bank statement

In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, referred to as the Voter ID Law or SEA 483. The statute requires citizens voting in person at primary and general elections to present a government-issued photo identification card. It does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail. There is an exception for persons living and voting in a state-licensed facility such as a nursing home. Voters who lack compliant photo identification may cast a provisional ballot. The ballot will be counted only if they execute an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within ten days following the election. A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 10 days following the election. The state offers free photo identification to qualified voters able to establish their residence and identity. Promptly after the enactment of SEA 483 in 2005, the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the state officials responsible for its enforcement. A second suit seeking the same relief was brought on behalf of two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations representing groups of elderly, disabled, poor, and minority voters. The cases were consolidated, and the State of Indiana intervened to defend the validity of the statute. After discovery, District Judge Barker prepared a comprehensive 70-page opinion explaining her decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. She found that petitioners had not introduced evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote as a result of SEA 483 or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its requirements. She rejected as utterly incredible and unreliable an expert's report that up to 989,000 registered voters in Indiana did not possess either a driver's license or other acceptable photo identification. She estimated that as of 2005, when the statute was enacted, around 43,000 Indiana residents lacked a state-issued driver's license or identification card. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Four judges voted to grant a petition for rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration tags. During the stop, the officer learned that Riley's license had been suspended. The officer impounded Riley's car pursuant to department policy and conducted an inventory search that located two handguns under the hood. Riley was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms. An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items associated with the Bloods street gang. He also seized a cell phone from Riley's pants pocket. The officer accessed information on the phone and noticed that some words were preceded by the letters CK. At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone. The detective found videos of young men sparring while someone yelled encouragement using the moniker Blood. The police also found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier. Riley was charged with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder. The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained from his cell phone. The trial court rejected that argument. At Riley's trial, police officers testified about the photographs and videos found on the phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into evidence. Riley was convicted on all three counts and received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. In the second case, a police officer performing routine surveillance observed respondent Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car. Officers subsequently arrested Wurie and took him to the police station. At the station, the officers seized two cell phones from Wurie's person. The one at issue here was a flip phone. Five to ten minutes after arriving at the station, the officers noticed that the phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a source identified as my house on the phone's external screen. A few minutes later, they opened the phone and saw a photograph of a woman and a baby set as the phone's wallpaper. They pressed one button on the phone to access its call log, then another button to determine the phone number associated with the my house label. They next used an online phone directory to trace that phone number to an apartment building. When the officers went to the building, they saw Wurie's name on a mailbox and observed through a window a woman who resembled the woman in the photograph on Wurie's phone. They secured the apartment while obtaining a search warrant and, upon later executing the warrant, found and seized 215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash. Wurie was charged with distributing crack cocaine, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search of his cell phone. The District Court denied the motion. Wurie was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 262 months in prison. A divided panel of the First Circuit reversed the denial of Wurie's motion to suppress and vacated Wurie's convictions for possession with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm as a felon. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Riley's conviction, rejecting his argument that the cell phone search violated the Fourth Amendment. The First Circuit reversed Wurie's conviction, concluding that the search of his cell phone was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.

Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, a citizen of Mexico, sought employment in the United States in 2000 by providing his employer a false name, birth date, and Social Security number along with a counterfeit alien registration card. The Social Security number and the number on the alien registration card were not those of any real person. In 2006 Flores presented his employer with new counterfeit Social Security and alien registration cards that used his real name, but the numbers on both cards were in fact numbers assigned to other people. Flores’ employer reported the request to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Customs discovered that the numbers on the new documents belonged to other people. The United States charged Flores with entering the United States without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), misusing immigration documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Flores moved for a judgment of acquittal on the aggravated identity theft counts, claiming the Government could not prove he knew the numbers belonged to other people. The District Court accepted the Government’s argument that such knowledge was unnecessary. After a bench trial the District Court found Flores guilty of the predicate crimes and aggravated identity theft. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld that determination in 274 Fed. Appx. 501 (CA8 2008) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the knowledge issue in light of disagreement among the circuits.

In the early and mid-1980s, petitioner John Hudson was the chairman and controlling shareholder of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. During the same period, petitioner Jack Rackley was president of Tipton and a member of the board of directors of Hammon. Petitioner Larry Baresel was a member of the board of directors of both Tipton and Hammon. An examination of Tipton and Hammon led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to conclude that petitioners had used their bank positions to arrange a series of loans to third parties. Those loans violated federal banking statutes and regulations. According to the OCC, those loans were in reality made to Hudson in order to enable him to redeem bank stock that he had pledged as collateral on defaulted loans. The illegal loans resulted in losses to Tipton and Hammon of almost $900,000 and contributed to the failure of those banks. On February 13, 1989, OCC issued a Notice of Assessment of Civil Money Penalty. The notice alleged that petitioners had violated 12 U.S.C. §§ 84(a)(1) and 375b and related regulations by causing the banks to make loans to nominee borrowers in a manner that unlawfully allowed Hudson to receive the benefit of the loans. OCC assessed penalties of $100,000 against Hudson and $50,000 each against Rackley and Baresel. On August 31, 1989, OCC also issued a Notice of Intention to Prohibit Further Participation against each petitioner. In October 1989, petitioners resolved the OCC proceedings against them by each entering into a Stipulation and Consent Order. These consent orders provided that Hudson, Baresel, and Rackley would pay assessments of $16,500, $15,000, and $12,500 respectively. In addition, each petitioner agreed not to participate in any manner in the affairs of any banking institution without the written authorization of the OCC and all other relevant regulatory agencies. In August 1992, petitioners were indicted in the Western District of Oklahoma in a 22-count indictment on charges of conspiracy, misapplication of bank funds, and making false bank entries. The violations charged in the indictment rested on the same lending transactions that formed the basis for the prior administrative actions brought by OCC. Petitioners moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but the District Court denied the motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holding on the nonparticipation sanction issue, but vacated and remanded to the District Court on the money sanction issue. The District Court on remand granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the indictments. This time the Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of concerns about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper.