Also known as: ancillary jurisdiction · pendent jurisdiction · ancillary/pendent jurisdiction · supplemental jurisdiction
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Nonstatutory doctrines authorizing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over related claims that form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court's original jurisdiction. The doctrines require at least one anchor claim satisfying statutory jurisdictional requirements before extending to additional related claims.
Alfred Ashford sued Arcadia Retail in federal court under diversity jurisdiction for breach of a supply contract seeking $90,000. Austin Abbott joined as a co-plaintiff asserting a related breach claim for only $40,000 arising from the same shipment dispute. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Abbott's claim because it shared a common nucleus of operative fact with Ashford's claim that met the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Alexis Archer filed a federal copyright infringement suit against Apollo Energy in district court. Alexandra Armstrong asserted a state unfair-competition claim in the same action arising from the identical unauthorized use of protected materials. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim because it formed part of the same case or controversy under Article III.
Aaron Adams brought a federal securities claim against Argonaut Shipping in district court. Albert Allen added a state-law fraud claim based on the same misleading disclosures and transaction documents. The court exercised pendent jurisdiction over the state claim because both claims derived from a common nucleus of operative fact.
Arcadia Retail sued Artemis Logistics in a diversity action for unpaid invoices exceeding $75,000. Artemis impleaded Apollo Energy under Rule 14 for contribution on the same contract. The court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over the impleader claim because exercising it would destroy complete diversity between the original parties.
Alfred Ashford sued Argonaut Shipping in admiralty for cargo damage. Austin Abbott asserted a related state-law indemnity claim against the same vessel arising from the identical voyage. The court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the indemnity claim to avoid piecemeal litigation of the single maritime incident.
In October 1953 Francisco Romero, a Spanish subject, signed on as a crew member of the S.S. Guadalupe, a vessel of Spanish registry owned by the Spanish corporation Compania Trasatlantica. Romero continued to serve on the Guadalupe after the initial voyage, so that under Spanish law the original contract of hire remained in force. The ship sailed from Bilbao, touched other Spanish ports, proceeded to New York and Hoboken, made a brief trip to Vera Cruz and Havana, and returned to Hoboken. On May 12, 1954, while the vessel lay in Hoboken, Romero was struck by a cable on deck and seriously injured. Romero filed suit on the law side of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against four corporate defendants. He asserted Jones Act and general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and maritime tort against Compania Trasatlantica and its New York husbanding agent Garcia & Diaz, Inc. He asserted maritime-tort claims against stevedore International Terminal Operating Co. and carpenter Quin Lumber Co., both of which were performing work aboard the Guadalupe under oral contracts with Garcia & Diaz. Jurisdiction was invoked under the Jones Act and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. After a pre-trial hearing the district court dismissed the entire complaint. It held that the Jones Act supplied no right of action against the foreign shipowner, that § 1331 did not confer jurisdiction over general maritime claims, that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer, and that complete diversity was lacking under Strawbridge v. Curtiss. The court also declined to exercise discretionary admiralty jurisdiction after examining Spanish law, which provided Romero a lifetime pension of 35 to 55 percent of his wages plus maintenance and cure enforceable through the Spanish consul. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicts among the circuits concerning the construction of § 1331 and the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen to the facts presented.
Alexis Archer sued Apollo Energy for breach of a licensing agreement. Apollo asserted a compulsory counterclaim for trademark infringement arising from the same agreement and product line. The court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the counterclaim because it arose from the identical transaction or occurrence as the original claim.
In the early morning hours of January 10, 1960, six men were playing poker in the basement of John Gladson's home in Lee's Summit, Missouri, when three or four masked men armed with a shotgun and pistols broke in and robbed each player of money and personal property before fleeing in a car belonging to one of the victims. Shortly afterward the stolen car was found abandoned in a field, and four men including petitioner Bob Fred Ashe were arrested that same morning. Ashe was first brought to trial on May 17, 1960, on a charge of robbing one of the players, Donald Knight. The State called Knight and three of his fellow poker players as prosecution witnesses. Each of them described the circumstances of the holdup and itemized his own individual losses. The State's evidence that the petitioner had been one of the robbers was weak. Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers altogether, and could not identify the petitioner as one of them. Another of the victims, who was the petitioner's uncle by marriage, said that at the "patrol station" he had positively identified each of the other three men accused of the holdup, but could say only that the petitioner's voice "sounded very much like" that of one of the robbers. The fourth participant in the poker game did identify the petitioner, but only by his "size and height, and his actions." The petitioner's defense was an alibi. The defense offered no testimony and waived final argument. The jury—though not instructed to elaborate upon its verdict—found the petitioner "not guilty due to insufficient evidence." Six weeks later the petitioner was brought to trial again, this time for the robbery of another participant in the poker game, a man named Roberts. The witnesses were for the most part the same, though this time their testimony was substantially stronger on the issue of the petitioner's identity. For example, two witnesses who at the first trial had been wholly unable to identify the petitioner as one of the robbers, now testified that his features, size, and mannerisms matched those of one of their assailants. Another witness who before had identified the petitioner only by his size and actions now also remembered him by the unusual sound of his voice. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, based on his previous acquittal. The motion was overruled, and the second trial began. This time the jury found the petitioner guilty, and he was sentenced to a 35-year term in the state penitentiary. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, holding that the "plea of former jeopardy must be denied." A collateral attack upon the conviction in the state courts five years later was also unsuccessful. The petitioner then brought the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, claiming that the second prosecution had violated his right not to be twice put in jeopardy. The District Court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, also upon the authority of Hoag v. New Jersey. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional question this case presents.
Ancillary and pendent jurisdiction were judicially created doctrines that permitted federal courts to hear related claims lacking an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Congress codified both doctrines in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) under the single heading of supplemental jurisdiction.
…satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.” III Our interpretation is consistent with the historical development of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. Before the enactment of §1367, the Court had recognized that in a diversity case, a court could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over claims by intervenors and over compulsory counterclaims…
…principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel caution the civil plaintiff against splitting his case. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has furthered single trials of related cases. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra . Moreover, we have recognized the
…496 (1941). This rests upon a perception of the constitutional and congressional plan underlying the creation of diversity and pendent jurisdiction in the lower federal courts, which should quite obviously be carried forward into our interpretation of ambiguous statutes relating to the exercise of that
…because Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. , 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
…of them "pendent" to its jurisdiction
Supplemental jurisdiction reaches additional plaintiffs' claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with an anchor claim meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement, provided complete diversity is preserved. The Supreme Court confirmed this application in diversity actions where at least one plaintiff's claim satisfies the jurisdictional amount.
A court may decline supplemental jurisdiction when the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, when state claims substantially predominate, when the anchor claim has been dismissed, or when other compelling reasons exist. These discretionary grounds appear in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Supplemental jurisdiction applies in diversity cases but is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), which bars jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 when exercising jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the requirements of section 1332.
Claims share a common nucleus when they arise from the same transaction or occurrence and a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one proceeding. This standard originated in pendent-jurisdiction cases and continues under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.