333 U.S. 138, 68 S. Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596 (1948)
During the period of World War II a housing shortage developed in many areas.1 Heavy demobilization of veterans after the war and the allocation of building materials to military projects during hostilities contributed to a continuing deficit in housing.2 On December 31, 1946, the President issued a proclamation that terminated hostilities though it recognized that a state of war still existed.3 Congress responded by enacting the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 which became effective on July 1, 1947.4
The following day the appellee Cloyd W. Miller Co. demanded increases of 40% and 60% for rental accommodations in the Cleveland Defense-Rental Area.5 This action violated the maximum rent provisions of the Act and the regulations adopted under it.6 Appellant Woods as Housing Expediter instituted this proceeding under section 206(b) of the Act to enjoin the violations.7 A preliminary injunction was granted but after a hearing it was dissolved and a permanent injunction was denied.8
The district court was of the view that the authority of Congress to regulate rents by virtue of the war power ended with the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on December 31, 1946.9 It also concluded that Congress did not act under the war power because it did not say so.10 It also held that the Act lacks in uniformity of application and distinctly constitutes a delegation of legislative power not within the grant of Congress because of the authorization to the Housing Expediter to lift controls in any area before the Act's expiration. The district court expressed the view that rent control is not within the war power because the emergency created by housing shortage came into existence long before the war.11
The case came before the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Act of August 24, 1937 from the judgment of the district court holding Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 unconstitutional.12
Whether the war power sustains Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947?13
The war power includes the power to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress and continues for the duration of that emergency.14 Congress may act to control the forces that a short supply of housing created by the war effort even after the cessation of hostilities.15 The Necessary and Proper Clause would otherwise be drastically limited in its application to the several war powers.16
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that a housing shortage developed during World War II.17 Heavy demobilization of veterans after the war together with the allocation of building materials to military projects during hostilities contributed to a continuing deficit in housing.18 Congress responded by enacting the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, which became effective on July 1, 1947, to address that deficit.19
The Supreme Court concluded that the war power sustains the legislation because the deficit was greatly intensified during the period of hostilities by the war effort.20 Congress retains authority to remedy conditions that necessarily followed from the mobilization of men and materials.21
The war power sustains Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter concurs in this opinion because it decides no more than was decided in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, and Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, and merely applies those decisions to the situation now before the Court.23
Justice Jackson agrees with the result but expresses more explicit misgivings about war powers than the Court has done.24 He observes that the Government asserts no constitutional basis for this legislation other than the vague, undefined and undefinable war power.25 He finds the conclusion that the war power has been applicable during the lifetime of this legislation unavoidable.26
At the same time he cautions that war powers should not be indefinitely prolonged merely by keeping legally alive a state of war that had in fact ended.27
Whether the constitutionality of action taken by Congress depends on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise?28
The question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.2930 Legislative history may be examined to determine that Congress was invoking its war power to cope with a current condition of which the war was a direct and immediate cause.31
No. The legislative history of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 makes plain that Congress was invoking its war power to cope with the housing deficit caused by the war effort.32 The Supreme Court held that the judgment of Congress on that score is entitled to the respect granted like legislation enacted pursuant to the police power.33 No explicit recitals in the statute itself are required.34
The constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.
Whether the authorization to the Housing Expediter to remove rent controls in any defense-rental area constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power?35
The standards prescribed for administrative action must pass muster under established decisions.36 Authorization to remove rent controls when the need no longer exists by reason of new construction or satisfaction of demand in other ways constitutes a valid delegation.37 The powers are far less extensive than those previously sustained and the standards are sufficiently definite.38
No. Under the Act the Housing Expediter is authorized to remove rent controls in any defense-rental area if in his judgment the need no longer exists due to sufficient construction or satisfaction of demand.39 The Supreme Court held that these powers are far less extensive than those sustained in prior cases.40 The standards prescribed pass muster under decisions upholding comparable delegations.41
The authorization to the Housing Expediter to remove rent controls in any defense-rental area does not constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.42
Whether the Act's exemption of hotels providing customary services, motor courts, tourist homes serving transient guests, and newly constructed or converted housing accommodations violates the Fifth Amendment?43
Congress need not control all rents or none and may select those areas or classes of property where the need seems the greatest.44 Exemptions of hotels providing customary services, motor courts, tourist homes serving transient guests, and newly constructed or converted housing accommodations do not violate the Fifth Amendment.45 Similar exemptions under the Fourteenth Amendment were upheld in earlier rent-control cases.46
No. The Act exempts hotels providing customary services, motor courts, tourist homes serving transient guests, and newly constructed or converted housing.47 The Supreme Court held that Congress is not under greater limitations than the states.48 This alone adequately answers the objection that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment.49
The Act's exemption of hotels providing customary services, motor courts, tourist homes serving transient guests, and newly constructed or converted housing accommodations does not violate the Fifth Amendment.50
Whether the Act lacks uniformity of application in violation of the Constitution?51
No. The Act applies only in defense-rental areas such as the Cleveland Defense-Rental Area and exempts specified classes of housing including hotels providing customary services, motor courts, tourist homes, and newly constructed accommodations.54 The Supreme Court held that the objection of nonuniformity is equally applicable to the original rent-control statute previously sustained.55 Congress is not required to control all rents or none and may instead select those areas or classes of property where the need seems the greatest.56
The Act does not lack uniformity of application in violation of the Constitution.57