Also known as: cedes · ceded · ceding · cedent · cedents · cession · cessions · reinsurance cede · cede rights
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
To transfer sovereignty, jurisdiction, or rights from one party to another, typically by treaty, statute, or agreement, thereby binding the transferring party to forgo future exercise of the surrendered power.
Charlotte Chung, a textile importer in New York, challenges a federal excise on imported fabric that applies only to shipments entering East Coast ports. Congress enacts the levy under its Article I power and refuses to extend the same rate to Gulf ports. The court upholds the statute because the taxing power does not require states to cede any portion of their own revenue authority to the federal government.
Connor Clark sues a rival for infringing his patented diagnostic device. At trial the parties dispute the meaning of the term "sample chamber." The district judge construes the claim rather than submitting the question to the jury, exercising the judicial authority that precedent assigns to the court instead of ceding it to lay fact-finders.
Markman owns United States Reissue Patent No. 33,054 for his Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores. The patent describes a system that can monitor and report the status, location, and movement of clothing in a dry-cleaning establishment. The Markman system consists of a keyboard and data processor to generate written records for each transaction, including a bar code readable by optical detectors operated by employees, who log the progress of clothing through the dry-cleaning process. Respondent Westview's product also includes a keyboard and processor, and it lists charges for the dry-cleaning services on bar-coded tickets that can be read by portable optical detectors. Markman brought an infringement suit against Westview and Althon Enterprises, an operator of dry-cleaning establishments using Westview’s products. Part of the dispute hinged upon the meaning of the word inventory, a term found in Markman’s independent claim 1, which states that Markman’s product can maintain an inventory total and detect and localize spurious additions to inventory. The case was tried before a jury, which heard, among others, a witness produced by Markman who testified about the meaning of the claim language. After the jury compared the patent to Westview’s device, it found an infringement of Markman’s independent claim 1 and dependent claim 10. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Westview’s deferred motion for judgment as a matter of law. One of its reasons was that the term inventory in Markman’s patent encompasses both cash inventory and the actual physical inventory of articles of clothing. The court directed a verdict on the ground that Westview’s device does not have the means to maintain an inventory total. Markman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s judgment. Markman sought review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseCody Callahan, an army sergeant stationed in Japan, is accused of murdering his wife on base. Under the status-of-forces agreement the United States obtains exclusive jurisdiction and the Japanese government formally cedes any right to prosecute in its civilian courts.
Mrs. Clarice Covert, a civilian, killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an airbase in England where she was residing with him. Mrs. Dorothy Smith, also a civilian, killed her husband, a colonel in the United States Army, at a post in Japan where she was living with him. Both women were tried by courts-martial convened under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the offense of murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The court-martial that tried Mrs. Covert was composed of Air Force officers after charges were preferred by Air Force personnel. The judgment was affirmed by the Air Force Board of Review but reversed by the Court of Military Appeals on grounds related to the defense of insanity, leaving a retrial pending in the District of Columbia. Mrs. Smith was tried by an Army court-martial. Her conviction was approved by the Army Board of Review and the Court of Military Appeals, after which she was confined in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia. While Mrs. Covert was held pending retrial, her counsel petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. That court ordered her release. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Mrs. Smith's father petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia for habeas corpus relief on her behalf. That court denied the writ, and while an appeal was pending in the Fourth Circuit the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The two cases were consolidated for argument. An executive agreement between the United States and Great Britain permitted United States military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by American servicemen or their dependents. A similar administrative agreement governed jurisdiction in Japan. Both women were tried pursuant to Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which extends court-martial jurisdiction to persons accompanying the armed forces outside the continental United States subject to treaty or international law provisions.
View caseCecilia Cabrera, a former state employee, sues Maine in its own courts for unpaid overtime under federal law. Maine refuses to recognize congressional power to abrogate its immunity, arguing that the Constitution never authorized states to cede their traditional immunity in their own tribunals.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
View caseCynthia Cortez is convicted of assault. The judge finds that she used a firearm and imposes an enhanced sentence beyond the statutory maximum. The Supreme Court reverses because the legislature cannot cede to the judge the jury's historic role of determining facts that increase punishment.
In 1998, Ralph Howard Blakely abducted his estranged wife Yolanda from their orchard home in Grant County, Washington. He bound her with duct tape and forced her at knifepoint into a wooden box in the bed of his pickup truck while imploring her to dismiss divorce and trust proceedings. When their 13-year-old son Ralphy returned from school, Blakely ordered him to follow in another car under threat of harming Yolanda with a shotgun. Ralphy escaped at a gas station and sought help, but Blakely continued with Yolanda to a friend's house in Montana before his arrest. The State initially charged Blakely with first-degree kidnapping but reached a plea agreement that reduced the charge to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely entered a guilty plea admitting the elements of the reduced charge along with the domestic-violence and firearm allegations, but no other relevant facts. Washington law classified the offense as a class B felony carrying a statutory maximum of ten years, yet specified a standard sentencing range of 49 to 53 months for this offender score and offense level. At sentencing the State recommended a term within the standard range. After hearing Yolanda's account of the incident, the judge rejected the recommendation and conducted a three-day bench hearing that included testimony from Blakely, Yolanda, Ralphy, a police officer, and medical experts. The judge issued 32 findings of fact detailing the defendant's motivation, methods, and violation of a restraining order, then concluded that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty, a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor. The judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months, 37 months above the standard maximum. Blakely appealed, contending that the sentencing procedure deprived him of the right to jury determination of facts essential to his sentence. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the state supreme court's earlier rejection of a similar challenge, and the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the sentencing procedure under the Sixth Amendment.
View caseClaire Campbell is convicted under the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act for carrying a handgun near a high school. The Court invalidates the statute, holding that Congress may not regulate purely local, noncommercial activity by claiming authority the Constitution never ceded to the national government.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseCession transfers authority over persons or territory from one government to another, usually by treaty or statute. The ceding party loses the power to exercise the surrendered authority. In military contexts the receiving sovereign must still afford due process.
No. Limited partners owe no duties merely by holding that status. Any obligations arise only from the partnership agreement or from the duty of good faith when they exercise specific statutory rights. The law treats limited partners as passive investors who have ceded management to the general partner.
No. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to strip states of immunity in their own judicial systems. Early congressional practice and founding-era concerns confirm that states never ceded this immunity to the federal government.
Uniformity in patent scope requires that legal construction remain with the court. Allowing juries to decide claim meaning would produce inconsistent results across cases involving the same patent.
…well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, and other matters substantially affected commerce, the founding generation did not cede authority over all these activities to Congress. Hamilton, for instance, acknowledged that the Federal Government could not regulate agriculture and like concerns: "The administration of…