529 U.S. 362 (2000)
On November 3, 1985, Harris Stone was found dead in his residence on Henry Street in Danville, Virginia.1
Six months after Stone's death, Terry Williams, who was then incarcerated in the city jail for an unrelated offense, wrote a letter to the police stating that he had killed that man down on Henry Street.2 The police identified Williams as the author from the letter's reference to "I cell" and obtained several statements from him on April 25, 1986.3 In one statement Williams admitted that after Stone refused to lend him a couple of dollars, he had killed Stone with a mattock and taken the money from his wallet.4
In September 1986, Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder.5 At the sentencing hearing the prosecution proved that Williams had been convicted of armed robbery in 1976 and burglary and grand larceny in 1982.6 The prosecution introduced his written confessions to two auto thefts and two separate violent assaults on elderly victims after the Stone murder.7 The prosecution also presented evidence that Williams had been convicted of arson for setting a fire in the jail while awaiting trial and expert testimony that there was a high probability that Williams would pose a serious continuing threat to society.8
Williams' trial counsel offered the testimony of Williams' mother, two neighbors, and a taped excerpt from a psychiatrist's statement.9 Counsel emphasized in closing argument that Williams had turned himself in on four crimes the police otherwise would not have solved.10 The jury found a probability of future dangerousness and fixed Williams' punishment at death, which the trial judge imposed.11 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.12
In 1988 Williams filed for state collateral relief in the Danville Circuit Court.13 After an evidentiary hearing the circuit court found that trial counsel had been ineffective during sentencing but recommended a rehearing on the sentencing phase.14 The Virginia Supreme Court assumed without deciding that trial counsel had been ineffective but held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice.15 Williams then sought federal habeas corpus relief.16 The federal district court agreed that the death sentence was constitutionally infirm after reviewing the state habeas hearing transcript and findings.17 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.19
Whether Terry Williams' constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated?20
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense by creating a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.21
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that trial counsel failed to investigate and present extensive mitigating evidence of Williams' abusive childhood, borderline mental retardation, and positive conduct in structured settings.22 This omission resulted from an erroneous belief that state law barred access to the records rather than any strategic decision.23 This performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness required by the first prong.24
The prejudice prong is satisfied because the state habeas court, after hearing the omitted evidence, found a reasonable probability that the sentencing result would have differed.25 The federal district court confirmed that finding upon review of the full record.26
Williams' constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Kennedy
Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that the Virginia Supreme Court's adjudication of Williams' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a decision that was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedent.28 She explained that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was contrary to Strickland itself because it held that a focus on outcome determination was insufficient standing alone.29 O'Connor stressed that Williams' case did not implicate the unusual circumstances present in cases like Lockhart or Nix v. Whiteside.30
She further observed that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision revealed an obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence.31 O'Connor clarified that under § 2254(d)(1)'s unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly; rather, that application must also be unreasonable.32
Whether the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court refusing to set aside his death sentence was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?33
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.34 Strickland qualifies as clearly established law.35 A state court errs when it misapplies that standard by requiring more than a reasonable probability of a different outcome or by failing to weigh the totality of available mitigation evidence.36
Yes. The established facts show that the Virginia Supreme Court assumed deficient performance but rejected prejudice by relying on Lockhart to demand more than outcome determination.37 The court characterized the omitted mitigation evidence as barely altering the defendant's profile without considering its full cumulative weight against the aggravation evidence.38 This approach was contrary to Strickland because it imposed an incorrect legal standard.39
It was an unreasonable application because the court failed to reweigh all mitigation evidence, including the childhood abuse and mental limitations, against the prosecution's case.40
The judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Scalia And Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) but dissented from the grant of relief.42 He concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court properly applied Strickland without relying on Lockhart.43 Rehnquist found that the state court's prejudice determination was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence of future dangerousness.44
He noted the crime spree that included the murder and subsequent violent acts.45 Rehnquist emphasized that it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that a jury would not have been swayed by evidence of a terrible childhood and low IQ in light of the strong future-danger evidence.46