391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968)
In 1959 the petitioner shot and killed a policeman in Cook County, Illinois, during a struggle with a woman he had met in a tavern.1 The petitioner was brought to trial in 1960 upon a charge of murder.2
At the time an Illinois statute provided that in trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment or that he is opposed to the same.3 Through this provision the prosecution eliminated nearly half the venire of prospective jurors by challenging any who expressed qualms about capital punishment.4 From those who remained were chosen the jurors who ultimately found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to death.5
The trial judge stated early in the voir dire that the conscientious objectors should be gotten out of the way without wasting time.6 In rapid succession forty-seven veniremen were successfully challenged for cause on the basis of their attitudes toward the death penalty.7 Only five of the forty-seven explicitly stated that under no circumstances would they vote to impose capital punishment.8 Six said that they did not believe in the death penalty and were excused without any attempt to determine whether they could nonetheless return a verdict of death.9 Thirty-nine veniremen acknowledged having conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty and were excluded without effort to find out whether their scruples would invariably compel them to vote against capital punishment.10
One venireman who admitted to a religious or conscientious scruple against the infliction of the death penalty in a proper case was examined at length.11 She was asked whether she believed in the death penalty and replied that she would not want to be responsible.12 After the judge admonished her about her duty as a citizen she repeated that she would not like to be responsible for deciding somebody should be put to death and was told to step aside.13 After conviction the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in 1963.14 The petitioner pursued post-conviction relief in state and federal courts without initially raising the jury-selection claim.15 In 1965 he filed a new state petition that raised the claim for the first time; the Illinois Supreme Court denied relief and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether a state may constitutionally execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which prospective jurors were excluded for cause because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction?17
A State may not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.18 A sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.19
No. The established facts establish that in 1959 the petitioner shot and killed a policeman in Cook County, Illinois, during a struggle with a woman he had met in a tavern. The petitioner was brought to trial in 1960 upon a charge of murder under an Illinois statute that made conscientious scruples against capital punishment a cause for challenge.
Through this statute the prosecution eliminated nearly half the venire of prospective jurors by challenging any who expressed qualms about capital punishment. The trial judge stated early in the voir dire that the conscientious objectors should be gotten out of the way without wasting time. In rapid succession forty-seven veniremen were successfully challenged for cause on the basis of their attitudes toward the death penalty.
Only five of the forty-seven explicitly stated that under no circumstances would they vote to impose capital punishment. Thirty-nine veniremen acknowledged having conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty and were excluded without effort to determine whether their scruples would invariably compel them to vote against capital punishment. One venireman examined at length was excused after repeating that she would not like to be responsible for deciding somebody should be put to death.
After conviction the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in 1963. The petitioner pursued post-conviction relief in state and federal courts without initially raising the jury-selection claim. In 1965 he filed a new state petition that raised the claim for the first time and the Illinois Supreme Court denied relief. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. A jury culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment cannot speak for the community on the ultimate question of life or death.
The petitioner's death sentence cannot be carried out because the jury that imposed it was selected in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.20
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Joined by Mr. Justice Harlan And Mr. Justice White
Justice Black dissented and argued that the majority's decision forces states to try murder cases with biased juries.21 He maintained that the Illinois courts under Justice Schaefer had not stacked the deck against the petitioner.22 The statute ensures an impartial jury by excluding those who cannot stand indifferent between the government and the accused on the penalty issue.23
Able defense counsel had accepted the jury without objection at trial.24
Justice White dissented and argued that the Constitution permits a legislature to delegate the penalty decision to a group that will impose the death penalty more often than another group.25 The majority's raw assertion lacks analytic basis.26 The Illinois statute represents a reasonable legislative choice to implement the majority's will on sentencing while preserving unanimous verdicts.27
Whether the exclusion of prospective jurors opposed to capital punishment results in a jury biased in favor of conviction on the issue of guilt?28
The data adduced by the petitioner are too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt.29 The Court is not prepared to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction returned by a jury selected after excluding those opposed to capital punishment.30
No. The petitioner contended that a jury selected after excluding those opposed to capital punishment must necessarily be biased in favor of conviction because such jurors would too readily ignore the presumption of innocence.31 The petitioner referred to competent scientific evidence that death-qualified jurors are partial to the prosecution on the issue of guilt or innocence. The established facts contain no specific studies or data demonstrating that the exclusion in this case produced an unrepresentative jury on guilt or substantially increased the risk of conviction. The Court therefore declines to reverse the conviction on this ground.
The exclusion of prospective jurors opposed to capital punishment does not on this record require reversal of the guilt determination.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas filed a separate opinion concurring in the reversal of the penalty but arguing that the jury must be impartially drawn from a cross-section of the community.33 He maintained that systematic exclusion of those opposed to capital punishment deprives the accused of a representative jury on both guilt and punishment.34 Prejudice results from class exclusion based on beliefs even without a specific showing of likelihood of bias in the particular case.35
Whether a jury selected after excluding all veniremen who expressed any reservations about capital punishment can perform the discretionary task of determining whether death is the proper penalty?36
A jury from which all who oppose the death penalty have been excluded cannot perform the discretionary task of choosing between life imprisonment and capital punishment because it can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority rather than the conscience of the community.37
No. In Illinois the jury is given broad discretion to decide whether death is the proper penalty in a given case and a juror's general views about capital punishment play an inevitable role in that decision.38 The established facts show that the prosecution excluded not only those who would never vote for death but also those with general conscientious or religious scruples or opposition in principle. This produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die. A man who opposes the death penalty can nonetheless make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and obey the oath he takes as a juror.
A jury selected after excluding all veniremen who expressed any reservations about capital punishment cannot constitutionally determine the penalty of death.39