376 U.S. 1 (1964)
In 1931 the Georgia legislature enacted a statute that divided the state into ten congressional districts.1 One of those districts, the Fifth, encompassed Fulton, DeKalb, and Rockdale Counties.2
The Fifth District had a 1960 census population of 823,680.3 The average population of the ten districts was 394,312, and the Ninth District contained only 272,154 people.4 These figures produced substantial disparities in which the Fifth District's Congressman represented from two to three times as many people as Congressmen from other districts.56
Appellants, citizens and qualified voters of Fulton County residing in the Fifth District, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the Governor and Secretary of State of Georgia.7 They sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1931 statute was invalid and an injunction against conducting elections under it.8 The complaint alleged that the population disparities deprived them of rights under Article I, Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment.9
A three-judge district court unanimously found that the Fifth District's population was grossly out of balance with the other nine districts.10 A majority nevertheless dismissed the complaint by relying on Colegrove v. Green and concluding that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question or warranted dismissal for want of equity.11 Judge Tuttle dissented from the dismissal, though he would have denied immediate injunctive relief to permit the Georgia legislature an opportunity to act.12
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and later reversed the dismissal.13
Whether challenges to the apportionment of congressional districts present justiciable questions?14
Challenges to congressional district apportionment present justiciable questions.15
Yes. The established facts show that appellants, citizens and qualified voters of Fulton County in Georgia's Fifth Congressional District, sued the Governor and Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) to challenge the 1931 Georgia statute creating ten districts with gross population disparities, including 823,680 in the Fifth District against an average of 394,312 and 272,154 in the Ninth.16 A three-judge district court unanimously found the Fifth District grossly out of balance.17 A majority dismissed the complaint by relying on Colegrove v. Green to label the matter a nonjusticiable political question or one warranting dismissal for want of equity.18
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.19 It held that the reasoning of Baker v. Carr applies equally here.20 Nothing in Article I, Section 4 immunizes state apportionment laws from judicial protection of constitutional voting rights as recognized since Marbury v. Madison.21 The district court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint on either nonjusticiability or want of equity grounds.22
Challenges to the apportionment of congressional districts present justiciable questions.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark agreed that congressional districting is subject to judicial scrutiny under precedents such as Smiley v. Holm and Baker v. Carr.23 Those cases settled the issue of justiciability for questions of congressional redistricting.24 He would have examined the Georgia districts under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Article I, Section 2.25
He would have vacated the judgment to remand for a hearing on the merits and recommended applying Baker standards at that hearing.26 He also suggested deferring coercive relief if the legislature appeared likely to act appropriately, respecting ongoing state processes.27
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that Article I, Sections 2, 4, and 5 commit regulation of the times, places, and manner of congressional elections exclusively to state legislatures, subject only to congressional supervision.28 This structure renders the claim nonjusticiable in federal court as part of the separation of powers.29 The matter lies beyond judicial power because the Constitution has committed the field exclusively to the political process.30
He would have affirmed the judgment below dismissing the complaint.31
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Stewart stated that this Court has power to afford relief in a case of this type as against the objection that the issues are not justiciable.32 With this single qualification he joined the dissent.33 He could not subscribe to any possible implication to the contrary which may lurk in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion.34
He joined because Justice Harlan demonstrated that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution gives no mandate to this Court or to any court to ordain that congressional districts within each State must be equal in population.35
Whether Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that congressional districts within a state contain substantially equal populations?36
Article I, Section 2 provides that Representatives shall be chosen by the People of the several States and apportioned among the States according to their respective Numbers.37 Construed in its historical context from the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates, the provision requires that as nearly as is practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.38 This makes equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.39
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the 1931 Georgia statute created districts with populations varying from 823,680 in the Fifth District to 272,154 in the Ninth against an average of 394,312.40 The disparities thereby contracted the value of some votes and expanded others.41 The Court held that the command of Article I, Section 2 that Representatives be chosen by the People means equal representation based on population.42
That principle was fought for at the Convention through the Great Compromise.43 It is reflected in Madison's Federalist writings and ratification debates.44 Those sources emphasize that numbers of inhabitants form the basis of representation without tolerating rotten boroughs or unequal districts within a state.45
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that congressional districts within a state contain substantially equal populations.46
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark stated that the historical background and language of Article I, Section 2 preclude a finding that it lays down an ipse dixit of one person one vote in congressional elections.47 He would instead have applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to test the Georgia districts.48 He viewed the equal protection clause as the proper vehicle for addressing discriminatory districting because such legislation is exactly the kind the clause was intended to prohibit.49
Justice Harlan dissented that Article I, Section 2 confers the right to vote for Representatives only on those whom the State has found qualified to vote for members of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.50 It gives states plenary power to select their allotted Representatives in accordance with any method of popular election they please, subject only to the supervisory power of Congress under Section 4.51 There is no requirement of equal population districts within the constitutional text or history because Georgia's ten Representatives are elected by the People of Georgia just as in other States.52
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Stewart stated that this Court has power to afford relief in a case of this type as against the objection that the issues are not justiciable. With this single qualification he joined the dissent. He could not subscribe to any possible implication to the contrary which may lurk in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion.
He joined because Justice Harlan demonstrated that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution gives no mandate to this Court or to any court to ordain that congressional districts within each State must be equal in population.
Whether the 1931 Georgia congressional apportionment statute creates unconstitutional population disparities among districts?53
Yes. The established facts establish that the 1931 Georgia statute produced a Fifth District of 823,680 people against an average of 394,312 and a Ninth District of only 272,154.56 The Fifth District's Congressman represented from two to three times as many people as Congressmen from other districts. This arrangement debased the weight of votes in the larger district.57
The Court held that this gross discrimination contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others.58 Such action stands in direct violation of the constitutional requirement of equal representation for equal numbers of people.59
The 1931 Georgia congressional apportionment statute creates unconstitutional population disparities among districts.60
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark noted that the trial court found the Fifth District grossly out of balance but did not pass upon the merits of the case.61 He would have remanded for application of Baker v. Carr standards under the Equal Protection Clause.62 He would have allowed the legislature an opportunity to reapportion before imposing coercive relief because the General Assembly had been recently reapportioned as a result of the order of the three-judge District Court in Toombs v. Fortson and a study committee was working on the problem.63
This approach respected ongoing state processes.64
Justice Harlan dissented that the Georgia statute satisfies Article I because all representatives are elected by the people of the state.65 The Constitution commits any question of equal districts to the political process rather than judicial decree.66 He would have left the matter to Congress and the state legislature under the text of Sections 2, 4, and 5 because it is beyond the province of this Court to decide whether equally populated districts is the preferable method.67
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Stewart stated that this Court has power to afford relief in a case of this type as against the objection that the issues are not justiciable. With this single qualification he joined the dissent. He could not subscribe to any possible implication to the contrary which may lurk in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion.
He joined because Justice Harlan demonstrated that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution gives no mandate to this Court or to any court to ordain that congressional districts within each State must be equal in population.