Also known as: aggressions · act of aggression · crime of aggression · armed aggression
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An act of armed force by one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state or in a manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. The category includes invasion, attack, blockade, or landing of troops.
An act of armed force by one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state or in a manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. The category includes invasion, attack, blockade, or landing of troops.
A senator publicly criticized a researcher's federal grant as wasteful. The researcher sued for defamation, alleging the statements amounted to political aggression that damaged his reputation. The court examined whether the speech concerned a matter of public concern.
Conduct by one person that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact in another. The conduct supplies the threat element in assault and triggers the privilege of self-defense when the threatened harm is serious.
Carlos grabbed Luis by the shoulder at Apex Auto, spun him around, and raised a fist inches from his face. Luis swung a tire iron at Carlos's arm to stop the blow. The force Luis used was justified because Carlos's conduct created an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.
A grand jury subpoenaed a reporter who had published a story based on confidential sources. The reporter refused to disclose the sources, citing fear of government aggression against informants. The court weighed the reporter's claim against the need for testimony in a criminal investigation.
Conduct by one person that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact in another. The conduct supplies the threat element in assault and triggers the privilege of self-defense when the threatened harm is serious.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
In March 1975, United States Senator William Proxmire from Wisconsin established the Golden Fleece of the Month Award to highlight examples of what he viewed as wasteful federal spending. The second award, announced in April 1975, targeted grants totaling approximately half a million dollars over seven years from the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Naval Research to support research by Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. At the time, Hutchinson served as director of research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, operated by the Michigan State Department of Mental Health, after holding a similar position at the Ft. Custer State Home. He also acted as an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University and later became research director at the Foundation for Behavioral Research when the hospital department closed in June 1975. His work focused on developing an objective measure of aggression through studies of animal behavior patterns, such as jaw clenching in response to stress, with potential applications for human confinement in space and undersea environments. Proxmire's legislative assistant Morton Schwartz prepared the award materials after reviewing Hutchinson's grant reports and contacting federal agencies. On April 18, 1975, Proxmire presented a speech in the Senate, which was distributed via an advance press release to 275 media outlets, describing the research in critical terms including references to monkey business and taxpayer waste. The speech text appeared in a May 1975 newsletter sent to about 100,000 recipients, and Proxmire referenced similar research on a television program; a February 1976 newsletter summarized the award without naming Hutchinson. Schwartz telephoned Hutchinson prior to the release to inform him of the award, and Hutchinson objected to the summary's accuracy. Following the announcement, Schwartz contacted sponsoring federal agencies to discuss the funding. Hutchinson filed suit on April 16, 1976, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, alleging defamation that damaged his professional reputation and income, interference with contractual relations, and later infringement of privacy rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to Proxmire and Schwartz. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1979.
View caseA state board required students to salute the flag as a symbol of protection against foreign aggression. Students who refused on religious grounds faced expulsion. The court addressed whether the compulsion violated free speech protections.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseIn November 1969, Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky, published an article describing his observations of two individuals synthesizing hashish from marijuana in Jefferson County. The article included a photograph and stated that Branzburg had promised not to reveal the identities of the two. He was subsequently subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury and refused to identify the individuals he had observed. A state trial court ordered him to answer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied his petition for relief. In January 1971, Branzburg published a second article detailing drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky, based on interviews with several dozen users over two weeks. He was subpoenaed by the Franklin County grand jury to testify about violations of drug statutes. The Court of Appeals denied the requested writs and rejected his First Amendment claim. This Court granted certiorari. In July 1970, Paul Pappas, a television newsman-photographer, was assigned to cover civil disorders in New Bedford, Massachusetts, involving the Black Panthers. He entered Panther headquarters under an agreement not to disclose what he saw or heard inside except for an anticipated police raid, which did not occur. Two months later, he was summoned before the Bristol County grand jury but refused to answer questions about his observations inside the headquarters. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that he must appear and testify. In February 1970, Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, received a subpoena to appear before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of federal law by the group, including threats against the President. The District Court denied the motion to quash but issued a protective order. Caldwell refused to appear and was held in contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a qualified privilege. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
View caseA chronic alcoholic was charged with assault after an aggressive episode triggered by drinking. The defense argued the condition removed the capacity for control. The court considered whether the aggression was voluntary conduct subject to criminal liability.
In late December 1966, appellant Leroy Powell was arrested and charged with being found in a state of intoxication in a public place in violation of Texas Penal Code, Art. 477 (1952). He was tried in the Corporation Court of Austin, Texas, found guilty, and fined twenty dollars. He appealed to the County Court at Law No. 1 of Travis County, Texas, where a trial de novo was held. At the county court trial without a jury, the defense presented testimony from psychiatrist Dr. David Wade, who had examined Powell and testified that he is a chronic alcoholic with an uncontrollable compulsion to drink and that he loses the power to control his drinking. Powell testified that he works at a tavern shining shoes, makes about twelve dollars a week which he uses to buy wine, drinks wine every day, gets drunk about once a week, and usually goes to sleep in public places such as the sidewalk when drunk. The arresting officer testified that Powell staggered when he walked, that his speech was slurred, and that he smelled strongly of alcohol. The trial court entered findings of fact that chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys the afflicted person's will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol, that a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism, and that Powell is a chronic alcoholic who is afflicted with the disease. The court nevertheless convicted Powell and fined him fifty dollars. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Powell appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction. The record shows Powell had been convicted of public intoxication approximately one hundred times since 1949 and that he works shining shoes, earns about twelve dollars a week, and uses his earnings to buy wine, getting drunk about once a week usually in public places.
View caseA defendant charged with murder offered psychiatric testimony that a mental condition negated intent. The prosecution countered that the evidence showed only a general aggressive personality. The court limited the evidence to issues of mens rea rather than character.
In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police responded in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music blaring was circling a residential block. When he located the truck, the officer turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car. This prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck’s driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark to stay where he was. Less than a minute later, Clark shot the officer. The officer died soon after but not before calling the police dispatcher for help. Clark ran away on foot but was arrested later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands. The gun that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap. Clark was charged with first-degree murder under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1105(A)(3) for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty. In March 2001, Clark was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment. Two years later the same trial court found his competence restored and ordered him to be tried. Clark waived his right to a jury, and the case was heard by the court. At trial, Clark did not contest that he shot the officer or that the officer died. He relied on his own undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident to deny that he had the specific intent to shoot an officer or knowledge that he was doing so. The prosecutor offered circumstantial evidence that Clark knew the victim was a police officer. The prosecutor also offered testimony indicating that Clark had previously stated he wanted to shoot police and had lured the victim to the scene to kill him. In presenting the defense case, Clark claimed mental illness. He sought to introduce it for two purposes. First, he raised the affirmative defense of insanity. This put the burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the crime he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that he did not know the criminal act was wrong. Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea. Ruling that Clark could not rely on evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea, the trial court cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mott. That decision refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent. It held that Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mens rea element of a crime. As to his insanity, Clark presented lay testimony describing his increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting. This included testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with aliens trying to kill him and that bullets were the only way to stop them. A psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions about aliens when he killed the officer. The psychiatrist concluded that Clark was incapable of luring the officer or understanding right from wrong and was thus insane at the time of the killing. In rebuttal, the State’s psychiatrist gave his opinion that Clark’s paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct before and after the shooting. The judge then issued a first-degree murder verdict. The judge found that Clark had not established that his schizophrenia distorted his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong. Clark moved to vacate the judgment and life sentence. He argued that Arizona’s insanity test and its Mott rule each violate due process. The trial court denied the motion. Affirming, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the State’s insanity scheme was consistent with due process. The court read Mott as barring the trial court’s consideration of evidence of Clark’s mental illness and capacity directly on the element of mens rea. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied further review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View case4 common questions
Serious bodily harm differs in kind, not merely degree, from other harm. It includes harm creating a substantial risk of death, harm constituting mayhem, or permanent loss of function of an important organ or member.
A visible and controlled halt just short of contact can show that no actual contact was intended. When the actor's conduct demonstrates restraint, a reasonable person may not apprehend that harmful contact will occur.
Deadly force is justified without a duty to retreat when the actor is at his or her place of work and is not the initial aggressor. The rule creates an exception to any general retreat requirement for the workplace.
An honest though unreasonable belief that deadly force is necessary can mitigate an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter. The mitigation turns on the defendant's subjective sincerity rather than objective reasonableness.
…against the strong, security against the exercise of arbitrary power, and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggression, and "WHEREAS, The West Virginia State Board of Education maintains that the public schools, established by the legislature of the State of West Virginia under the authority of the…