Also known as: adjective laws · procedural law
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The body of rules governing procedure and practice. It encompasses the remedial agencies and methods by which rights are maintained, their invasion redressed, and the methods by which such results are accomplished in judicial tribunals.
Adam Anderson filed a diversity suit against Apex Dynamics in federal court sitting in State X. The court applied federal rules to determine the validity of service on the defendant's registered agent. That procedural step proceeded under federal adjective law even though the underlying contract claim followed State X substantive rules.
Angela Acosta sued Apollo Energy after an on-site injury. The federal court ordered her to submit to a physical examination under the applicable federal rule. The order was treated as a matter of adjective law that the court could enforce without altering substantive rights.
Sibbach initiated an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking damages for bodily injuries that occurred in Indiana. Wilson & Co. filed an answer denying the complaint's allegations and moved for an order compelling Sibbach to undergo a physical examination by a court-appointed physician to assess the nature and extent of her injuries. The district court granted the motion and directed Sibbach to submit to the examination. Upon Sibbach's refusal to comply, Wilson obtained an order requiring her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt. Sibbach responded by contesting the court's authority to issue the examination order, pointing out that Indiana courts permitted such orders while Illinois courts did not, and that neither state had a governing statute. The district court found Sibbach in contempt and ordered her committed until she obeyed the examination order or was otherwise discharged. Sibbach appealed the contempt adjudication to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the question involved. The proceedings centered on Rules 35 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been promulgated pursuant to congressional authorization in the Act of June 19, 1934.
View caseAaron Adams commenced a diversity action against Arcadia Retail in federal court. The defendant moved to dismiss for untimely service under state practice. The court applied the federal rule governing service because it was adjective law that controlled the manner of proceeding.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View caseAbigail Alvarez brought a state-law claim in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The court looked to state law to decide whether the action was timely. That outcome-determinative rule was classified as substantive rather than adjective law.
In May 1930 the Van Sweringen Corporation issued $30,000,000 in notes under an indenture naming Guaranty Trust Co. of New York as trustee with power to enforce noteholders' rights. In October 1930 Guaranty and other banks advanced large sums to companies affiliated with the Corporation and controlled by the Van Sweringens. When the Corporation could not meet its obligations, Guaranty participated in an exchange plan under which noteholders could surrender their notes for cash equal to 50 percent of face value plus twenty shares of Van Sweringen stock per $1,000 note; the offer remained open until December 15, 1931. In 1934 respondent York received $6,000 of the notes as a gift from a donor who had not accepted the exchange offer. In April 1940 three accepting noteholders filed the Hackner suit in federal court charging Guaranty with fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the exchange. York's motion to intervene was denied, and summary judgment for Guaranty was affirmed on appeal. On January 22, 1942, after her exclusion from the Hackner litigation, York filed the present class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of non-accepting noteholders. The complaint, resting exclusively on diversity of citizenship, alleged that Guaranty had breached its trust by failing to protect noteholders' interests when it assented to the exchange offer and by failing to disclose its own self-interest. The district court granted Guaranty's motion for summary judgment on the authority of the Hackner decision. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a federal court sitting in equity is not required to apply the New York statute of limitations that would govern an identical suit in the New York state courts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAndrew Avery filed a contract action against Azure Solutions that was referred to a bankruptcy court. The court declined to adjudicate the state-law claim because its authority was limited to matters properly classified as procedural under federal adjective law.
In 1978 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act after nearly ten years of study. The statute established a United States bankruptcy court in each judicial district as an adjunct to the district court. It granted those courts jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11. Bankruptcy judges appointed under the Act served fourteen-year terms. They were subject to removal by the judicial council of the circuit for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability. They received salaries subject to congressional adjustment. In January 1980 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a petition for reorganization under the Act in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota. In March 1980 Northern filed a separate suit in the same court against Marathon Pipe Line Co. seeking damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty as well as for misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Marathon moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power on bankruptcy judges who lacked life tenure and salary protection. The United States intervened to defend the statute. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal the District Court reversed and dismissed the suit. Northern and the United States filed notices of appeal, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseArthur Abrams moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search in his federal criminal case. The court applied federal procedural standards to decide admissibility. Those standards constituted adjective law that governed the conduct of the proceeding.
The petitioners, Elkins and Clark, were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon for intercepting and divulging telephone communications and conspiracy to do so under 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. State law enforcement officers received information that Clark possessed obscene motion pictures and sound recordings. They procured a search warrant based on an affidavit reciting that "upon information and belief" Clark possessed such materials. The officers searched his home, found no obscene pictures, but seized wiretap paraphernalia and a recording machine. The state officers placed the seized articles in a local bank safe-deposit box. The Multnomah County District Court and later the Circuit Court for Multnomah County held the search warrant invalid and ordered suppression of the evidence. The state grand jury indictment was dismissed. Federal officers then obtained the articles from the bank box pursuant to a federal search warrant. Before trial in federal court the petitioners moved to suppress the tape and wire recordings and recording machine. The district judge assumed without deciding that the articles had been obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure. He denied the motion because there was no evidence that any agent of the United States had any knowledge or information or suspicion that the search was being contemplated or was made by the state officers until they read about it in the newspaper. The articles were admitted in evidence at trial and the petitioners were convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. That court held it unnecessary to determine whether the original state search and seizure had been lawful because there had been no participation by federal officers. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether evidence obtained by state officers in an unreasonable search and seizure without federal involvement is admissible in a federal criminal trial over timely objection.
View caseAdjective law consists of the rules that govern procedure and practice in court. Substantive law declares the rights and duties of persons subject to the law. The distinction determines whether a federal court in diversity applies state or federal rules.
Yes. Rules governing the manner and timing of service are classic examples of adjective law because they regulate how litigation proceeds rather than the underlying rights asserted.
Federal courts may adopt procedural rules that incidentally affect litigants' rights, but they may not use adjective law to alter substantive rights created by state law.
Supporting sources
The distinction controls whether the federal court applies state substantive law or federal procedural rules. This prevents forum shopping and ensures that the outcome in federal court mirrors the result that would obtain in state court.
…of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. However, as subsequent cases sharpened the distinction between substance and procedure, the line of cases following Erie diverged markedly from the line construing the Enabling Act.…