502 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App. 2016)
Brandon Joseph Williams, an Army veteran, was convicted by a jury of murdering Veta Karla Conrad, known as Karla.1 The jury assessed punishment at sixty-seven years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. Williams timely appealed to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).2
Karla and her daughter Sarah were living with Williams at the residence of his mother, Belinda Sue Williams, in Lake Jackson, Texas. Karla and Sarah shared Sue's bedroom while Sue slept on the living room couch and Williams had his own bedroom.3 On the night of the shooting, Williams, who had been using synthetic marijuana and methamphetamine, woke Sue and said he heard something outside. He told her to take Karla and Sarah into the bathroom, but Sue refused to avoid scaring them.4
Williams went through the kitchen and out the backdoor.5 Sue rose and saw him standing in the breezeway by the garage.6 He appeared startled, fell backwards, then raised and pointed his gun at her while advancing and yelling for her to get on the ground.7 Sue backed up, turned on a lamp, identified herself as his mother, and knelt on one knee.8 A single bullet from Williams's gun struck Karla, who had entered the room behind Sue. Sue tackled Williams, causing the gun to fly out of his hand, and held him down until police arrived after Sarah called 911.9
Approximately twelve hours after the shooting and after emergency medical treatment, Williams gave a recorded statement to investigators. In the statement he described seeing a figure, directing it to put its hands up and identify itself, and firing one round. He acknowledged shooting someone and described delusions and fighting with the devil.10 Williams tested positive for amphetamines and cannabis; the attending emergency room physician noted his heart rate, blood pressure, and respiratory rate were so elevated from the drugs that an abnormally high level of benzodiazepines was required.11 At trial Sue testified that she believed Williams had been suffering from PTSD or a flashback, though she had been unaware of his recent drug use in the house.12
Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Williams of murder on the ground that the State failed to establish the requisite mental state?13
A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.14 Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon unless the manner of use makes it reasonably apparent that death or serious bodily injury could not result.15 Evidence of mental illness or voluntary intoxication provides at best an excuse for the offense rather than negating mens rea, and the jury is the exclusive judge of credibility and the weight to be given the evidence.16
No. Williams used a firearm, a deadly weapon per se, in a deadly manner by firing one round at the figure after directing it to put its hands up and identify itself, as shown in his recorded statement.17 Although Williams had used synthetic marijuana and methamphetamine shortly before the shooting and tested positive for amphetamines and cannabis, his mother Sue testified she believed he was suffering from PTSD or a flashback.18 The jury was not required to credit that testimony given her unawareness of his recent drug use in the house.19 The established facts confirm that Williams acknowledged shooting someone, never claimed the gun accidentally discharged, and described the sequence of events in detail, allowing the inference of intent under the rule.20
The evidence was sufficient to support Williams's conviction for murder.21
Whether the trial court erred by denying Williams's pretrial motion to suppress his oral confession on the ground that it was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily?22
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.23 We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and to the trial court's application of law to fact questions that turn upon credibility and demeanor.24 Voluntariness is assessed under the totality of the circumstances, including the accused's experience, background, conduct, and characteristics such as mental illness or intoxication; a confession is involuntary only if the totality demonstrates the confessor did not make the decision of his own free will, and claims based on state of mind are resolved under article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.25
No. The trial court's amended findings established that Williams requested to speak with investigators, was properly advised of his Miranda and statutory rights, nodded affirmatively when asked if he understood, communicated appropriately without appearing intoxicated or hallucinating during the seventy-two-minute interview, and never requested counsel or asked to stop.26 The established facts show the statement occurred approximately twelve hours after the shooting and after emergency treatment restored his vital signs, with Williams describing the events coherently, expressing remorse, and showing no ongoing delusions or loss of control, supporting the conclusion that he made an independent and informed decision under the totality of circumstances.27
The trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the oral confession.28
Whether the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony during the guilt/innocence phase concerning Williams's mental illness and PTSD?29
A trial court's decision to exclude evidence of mental illness is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.30 Diminished-capacity evidence is admissible only if it directly rebuts the particular mens rea necessary for the charged offense. Expert testimony that merely provides an excuse or justification for forming intent, or that describes disorders without addressing the defendant's ability to form the intent to kill or act knowingly, is not relevant and may be excluded.31
No. The oral proffer of testimony from Drs. Axelrad, Fuller, and Harrison described Williams's PTSD, depressive disorder, cannabis abuse, ADHD, possible Tourette's, and drug-induced psychotic disorder but contained nothing about his ability or inability to form the intent to kill Karla or to act with knowledge of his conduct and its consequences.32 The established facts show that Williams turned, saw a figure, directed it to put its hands up and identify itself, and fired one round, and the proffered evidence therefore did not negate the mens rea element for murder under the rule.33
The trial court did not err by excluding the expert testimony during the guilt/innocence phase.34
Whether the trial court erred by rejecting the requested lesser-included offense instructions in the jury charge?35
Review of alleged charge error requires determining first whether error existed and second whether sufficient harm resulted from the error.36 A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction only if the proof necessary to establish the charged offense also includes the lesser offense. If this threshold is met, the court must then consider whether the evidence shows that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense. An appellant must provide citations to the record and substantive legal argument with authorities to preserve the complaint.37
No. Although the State did not dispute that voluntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and deadly conduct fall within murder, Williams provided no citations to any portion of the record containing evidence germane to the requested instructions and offered only the conclusory assertion that the record contained a mountain of evidence he was guilty only of a lesser offense.38 The established facts contain no substantive analysis or authorities addressing the standard for harm under Almanza, rendering the briefing inadequate under the rule.
The trial court did not err by rejecting the lesser-included offense instructions.39