Also known as: as-applied · as-applied challenge · as applied challenge
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A method of challenge asserting that a statute, regulation, or other legal rule violates applicable law in its application to the particular facts of the plaintiff's situation. The challenge succeeds only if the rule produces an unlawful result when enforced against the challenger. A successful claim leaves the rule intact for enforcement against other parties.
Andre Antoine owns a parcel zoned for residential use only. He applies for a permit to operate a small manufacturing shop. City officials deny the permit under the zoning ordinance. Andre sues claiming the denial deprives him of all beneficial use of the land without advancing public health or safety. The court examines whether the ordinance produces an unconstitutional result when enforced against Andre's specific parcel.
Adam Anderson creates a trust and later attempts to revoke it without trustee consent. The trustee objects that revocation requires consent under the trust terms. Adam argues the trust is revocable as applied to him because he retained sole power to revoke without adverse-party approval. The court determines whether the revocation power operates validly in this settlor's circumstances.
Aether Technologies adopts a bylaw requiring directors to have served as officers in the same industry. Amber Alonzo, a nominee with extensive finance experience but no industry officer service, is rejected. She challenges the bylaw as unreasonable when applied to her background and the corporation's needs. The court assesses whether the qualification produces a lawful result in this nomination context.
Alice Atkins, a physician, seeks to perform an abortion for a patient whose health would be endangered by the statutory procedure ban. She sues claiming the ban violates due process when enforced against this medical situation. The court considers whether the statute produces an unconstitutional result as applied to Alice's patient.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseAtlas Ventures, an out-of-state corporation, maintains minimal contacts in the forum through occasional sales representatives. The state seeks to enforce employment taxes against it. The company challenges the long-arm statute as unconstitutional when applied to its limited activities. The court evaluates whether jurisdiction produces a due-process violation in this specific enforcement setting.
International Shoe Co. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. The company manufactured and sold shoes and other footwear. During the years 1937 to 1940 the company employed eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington and whose principal activities were confined to that state. These salesmen were compensated by commissions totaling more than $31,000 each year. The salesmen displayed samples to prospective purchasers. On occasion they rented permanent sample rooms in business buildings or rented rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals was reimbursed by the company. The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection. When accepted the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f. o. b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. Washington state maintained a comprehensive unemployment compensation scheme. The costs of the scheme are defrayed by contributions required to be made by employers to a state unemployment compensation fund. The contributions are a specified percentage of the wages payable annually by each employer for his employees' services in the state. The assessment and collection of the contributions and the fund are administered by appellees. For the years in question notice of assessment for delinquent contributions was personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant in the State of Washington. A copy of the notice was mailed by registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis, Missouri. Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment and moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the service upon appellant's salesman was not proper service upon appellant. Appellant also asserted that it was not doing business within the state and that it is not an employer and does not furnish employment within the meaning of the statute. The motion was heard on evidence and a stipulation of facts by the appeal tribunal which denied the motion and ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner. Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. The company appealed to the United States Supreme Court under section 237(a) of the Judicial Code. The facts found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the state courts showed that the company had no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.
View caseAva Adebayo owns Grand Central Terminal and seeks to build an office tower above it. The city denies the permit under the landmarks law. She claims the denial effects a taking when applied to the terminal's air rights and economic value. The court examines whether the restriction produces an unconstitutional result in this property's circumstances.
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseAn as-applied challenge claims the statute produces an unconstitutional result when enforced against the particular plaintiff. A facial challenge asserts the statute is invalid in every application. A successful as-applied claim leaves the statute on the books for other parties.
No. The statute remains enforceable against other parties whose situations do not produce the same constitutional violation. Only the application to the successful plaintiff is barred.
Courts may uphold a statute against facial attack yet still entertain later as-applied claims when the statute produces unconstitutional results in particular circumstances, such as when a health exception becomes necessary in an abortion regulation.
…impose these selfsame statutory limitations on abortion. My understanding of past practice is that a statute found to be invalid as applied to a particular plaintiff, but not unconstitutional as a whole, is not simply "struck down" but is, instead, declared unconstitutional as applied to the fact situation before the Court.…