Also known as: Article 3 standing · art. III standing · constitutional standing
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional limitation on federal judicial power requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Generalized grievances shared equally by all citizens fail this test. A bare statutory violation without real-world harm or material risk likewise falls short.
Alexandra Armstrong, a citizen taxpayer, sued federal officials alleging that certain expenditures violated statutory limits on how agencies may allocate funds. She identified no personal financial loss or other distinct harm beyond her general interest in lawful government spending. The court dismissed the action because the asserted injury was shared equally by all citizens and therefore insufficient.
Andre Antoine sued a reporting agency after discovering an error in his consumer file that violated a federal accuracy statute. He received every job interview he sought and suffered no lost opportunities, emotional distress, or other tangible effect. The court held that the bare statutory violation alone did not supply the concrete injury required for federal jurisdiction.
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Audrey Ashton, a sitting senator, challenged a campaign-finance provision whose earliest possible impact on her would occur years later at the next primary. No present or imminent effect on her candidacy was shown. The court found the asserted injury too remote in time to satisfy the constitutional threshold.
Abigail Alvarez, an environmental group member, sued a company for past reporting failures under a federal statute. No continuing violation or present injury to her interests was alleged. The court treated standing as a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be resolved before any merits determination.
Arthur Abrams, a developer, and a nonprofit housing organization challenged a village zoning decision that blocked a proposed integrated housing project. They alleged the denial was racially motivated and would prevent construction. The court examined whether the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficiently personal stake to invoke federal jurisdiction.
Alexis Archer, a physician, sought to enjoin enforcement of a state ban on assisted suicide. She alleged that the statute chilled her ability to counsel patients but identified no patient who had been denied care or faced imminent prosecution. The court assessed whether the claimed injury met the constitutional requirements for adjudication.
No. Article III requires an injury in fact that is both particularized and concrete. A plaintiff cannot rely solely on the fact that a statute was violated. There must be some actual or realistically threatened harm.
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No. Congress may create statutory rights whose violation can satisfy standing, but it cannot eliminate the constitutional requirement of a concrete and particularized injury in fact.
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A generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all citizens, such as an interest in having the government follow the law, does not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.
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Yes. Standing is required at all stages. Private proponents of a ballot initiative who assert only a generalized interest in the enforceability of state law lack standing to appeal after the government accepts an adverse judgment.
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…adequate safeguards against abuse), vacated, Lee v. Oregon , 107 F. 3d 1382 (CA9 1997) (concluding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing). Lee , of course, is not before us, any more than it was before the Court of Appeals below, and we offer no opinion as to the validity of the Lee courts' reasoning. In Vacco v.…