Also known as: agents authorized by appointment or by law · authorized agent · legal agent · appointed agent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person or entity empowered to accept service of process or execute binding records on behalf of a principal, either through the principal's explicit designation or by operation of law.
Andrew Avery orders $600 in custom parts from Avalon Pharmaceuticals. The company's sales manager, acting under company policy, signs and mails a confirmation listing the quantity and price to Avery's address. Avery receives the document but raises no objection within ten days. The signed record satisfies the statute of frauds requirement against Avery because the manager qualifies as an authorized agent.
Atlas Ventures leases equipment to Anthony Arnold under a contract naming a New York resident as the agent for accepting process. When Atlas sues in federal court for breach, the process server delivers the summons and complaint to that named individual. Arnold receives prompt notice from the agent. Service is effective because the contract created an agent authorized by appointment to receive process.
In 1961 Steve and Robert Szukhent, father and son farmers residing in Michigan, obtained two incubators from National Equipment Rental, Ltd. under a lease. National Equipment Rental is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in New York. The lease was a standard printed form less than a page and a half long that contained eighteen numbered paragraphs. The final numbered paragraph, printed in the same type as the rest of the document and appearing immediately above the Szukhents' signatures, stated that the lessees designated Florence Weinberg, 47-21 Forty-first Street, Long Island City, New York, as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York. The Szukhents had never met, seen, or heard of Florence Weinberg before the lawsuit. In 1962 National Equipment Rental filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that the Szukhents had failed to make any of the periodic payments required by the lease. The marshal delivered two copies of the summons and complaint to Florence Weinberg. On the same day she mailed the summons and complaint to the Szukhents by certified mail together with a letter stating that the documents had been served upon her as their agent pursuant to the lease. National Equipment Rental also notified the Szukhents of the service by certified mail. The Szukhents moved to quash service. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA plaintiff seeks to sue a foreign state-owned bank in U.S. district court. No special arrangement for service exists. The plaintiff delivers the summons and complaint to the bank's managing agent located in the United States. The delivery satisfies the statutory requirement because the managing agent is authorized by law to receive service on the bank's behalf.
In February and July of 1960 respondent Farr, Whitlock & Co., an American commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar free alongside the steamer from a wholly owned subsidiary of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (C. A. V.), a Cuban corporation whose capital stock was owned principally by United States residents, with payment to be made in New York upon presentation of shipping documents and a sight draft. On July 6, 1960, Congress amended the Sugar Act of 1948 to permit reduction of Cuba's sugar quota and President Eisenhower exercised that power the same day. Cuba responded by enacting Law No. 851, which authorized the President and Prime Minister to nationalize by forced expropriation property or enterprises in which American nationals held an interest. Between August 6 and 9 the sugar covered by the Farr, Whitlock contract was loaded onto the S. S. Hornfels at the Cuban port of Jucaro. On August 6 the Cuban President and Prime Minister issued Executive Power Resolution No. 1 pursuant to Law No. 851, ordering compulsory expropriation of C. A. V. and other listed American-owned companies. To obtain consent for the vessel to sail, Farr, Whitlock on August 11 entered identical contracts with Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government, and the Hornfels sailed for Morocco on August 12. Banco Exterior assigned the bills of lading to petitioner Banco Nacional de Cuba, another Cuban government instrumentality, which instructed its New York agent to deliver the documents and a sight draft for $175,250.69 to Farr, Whitlock in exchange for payment. Farr, Whitlock refused the initial tender after receiving notice of C. A. V.'s claim to the proceeds, accepted the documents only after C. A. V. agreed to indemnify it, negotiated the bills of lading to its customer, received payment, and refused to remit the proceeds. The New York Supreme Court appointed respondent Sabbatino temporary receiver of C. A. V.'s New York assets and enjoined Farr, Whitlock from removing the funds from the state. Pursuant to court order Farr, Whitlock transferred the funds to Sabbatino to abide the event of a judicial determination as to their ownership. Petitioner then instituted this action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. Alleging conversion of the bills of lading, it sought to recover the proceeds thereof from Farr, Whitlock and to enjoin the receiver from exercising any dominion over such proceeds. The District Court sustained jurisdiction, found the sugar located in Cuba at the time of expropriation, concluded that the expropriation violated international law on three grounds, and granted summary judgment against petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed on similar grounds after considering two additional State Department letters, and this Court granted certiorari.
Illinois files an original action in the Supreme Court against the City of Milwaukee alleging pollution of Lake Michigan. Process is delivered to an officer of the city who is designated by state law to accept service for municipal defendants. The city receives timely notice through that officer. Service is valid because the officer qualifies as an agent authorized by law to receive process.
In 1972 the State of Illinois filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court invoking its original jurisdiction against four Wisconsin cities, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. The complaint alleged that these defendants discharge some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other waste materials daily into Lake Michigan, an interstate body of water. Illinois further alleged that it and its subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges while the defendants do not, and it asked the Court to abate the resulting public nuisance. No proceedings had taken place in any lower court because Illinois sought to commence the action directly before the Supreme Court. Illinois argued that the named agencies are instrumentalities of Wisconsin and that the suit is therefore effectively against the State of Wisconsin, which could not be brought in any other forum. The defendants are public corporations whose existence and operations are controlled by Wisconsin. Congress has enacted statutes addressing pollution of interstate and navigable waters, including the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act declares it federal policy to recognize the primary responsibilities of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution while also providing for federal enforcement actions and water-quality standards.
Authorization by appointment occurs when the principal expressly or impliedly designates a person to receive process on the principal's behalf, such as through a contractual clause naming a specific individual. The designation must be clear enough that the agent understands the role and the principal intends the agent to act in that capacity. Courts examine the parties' agreement and conduct to determine whether the appointment exists.
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…proliferating contentions would seem to be inevitable. Until the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights. And the logic and practicality of regarding…
…4 (d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes service of process for suits in federal courts to be made on “an agent authorized by appointment or by law
…ticket required an injured party to submit “written notice of the claim with full particulars ... to the carrier or its duly authorized agent within 185 days after the date of injury.” The ticket further required any lawsuit to be “filed within one year after the date of injury” and to be “served upon the carrier within 120 days…
…it to the State court could have been sustained.” This appears to be the only reported case of a removal by the plaintiff as authorized
…name, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other
Authorization by law arises when a statute or rule itself designates certain persons, such as officers or managing agents of a corporation, to accept service for the principal. The authority stems directly from the legal provision rather than from any agreement between the parties. Examples include provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and statutes governing service on foreign states or municipalities.
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Yes. A record signed by a party's authorized agent is sufficient to indicate that a contract for the sale of goods has been made and satisfies the writing requirement against the party to be charged. The agent's authority may come from appointment by the principal or from operation of law. The record need not identify the principal explicitly if the agent is properly authorized.
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Service is ineffective if the recipient lacks actual authority by appointment or by law to accept process for the defendant. A mistaken belief by the process server or the recipient does not create the required authorization. The plaintiff must then effect proper service on a qualifying agent or use another authorized method.
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