adequate and independent

Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, Oklahoma, in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose of advising with the Court as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation. The examining psychiatrist reported that at times Ake appeared to be frankly delusional and claimed to be the sword of vengeance of the Lord. He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial. In March 1980, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his present sanity. On April 10, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a psychotic with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia chronic with exacerbation, that he was dangerous, and that he required a maximum security facility. The court found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial while receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine three times daily. At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. Counsel requested that a psychiatrist examine Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense or that the court provide funds for such an examination. The trial judge denied the motion. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase, defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined Ake at the state hospital, but none testified about his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists that Ake was dangerous to society. Ake had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce evidence in mitigation. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police responded in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music blaring was circling a residential block. When he located the truck, the officer turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car. This prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck’s driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark to stay where he was. Less than a minute later, Clark shot the officer. The officer died soon after but not before calling the police dispatcher for help. Clark ran away on foot but was arrested later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands. The gun that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap. Clark was charged with first-degree murder under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1105(A)(3) for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty. In March 2001, Clark was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment. Two years later the same trial court found his competence restored and ordered him to be tried. Clark waived his right to a jury, and the case was heard by the court. At trial, Clark did not contest that he shot the officer or that the officer died. He relied on his own undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident to deny that he had the specific intent to shoot an officer or knowledge that he was doing so. The prosecutor offered circumstantial evidence that Clark knew the victim was a police officer. The prosecutor also offered testimony indicating that Clark had previously stated he wanted to shoot police and had lured the victim to the scene to kill him. In presenting the defense case, Clark claimed mental illness. He sought to introduce it for two purposes. First, he raised the affirmative defense of insanity. This put the burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the crime he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that he did not know the criminal act was wrong. Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea. Ruling that Clark could not rely on evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea, the trial court cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mott. That decision refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent. It held that Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mens rea element of a crime. As to his insanity, Clark presented lay testimony describing his increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting. This included testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with aliens trying to kill him and that bullets were the only way to stop them. A psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions about aliens when he killed the officer. The psychiatrist concluded that Clark was incapable of luring the officer or understanding right from wrong and was thus insane at the time of the killing. In rebuttal, the State’s psychiatrist gave his opinion that Clark’s paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct before and after the shooting. The judge then issued a first-degree murder verdict. The judge found that Clark had not established that his schizophrenia distorted his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong. Clark moved to vacate the judgment and life sentence. He argued that Arizona’s insanity test and its Mott rule each violate due process. The trial court denied the motion. Affirming, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the State’s insanity scheme was consistent with due process. The court read Mott as barring the trial court’s consideration of evidence of Clark’s mental illness and capacity directly on the element of mens rea. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied further review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Respondent Rudy Bladel was a disgruntled former railroad employee. In December 1978 he murdered three Amtrak employees at the Jackson, Michigan station. He was arrested on January 1, 1979. After being questioned on two occasions, he was released on January 3. He was arrested again on March 22, 1979. The next morning Bladel was arraigned. He requested appointment of counsel because he was indigent. The detective in charge of the investigation was present at the arraignment. A notice of appointment was mailed to a law firm that did not receive it until March 27. On March 26 two police officers interviewed Bladel in the county jail. They advised him of his Miranda rights and obtained a confession. Bladel had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment but had not been told that counsel had been appointed. Respondent Robert Jackson was one of four participants in a plan to kill a man on July 12, 1979. Arrested on July 30 on an unrelated charge, he made six statements to police before his arraignment at 4:30 p.m. on August 1. At the arraignment he requested appointment of counsel while officers involved in the murder investigation were present. The following morning, before he had consulted counsel, two officers obtained a seventh statement from him after again advising him of his Miranda rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially affirmed Bladel's conviction but reversed after reconsideration. It affirmed Jackson's murder conviction while setting aside the conspiracy count. The Michigan Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. It held the post-arraignment statements inadmissible and reversed both convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985.

In 1975 respondent Dorothy Finley was convicted of second-degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and sentenced to life imprisonment. Her appointed trial counsel appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which unanimously affirmed in 1978. After the direct appeal failed, Finley filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., raising the same issues previously rejected. The trial court denied relief, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in 1981 and held that state law entitled her to appointed counsel for the postconviction proceedings. On remand the trial court appointed new counsel. That attorney reviewed the trial record, consulted with Finley, concluded there were no arguable bases for relief, and submitted a written no-merit letter to the court requesting permission to withdraw. The trial court conducted its own review of the record, agreed that no meritorious issues existed, and dismissed the petition. Finley obtained new appointed counsel and appealed the dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. In 1984 that court, over a dissent, held that the postconviction counsel's conduct violated her rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, relying on procedures derived from Anders v. California. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.