide. The court denies certification because the plaintiffs fail to show that common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues of managerial discretion.
In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the availability of class certification in diversity cases. Under the Rules Enabling Act the rule is valid because it regulates procedure and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. The federal rule therefore displaces the state statute that would otherwise bar class treatment.
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…and globally, women employed at Wal-Mart’s stores. Rule 23(a)(2), setting a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for class-action certification, demands nothing further. II A The Court gives no credence to the key dispute common to the class: whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are…
…for summary judgment on the Mexican law claim. The court then bifurcated the proceedings: it determined the due process and class action certification issues before holding a trial on the merits. During the due process phase, the court dismissed most of the plaintiffs. The court determined that seven of the plaintiffs could pursue their…
…judgment on its fair use defense. Plaintiffs cross-moved in the district court for summary judgment. On the appeal from the class certification, our court — questioning whether it was reasonable to infer that the putative
…the Ohio Supreme Court merely reaffirmed its recognition of the right and devoted the remainder of its opinion to the issue of class action certification. Vinci was an Olympic gold medal weight lifter who brought a
An order granting or denying class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(C). The flexibility permits the court to respond to developments in the litigation while the case remains pending.
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A party must file a petition for permission to appeal within fourteen days after entry of the order granting or denying certification. The fourteen-day period extends to forty-five days when the United States or a federal officer or agency is a party. The appeal does not automatically stay district court proceedings.
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A private citizen may proceed in a representative capacity through a properly constituted class action to abate a public nuisance without proving harm different in kind from that suffered by the general public. Certification under Rule 23 supplies the representative authority that would otherwise be lacking.
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