Also known as: adjudicatory proceedings · adjudicative proceeding
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A formal hearing or proceeding before a tribunal that determines the substantive rights of parties through the presentation of evidence and argument. The setting triggers duties of candor and the application of evidentiary rules unless a specific exception applies. It encompasses both judicial and administrative contexts where a decision maker resolves disputed issues after an adversarial process.
Aaron Adams represents Astra Aerospace before the state utilities commission in a pending rate-increase application. An insider informs Adams that company executives directed staff to fabricate maintenance-cost spreadsheets already filed as sworn exhibits. Adams must take reasonable remedial measures because the commission hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding in which the lawyer knows of fraudulent conduct tied to the matter.
Adrian Aguilar, counsel for Aurora Biotech in a pending administrative disciplinary hearing, gives an interview to a trade publication. The statements detail internal company documents and predict the outcome of the contested issues. The First Amendment limits discipline for such comments because the hearing qualifies as an adjudicatory proceeding whose fairness could be affected by publicity.
Alice Atkins, who has represented Argonaut Shipping in an ongoing arbitration over cargo damage, issues a press release describing the strength of her client's evidence. The release is distributed widely and addresses the central factual disputes before the arbitrator. The statement risks violating the rule because the arbitration is an adjudicatory proceeding that could be materially prejudiced by the extrajudicial communication.
Andrew Avery files a class grievance against Ashford Manufacturing under the NLRA. The company moves to compel individual arbitration pursuant to employment agreements. The board proceeding that will decide whether class procedures are protected is an adjudicatory proceeding whose structure is governed by the statute's existing framework rather than external procedural rules.
In each of three consolidated cases, an employer and an employee entered into a written contract specifying that disputes arising from the employment relationship would be resolved through individualized arbitration proceedings rather than in court. The agreements in the Ernst & Young case, for example, allowed the employee to select the arbitration provider and permitted the arbitrator to grant any relief a court could grant, but required that claims pertaining to different employees be heard in separate proceedings. After their employment ended, the employees filed suit in federal district court. They asserted claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime and related state-law claims, and they sought to litigate those claims on behalf of a nationwide class or collective group of similarly situated employees. In the Ernst & Young matter, junior accountant Stephen Morris filed such a suit after leaving the firm. The employers responded by moving to compel arbitration under the terms of the contracts. District courts in some of the cases granted the motions and ordered the employees to proceed in individual arbitrations. In the Ernst & Young case the district court compelled arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that order. Parallel proceedings occurred in the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, producing conflicting results on whether the arbitration agreements could be enforced. In 2012 the National Labor Relations Board issued its first decision addressing agreements of this type, concluding that the National Labor Relations Act rendered unlawful any contractual requirement of individualized arbitration. Before that Board decision, courts and the Board's own general counsel had treated such agreements as enforceable. The three cases reached the Supreme Court after the Court granted certiorari in 2017 to resolve the disagreement among the circuits and between the Board and several courts of appeals.
View caseAustin Abbott challenges a nuclear licensing decision and argues that the agency must address environmental issues through additional procedures. The commission instead resolves the fuel-cycle questions by generic rulemaking. The distinction matters because the agency previously addressed similar issues in adjudicatory proceedings that afforded parties greater procedural rights.
The cases involve two nuclear power projects regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission. In December 1967, the Commission granted Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. a permit to build a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont. Vermont Yankee subsequently applied for an operating license, prompting an adjudicatory hearing in August 1971 at which the Natural Resources Defense Council participated and objected to the exclusion of fuel reprocessing and waste disposal environmental effects. In November 1972 the Commission began informal rulemaking to address the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle for light water reactors, publishing notice of two proposed alternatives based on its Environmental Survey. Hearings occurred in February 1973 with over forty participants submitting written comments; the Commission allowed oral statements but prohibited discovery and cross-examination, instead permitting questioning by the Commission itself. The Commission adopted the second alternative in April 1974, incorporating numerical values into a table for cost-benefit analyses. In January 1969 Consumers Power Co. applied for a construction permit for two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. Intervenors including Saginaw and Mapleton submitted numerous environmental contentions and discovery requests, which the Licensing Board largely denied before holding hearings in 1972. Although Saginaw raised energy conservation issues in comments on the draft environmental impact statement, it did not present evidence at the hearings or participate further after the final statement issued. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1976 remanded both the Vermont Yankee operating license and the Consumers Power construction permit. It found the fuel cycle rulemaking procedurally inadequate and required consideration of energy conservation alternatives as well as further development of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards report. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977.
View caseAisha Ahmed petitions for review of an environmental permit and contends that the agency must use adjudicatory procedures rather than informal methods. The agency elects to handle the fuel-cycle issues through rulemaking. The court upholds the choice because the statute does not require adjudicatory proceedings for every contested issue.
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively. In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record. NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977. The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
View caseThe duty is triggered when the lawyer knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding. The obligation continues through the conclusion of the proceeding and may require disclosure to the tribunal even if the information is otherwise confidential.
Yes. A rule prohibiting statements with a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding is permissible, but vague safe-harbor language can render enforcement unconstitutional when the speech is largely political.
Yes. A contested cash-collateral hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding that determines substantive rights, so the ordinary federal evidence rules govern absent a specific exception.
Yes. Once the lawyer acquires knowledge of falsity, reasonable remedial measures are required, including disclosure to the tribunal if necessary to correct the record.
…in No. 76-419, p. 46. In support NRDC first argues that the Commission has considered other equally generic issues in adjudicatory proceedings. But NRDC conceded in the court below that the agency could promulgate rules regarding the fuel cycle in rulemaking proceedings. 178 U. S. App. D. C., at 346, 547 F. 2d, at 643. Moreover,…