551 U.S. 537 (2007)
In 1994 Harvey Frank Robbins purchased the High Island Ranch in Hot Springs County, Wyoming, a patchwork of mostly contiguous land parcels intermingled with tracts belonging to other private owners, the State of Wyoming, and the National Government.1 The ranch's previous owner, George Nelson, had granted the United States a nonexclusive deed of easement over South Fork Owl Creek Road in exchange for a right-of-way across federal land that connected otherwise isolated parts of the ranch, but the Bureau of Land Management failed to record the easement, allowing Robbins to take title free of it under Wyoming law upon recording his warranty deed.2
After discovering the unrecorded easement in June 1994, Bureau employee Joseph Vessels telephoned Robbins and demanded that he regrant the easement.3 Robbins refused but indicated he would consider granting one in return for something; Vessels responded that the Federal Government does not negotiate, and talks broke down, after which Bureau officials including defendants Charles Wilkie and others undertook a series of actions against Robbins.4
Over the following years those actions included an unauthorized survey of the desired easement's terrain, cancellation of the reciprocal right-of-way originally given to Nelson, reduction of Robbins's five-year Special Recreation Use Permit to annual renewal, numerous administrative trespass and land-use violation charges, and a fine for unauthorized road repairs that Robbins appealed unsuccessfully to the Interior Board of Land Appeals.5 In 1997 Bureau employees filed two criminal charges against Robbins for knowingly and forcibly impeding and interfering with a federal employee; a jury acquitted him after deliberating less than thirty minutes.6
In 1999 the Bureau denied renewal of Robbins's Special Recreation Use Permit and revoked his grazing permit, the latter action being stayed by the Interior Board of Land Appeals, while additional incidents included Bureau employees videotaping ranch guests during a cattle drive, an attempt by defendant David Wallace to pressure a Bureau of Indian Affairs employee to impound Robbins's cattle, and encouragement of a neighbor to press trespass charges after an altercation with Robbins.78
Robbins filed suit in federal district court in 1998 against the Bureau officials.9 He originally included the United States but later dismissed it.10 He sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief on a RICO claim alleging that the officials repeatedly tried to extort an easement from him.11 He also brought a Bivens claim alleging violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.12
The district court dismissed some claims on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment but denied qualified immunity on the Fifth Amendment retaliation claim and the RICO claim.13 The Tenth Circuit affirmed those denials, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether a landowner has a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens against federal officials for a campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at extracting an easement?15
The decision whether to recognize a Bivens remedy requires two steps. First, whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.16 Second, even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment, paying particular heed to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.17
No. In the established facts, Robbins had an administrative, and ultimately a judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints through opportunities to contest administrative charges before the IBLA and seek judicial review under the APA.18 Although the combination of remedies was a patchwork, it provided means to be heard on each incident such as the unauthorized survey, permit reductions, and criminal charges.19 At step two, the difficulty in defining a workable cause of action for too much pressure in hard bargaining situations, as opposed to what for questions in traditional retaliation cases, counsels hesitation.20 Recognizing such a remedy would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing OSHA regulations.21
Robbins does not have a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas would not extend Bivens even if its reasoning logically applied to this case.23 He views Bivens as a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.24 Accordingly, in his view, Bivens and its progeny should be limited to the precise circumstances that they involved.25
This position reflects a broader skepticism toward judicial creation of new damages remedies against federal officials absent explicit congressional authorization.26
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, would recognize the Bivens claim because Robbins lacked an effective alternative remedy as piecemeal litigation cannot forestall death by a thousand cuts.27 The harassment was severe and pervasive over seven years, and the fear of floodgates is exaggerated as shown by the absence of similar claims under section 1983.28 The Fifth Amendment forbids government action calculated to acquire private property coercively and cost-free, and the officials' conduct violated Robbins's right to refuse an uncompensated taking.29
A pattern of severe and pervasive harassment should be actionable under a standard analogous to Title VII hostile environment claims.30
Whether RICO gives a landowner a claim against federal officials in their individual capacities based on alleged extortion under the Hobbs Act when the National Government is the intended beneficiary of the allegedly extortionate acts?31
The Hobbs Act does not apply when the National Government is the intended beneficiary of allegedly extortionate acts because at common law, extortion focused on the harm of public corruption by selling public favors for private gain, not on overzealous efforts to obtain property on the Government's behalf.32 Congress is presumed to have incorporated this common law conception when it passed the Hobbs Act in 1946.33
No. In the established facts, the Bureau officials sought the easement for the benefit of the National Government rather than for private gain.34 The common law conception of extortion under color of official right was the rough equivalent of taking a bribe for private benefit.35 There is no example in the Hobbs Act's 60-year history of extortion for the sole benefit of the Government.36 Therefore, the conduct does not constitute a predicate offense under RICO on either federal or state law grounds.37
RICO does not give Robbins a claim against defendants in their individual capacities.38