85 A. 399 (Me. 1912)
For several years prior to 1910, a religious sect led by the defendant gathered at a colony called Shiloh in Durham, Maine. There was a similar colony at Jaffa in Syria.1 The defendant served as president of a Yacht Club that owned the sailing yachts Kingdom and Coronet.2 These yachts transported members between the Maine coast and Jaffa.3
The plaintiff, a member of the sect whose husband was one of its ministers, sailed with her four children on the Coronet to Jaffa in 1905.4 She lived in Jerusalem and Jaffa until March 1909, when she decided to abandon the movement.5
On December 24, 1909, the Kingdom lay in Jaffa harbor with the defendant aboard.6 After receiving assurances that she would be returned to shore and would be free to leave upon reaching port, the plaintiff boarded the Kingdom on December 28 and sailed for America.7 The Kingdom arrived in Portland Harbor on the afternoon of Sunday, May 8, 1910.8 Later both yachts sailed to South Freeport, reaching there Tuesday morning, May 10.9 From this time until June 6 the plaintiff claims that she was prevented from leaving the Kingdom by the defendant in such manner as to constitute false imprisonment.10
On June 4, 1910, application was made to a Justice of this court for a writ of habeas corpus to take and bring before the court the plaintiff and her four minor children.11 It was alleged they were restrained of their liberty on the yacht Kingdom by the defendant or others in charge.12 The application was made by one Harriman under R. S., Chap. 101, Section 4.13 The Justice ordered the writ to issue as prayed for, returnable before me at the Court House in Auburn, and to be heard on Wednesday, June 8, 1910, 2 P. M.14 The officer took the plaintiff and children and carried them before the Justice, who after hearing discharged them.15 The defendant himself was not then on board the Kingdom but was on the Coronet lying not far away.16 The defendant did not attend the hearing.17
At trial the plaintiff claimed and testified that on two or three occasions the defendant personally refused to furnish her with a boat so that she could leave the Kingdom.18 When she wanted to go ashore they had talked against it.19 The defendant had spoken plainly that it was out of the question.20 When she spoke to him about it he said he would leave it to her husband to do what he wanted to.21 He would not take the responsibility of separating families.22 When she asked her husband to take her ashore he replied we will see Mr. Sanford about it and see what he says.23
Several years ago the defendant said that God gave him a message that Elijah was here.24 He was the second Elijah and had come to prepare the way for the coming of Christ.25 He talked that to the people in the movement for years and they knew him as Elijah.26 Later he said God gave him messages and made him know that the Kingdom of God was established again on earth.27 God made him know that he was to be king among the people.28 The twelve tribes of Israel were scattered out over all the earth.29 God scattered them when they were in Palestine after he had brought them out of the land of Egypt.30 They sinned and he scattered them.31 But he said that in the last days they should be restored and brought back to Palestine.32 Palestine should be made a glorious land again as God intended it to be.33 These people should be gathered up and brought back and restored to the true religion of Jesus Christ.34 God said in the Bible among the prophesies that when these days come and the people are restored He is going to give them a king.35 He said that a king shall reign and rule in righteousness.36 God made him know that he was King David and that he was to reign and rule in righteousness and that all the earth was going to bow to him.37 All the people in the movement at Shiloh know him as King David and call him so.38
The defendant did not become a witness.39 It is claimed for him that after Tuesday, May 10, he assumed no responsibility whatever for the plaintiff and left her in the care of her husband.40 He specifically said that he would leave it to her husband to say whether she could leave the yacht.41 The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $1100.42 The case comes up on defendant’s exceptions and motion for a new trial.43
The presiding Justice instructed the jury that the discharge of the plaintiff on habeas corpus is not a judicial determination of the question involved here.44 The defendant would not be bound by that adjudication of a single Justice under the circumstances of this case, there being no notice to him and he having no opportunity to be heard upon it.45 You have a right for the purposes of this trial to consider the fact that she did resort to this petition of habeas corpus to obtain her release as bearing upon the testimony and all the circumstances surrounding her at that time as tending to show that she was restrained of her liberty.46 The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that to maintain her action the plaintiff must show some actual physical force exercised by the defendant or by someone acting as his agent and by his authority to restrain her of her liberty.47
Whether the record of habeas corpus proceedings was admissible in evidence in the plaintiff's action for false imprisonment?48
A record of habeas corpus proceedings is admissible in a false imprisonment action when offered to show when and how the plaintiff obtained her liberty.49 It demonstrates the improbability that she was free to leave, provided the jury is instructed that any discharge is not a binding judicial determination on the defendant.50
Yes. The habeas corpus record was properly admitted because it formed part of the history of the transaction and tended to show that the plaintiff was restrained of her liberty on the Kingdom.51 The application was made by Harriman on June 4, 1910, under R. S., Chap. 101, Section 4. The officer took the plaintiff and children from the yacht on June 6, and they were discharged after hearing.52 The presiding justice instructed the jury that the discharge was not binding on the defendant and could be considered only as bearing on the conduct of the plaintiff and the surrounding circumstances.53 This limited application rendered the record admissible.54
It served as evidence of the parties' conduct and the improbability of the plaintiff's freedom to depart at will.55
The record of the habeas corpus proceedings was admissible.56
Whether testimony describing the defendant's religious claims and asserted authority over members of the movement was admissible?57
Testimony describing a defendant's religious claims and asserted authority over movement members is admissible when it tends to show the nature and extent of the defendant's power and influence over those members, including the plaintiff's husband, as one step in proving that such authority was exercised to restrain the plaintiff.58
Yes. The testimony describing the defendant's religious claims was admissible because it supported a fair inference that a person believed by his followers to be the second Elijah and King David would likely obtain the power and influence needed to control the actions of members such as the plaintiff's husband.59 The plaintiff testified that the defendant had stated God made him know he was King David who was to reign and rule in righteousness, and that all people in the movement at Shiloh knew him as King David.60 A defense witness confirmed without objection that members believed Mr. Sanford was the David spoken of in the last days.61
This evidence was relevant both to the defendant's control over the husband and to rebut the claim that the captain and officers exercised independent authority over the boats.62
The testimony describing the defendant's religious claims and asserted authority was admissible.63
Whether the plaintiff's declaration required proof of actual physical force exercised by the defendant or his agents to recover for false imprisonment?64
Recovery for false imprisonment requires proof of actual physical restraint, which may be shown by intentional refusal to furnish agreed transportation when the plaintiff has no other means of escape, and does not require the laying on of hands or other direct physical force by the defendant or his agents.65
No. The plaintiff's declaration did not require proof of actual physical force exercised by the defendant or his agents.6667 The remaining counts alleged unlawful restraint by force and against the will of the plaintiff.68 The court correctly instructed that physical restraint exists when one intentionally locked into a room cannot leave or when a person in control of a vessel refuses a boat to a guest who has no other means to reach shore.69 The presiding justice told the jury that the restraint must be physical in the sense that one intentionally locked into a room would be physically restrained, though not necessarily involving physical force upon the person, and that refusing the boat was equivalent to turning the key.70
The defendant requested an instruction requiring actual physical force by the defendant or his agent, but that request was properly denied.71
The plaintiff's declaration did not require proof of actual physical force exercised by the defendant or his agents.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant unlawfully restrained the plaintiff of her liberty?72
Evidence is sufficient to support a finding of unlawful imprisonment when it shows that the defendant had the power to control the means of departure, personally refused the plaintiff a boat on multiple occasions, and through his influence over the plaintiff's husband prevented her from leaving the yacht despite her repeated requests.73
Yes. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant unlawfully restrained the plaintiff of her liberty because the defendant had the power to control the boats, personally refused the plaintiff a boat on multiple occasions, and through his influence caused the husband to refer all requests back to him.74 The Kingdom arrived in South Freeport on May 10, 1910, and from that date until June 6 the plaintiff was prevented from leaving. The plaintiff testified that the defendant refused her requests and that her husband replied they would see Mr. Sandford.75
The defendant did not testify, and the jury could find that he was the controlling factor who possessed the key to the situation and intentionally refused to use it, thereby restraining the plaintiff in violation of his duty under the agreement made in Jaffa.76
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant unlawfully restrained the plaintiff of her liberty.77
Whether the damages awarded by the jury were excessive?78
A verdict for false imprisonment is excessive when the plaintiff was afforded all liberties of the yacht, was taken ashore by her husband for shopping and visits to neighboring islands, and suffered no elements of humiliation or disgrace that frequently attend such imprisonment.79
Yes. The damages awarded by the jury were excessive because the plaintiff was not in close confinement, was afforded all the liberties of the yacht, went ashore with her husband to shop and visit a bank, visited neighboring islands for family picnics, and was respectfully treated as a guest except that she could not quit the yacht permanently.80 The jury returned a verdict of $1100, but the court determined that this amount was manifestly excessive under the circumstances shown by the evidence.81
The damages awarded by the jury were excessive.82