Also known as: service at abode · substituted service · service of process
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A method of serving process by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the defendant's usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there.
Alexis Archer sued Alpine Mining in federal court. The process server left the papers with a neighbor at Alexis's apartment building rather than with a resident of suitable age and discretion inside the unit. Alpine moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). The court granted the motion because the delivery failed to satisfy the requirements for abode service.
Antonio Alvarado registered as a possible father under the Uniform Parentage Act. An adoption petitioner left the termination papers with Antonio's adult roommate at his listed residence. The court held that the delivery constituted valid abode service and satisfied the notice obligation to a timely registrant.
Adam Anderson had not registered but was identified as an alleged genetic father of a child over one year old. The petitioner left adoption papers with Adam's spouse at their shared home. The court ruled the abode service provided adequate notice under the statute even without prior registration.
Audrey Ashton was served by leaving process with her adult child at her temporary vacation home in the forum state. She challenged personal jurisdiction. The court examined whether the abode service combined with her contacts satisfied due process standards for exercising jurisdiction.
On May 22, 1974, appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. The complaint named as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of one or both corporations. Heitner alleged that the individual defendants had violated their fiduciary duties by causing the corporations to engage in activities that resulted in a private antitrust judgment of over thirteen million dollars and a criminal contempt fine of six hundred thousand dollars, both arising from events in Oregon. The individual defendants resided primarily in Arizona and conducted their business there. Simultaneously with the complaint, Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366. The Court of Chancery granted the motion the same day and appointed a sequestrator who seized approximately eighty-two thousand shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen defendants, along with options belonging to two others and certain debentures, warrants, and stock unit credits. The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 deemed the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations to be in the state, allowing the sequestrator to place stop-transfer orders on the corporation's books. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately one point two million dollars. All twenty-eight defendants received notice of the suit by certified mail to their last known addresses and by publication in a New Castle County newspaper. The twenty-one defendants whose property had been seized entered special appearances and moved to quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. They argued that the ex parte sequestration procedure violated due process and that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments in a letter opinion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225 (1976). The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on February 22, 1977. The individual defendants whose property was seized became the appellants before the Court. Greyhound Corporation and its subsidiary appeared in the action and moved to dismiss on the ground that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional. The sequestration order remained in effect pending resolution of the constitutional questions presented.
View caseAlan Ackerman was served at his Massachusetts home by leaving papers with a household member under the federal rule. The defendant argued state law required personal delivery. The court applied the federal abode service provision because it was a federal question case.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View caseAnchor Bank sued Apollo Energy under a contract with a forum selection clause. Service was effected by leaving papers at the defendant's usual place of abode with a resident of suitable age and discretion. The court upheld the service as consistent with the contractual expectations for notice.
In November 1967, respondent Zapata, a Houston-based American corporation, contracted with petitioner Unterweser, a German corporation, to tow Zapata's ocean-going, self-elevating drilling rig Chaparral from Louisiana to a point off Ravenna, Italy, in the Adriatic Sea. Zapata had solicited bids for the towage, and Unterweser was the low bidder. Unterweser submitted a contract containing a forum-selection clause providing that any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice, as well as exculpatory clauses. After reviewing the contract and making several changes but without altering the forum-selection or exculpatory clauses, a Zapata vice president executed the contract and forwarded it to Unterweser in Germany, where Unterweser accepted the changes and the contract became effective. On January 5, 1968, Unterweser's deep sea tug Bremen departed Venice, Louisiana, with the Chaparral in tow bound for Italy. On January 9, while the flotilla was in international waters in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico, a severe storm arose. The sharp roll of the Chaparral caused its elevator legs, which had been raised for the voyage, to break off and fall into the sea, seriously damaging the Chaparral. In this emergency situation Zapata instructed the Bremen to tow its damaged rig to Tampa, Florida, the nearest port of refuge. On January 12, Zapata commenced a suit in admiralty in the United States District Court at Tampa, seeking $3,500,000 damages against Unterweser in personam and the Bremen in rem, alleging negligent towage and breach of contract. Unterweser responded by invoking the forum clause of the towage contract. It moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or on forum non conveniens grounds, or in the alternative to stay the action pending submission of the dispute to the London Court of Justice. Shortly thereafter, Unterweser commenced an action against Zapata seeking damages for breach of the towage contract in the High Court of Justice in London. Zapata appeared in that court to contest jurisdiction, but its challenge was rejected. Unterweser was faced with a dilemma in the pending action in the United States court at Tampa because the six-month period for filing action to limit its liability was about to expire. On July 2, 1968, Unterweser filed an action to limit its liability in the District Court in Tampa. That court entered the customary injunction against proceedings outside the limitation court, and Zapata refiled its initial claim in the limitation action. It was only at this juncture, on July 29, after the six-month period had run, that the District Court denied Unterweser's January motion to dismiss or stay Zapata's initial action. The District Court later denied another motion by Unterweser to stay the limitation action and granted Zapata's motion to restrain Unterweser from litigating further in the London court. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, and on rehearing en banc the panel opinion was adopted, with six of the 14 en banc judges dissenting. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseAbode service requires leaving the papers at the defendant's usual residence with a person of suitable age and discretion who lives there. Delivery to a neighbor outside the unit or to an unsuitable person fails the rule and supports dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5).
Yes when the papers are left with a suitable resident at the registered or alleged father's usual abode. The Uniform Parentage Act expressly permits service in the manner prescribed for civil process, which includes abode service for timely registrants and alleged genetic fathers.
Yes. When service occurs at a temporary location, the court may separately analyze whether the defendant's contacts with the forum satisfy due process even if the mechanical requirements of abode service were met.
Federal rules control the method of service in federal court even when state law would require a different approach. The federal provision for leaving papers at the usual place of abode therefore governs.
…communicating the notice. It is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual. Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley, supra , 618, 619; Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co. , 198 U. S. 424,…