493 P.2d 987
Genevieve McGuigan owned two abutting lots in Pacifica known as lots 19 and 20.1 There was a building on lot 19, and lot 20 was vacant.2 McGuigan was a member of the church, which was located across the street from her lots, and she permitted it to use lot 20 for parking during services.3
She sold lot 19 to one Petersen, who used the building as an office.4 He wanted to resell the lot, so he listed it with Willard, who is a realtor.5 Willard expressed an interest in purchasing both lots 19 and 20, and he and Petersen signed a deposit receipt for the sale of the two lots.6 Soon thereafter they entered into an escrow, into which Petersen delivered a deed for both lots in fee simple.7
At the time he agreed to sell lot 20 to Willard, Petersen did not own it, so he approached McGuigan with an offer to purchase it.8 She was willing to sell the lot provided the church could continue to use it for parking.9 She therefore referred the matter to the church's attorney.10 The attorney drew up a provision for the deed that stated the conveyance was subject to an easement for automobile parking during church hours for the benefit of the church on the property at the southwest corner of the intersection of Hilton Way and Francisco Boulevard.11 Such easement was to run with the land only so long as the property for whose benefit the easement is given is used for church purposes.12
Once this clause was inserted in the deed, McGuigan sold the property to Petersen.13 He recorded the deed.14
Willard paid the agreed purchase price into the escrow and received Petersen's deed 10 days later.15 He then recorded this deed, which did not mention an easement for parking by the church.16 While Petersen did mention to Willard that the church would want to use lot 20 for parking, it does not appear that he told him of the easement clause contained in the deed he received from McGuigan.17
Willard became aware of the easement clause several months after purchasing the property.18 He then commenced this action to quiet title against the church.19 At the trial, which was without a jury, McGuigan testified that she had bought lot 20 to provide parking for the church, and would not have sold it unless she was assured the church could thereafter continue to use it for parking.20 The court found that McGuigan and Petersen intended to convey an easement to the church.21 After a trial, judgment was entered quieting the Willards' title.22 The church has appealed.23
Whether a grantor may, in deeding real property to one person, effectively reserve an interest in the property to another?24
The common law rule that a grantor cannot reserve an interest in property to a stranger to the deed is abandoned because it frustrates the grantor's intent and is based on outdated feudal considerations.25
Yes. The court applies the principle that the primary objective in construing a conveyance is to give effect to the intent of the grantor rather than rigid feudal standards.26 In this case, McGuigan intended to convey an easement to the church.27 This is evidenced by her testimony that she would not have sold the lot without assurance the church could continue parking there.28 She also discounted the price by about one-third.29 The clause inserted by the church's attorney stated the conveyance was subject to the easement for the benefit of the church.30 The trial court found the parties intended to convey the easement.31 Therefore, the reservation effectively vests the interest in the church despite the common law rule.32
The old rule derived from feudal considerations and mistrust of conveyances by deed, but modern courts focus on effectuating the parties' intentions as in contracts.33 Several states have abandoned the rule, and California follows suit to avoid inequitable results where the grantee paid a reduced price for encumbered property.34