Also known as: Child Support Recovery Act · CSRA
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal criminal statute that prohibits any person from willfully failing to pay a child support obligation with respect to a child residing in another state when the obligation has remained unpaid for longer than one year or exceeds five thousand dollars.
Christopher Collins resides in State A and earns wages there after separating from his former spouse. Their child now lives with the former spouse in State C. Collins has made no payments on a support order for over two years. Prosecutors file charges in the District of State C. The court denies his motion to dismiss because the continuing failure to pay extends the offense to the district where the child resides and the obligation is owed.
Cecilia Cabrera lives in State X and receives her salary there while her child resides in State Y under a support order. She has ignored all payment demands for several years. Federal prosecutors charge her under the statute. The interstate residence of the child supplies the necessary connection that allows Congress to address the nonpayment through this criminal provision.
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women. Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment. In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university. The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
View caseConnor Clark maintains his home and bank account in State P after his divorce. His child lives with the former spouse in State Q. Clark receives regular wages yet refuses to arrange any transfers for support over multiple years. The government brings a prosecution under the statute in federal court. The multi-year interstate failure satisfies the elements for criminal liability.
In June 2003 a South Carolina family court entered an order requiring petitioner Michael Turner to pay respondent Rebecca Rogers $51.73 per week to help support their child. Rogers' father Larry Price currently has custody of the child and is also a respondent before this Court. Over the next three years Turner repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in contempt on five occasions. The first four times he was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment but ultimately paid what he owed. He paid twice without being jailed and twice after spending a few days in custody. The fifth time he did not pay but completed a six-month sentence. After his release Turner remained in arrears. On March 27, 2006 the family court clerk issued a new show cause order because Turner was $5,728.76 behind. Following an initial postponement due to Turner's failure to appear, his civil contempt hearing took place on January 3, 2008. Turner and Rogers were both present without representation by counsel. The court clerk stated the arrearage amount. The judge asked Turner if there was anything he wanted to say. Turner described getting back on drugs after release, breaking his back in September, filing for disability and SSI benefits, and hoping for another chance. The judge then asked Rogers if she had anything to say. The judge found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to twelve months in the Oconee County Detention Center. Turner could purge the contempt by reaching a zero balance. The judge completed a prewritten Order for Contempt of Court form but left blank the statement indicating whether Turner was gainfully employed and had the ability to make support payments when due. Turner served the full sentence. While serving the sentence Turner appealed with pro bono counsel claiming a federal constitutional right to counsel at the contempt hearing. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the claim after Turner completed his sentence. Turner sought certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court granted review. Within months of his release from the twelve-month imprisonment Turner was again the subject of civil contempt proceedings. He had arrears of $13,814.72 as of December 2010. Another hearing was scheduled for May 2011.
View caseVenue lies in any district where the offense was begun, continued, or completed. Because the statute addresses a continuing failure to pay support owed to a child in another state, the district where the child resides and feels the ongoing harm qualifies as a proper venue even if the defendant never entered that district.
Liability arises when a person willfully fails to pay a support obligation for a child living in another state and the unpaid amount exceeds five thousand dollars or has remained unpaid for more than one year. The statute focuses on the interstate character of the nonpayment and the willful nature of the omission.
The statute criminalizes willful nonpayment precisely when the child resides in a different state from the obligated parent. This interstate element allows federal prosecution of cases that state enforcement mechanisms often cannot reach effectively.
Supporting sources
…movement of some relevant object, thereby regulating local criminal activity or, for that matter, family affairs. See, e. g. , Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U. S. C. § 228. Although this possibility does not give the Federal Government the power to regulate everything, it means that any substantive limitation will apply randomly in terms of…