Also known as: capitale · capitalis · capital crime · capital punishment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A crime punishable by death. The classification triggers heightened procedural protections including the requirement of a grand jury indictment in federal cases and special rules governing expert mental health evidence and sentencing proceedings.
A crime punishable by death. The classification triggers heightened procedural protections including the requirement of a grand jury indictment in federal cases and special rules governing expert mental health evidence and sentencing proceedings.
Money or assets contributed to or invested in a business enterprise. The term distinguishes initial or agreed contributions from later advances that create reimbursement rights and from expenditures that may render a license irrevocable when made in reliance on representations about duration.
Money or assets contributed to or invested in a business enterprise. The term distinguishes initial or agreed contributions from later advances that create reimbursement rights and from expenditures that may render a license irrevocable when made in reliance on representations about duration.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Federal prosecutors charged Chloe Chen with a crime carrying the death penalty. Because the offense qualified as capital, the government presented the case to a grand jury before filing an indictment. The grand jury returned a true bill, satisfying the constitutional prerequisite for proceeding to trial.
Police questioned Carmen Choi for several hours after her arrest on capital murder charges. The officers obtained a detailed statement without first advising her of the right to remain silent. The statement was later suppressed because the interrogation occurred in a capital case without the required warnings.
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
View case1 common questions
A capital charge requires a grand jury indictment in federal court under the Fifth Amendment. Additional rules govern notice of mental health evidence, sealing of examination reports, and limits on using statements made during court-ordered examinations. These protections ensure heightened reliability in cases carrying the death penalty.
Supporting sources
Crestview Holdings granted Camila Cervantes a license to operate a facility on its land and represented that the arrangement would last at least ten years. Relying on that assurance, Camila spent substantial sums installing permanent equipment. When Crestview later sought to terminate the license, Camila remained entitled to continue operations long enough to recover her capital outlay.
Cameron Cruz and Cade Carpenter formed a partnership with each agreeing to contribute $50,000 in capital. Cameron later advanced an additional $30,000 to cover operating expenses. The partnership reimbursed Cameron for the excess advance, treating it as a loan that accrued interest from the date of payment.
In dissolving their marriage, the court apportioned assets between Corinne Cho and her spouse. The judge considered each party's opportunity to acquire future capital assets and income when deciding the final division. The resulting order reflected the statutory factors without regard to marital misconduct.
Cobalt Energy shareholders sued the company's officers in Delaware over alleged mismanagement. The plaintiffs attached the officers' shares of capital stock located in the state. The presence of that stock provided the basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.
On May 22, 1974, appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. The complaint named as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of one or both corporations. Heitner alleged that the individual defendants had violated their fiduciary duties by causing the corporations to engage in activities that resulted in a private antitrust judgment of over thirteen million dollars and a criminal contempt fine of six hundred thousand dollars, both arising from events in Oregon. The individual defendants resided primarily in Arizona and conducted their business there. Simultaneously with the complaint, Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366. The Court of Chancery granted the motion the same day and appointed a sequestrator who seized approximately eighty-two thousand shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen defendants, along with options belonging to two others and certain debentures, warrants, and stock unit credits. The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 deemed the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations to be in the state, allowing the sequestrator to place stop-transfer orders on the corporation's books. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately one point two million dollars. All twenty-eight defendants received notice of the suit by certified mail to their last known addresses and by publication in a New Castle County newspaper. The twenty-one defendants whose property had been seized entered special appearances and moved to quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. They argued that the ex parte sequestration procedure violated due process and that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments in a letter opinion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225 (1976). The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on February 22, 1977. The individual defendants whose property was seized became the appellants before the Court. Greyhound Corporation and its subsidiary appeared in the action and moved to dismiss on the ground that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional. The sequestration order remained in effect pending resolution of the constitutional questions presented.
3 common questions
An advance beyond the amount a partner agreed to contribute creates a loan that the partnership must reimburse with interest. A capital contribution forms part of the partner's ownership stake and does not automatically trigger reimbursement. The distinction determines whether the partner receives repayment priority or merely an equity adjustment.
Supporting sources
Expenditures of capital or labor made in reasonable reliance on the licensor's representations about license duration render the license irrevocable to the extent necessary to realize on those expenditures. The licensee may continue the permitted use until the outlays are recovered. Mere permission without such reliance does not create the same protection.
Supporting sources
The presence of capital stock within a state can provide a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction when the stock is attached. Courts must still evaluate whether the forum has sufficient contacts with the underlying controversy under due process standards. Mere stock situs without additional ties may not satisfy constitutional requirements.
Supporting sources
…criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, § 1, a capital crime, but in § 2 it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the "quickening" distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision…