486 U.S. 592 (1988)
John Doe began employment with the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973 as a clerk-typist and received consistently excellent or outstanding fitness reports.1 By 1977 he had advanced to the position of covert electronics technician.2
In January 1982 Doe informed a CIA security officer that he was homosexual.3 The Agency immediately placed him on paid administrative leave and conducted an investigation that included polygraph examinations on February 12 and February 17.4 The polygraph officer concluded that Doe had answered all questions truthfully, including denials of sexual relations with foreign nationals and disclosure of classified information to partners.5
On April 14, 1982 a security agent told Doe that his homosexuality posed a security threat.6 After Doe refused to resign, the Director of Central Intelligence terminated his employment pursuant to Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, citing the interests of the United States.7 The Agency offered a positive job recommendation but stated it would inform future employers requiring security clearances of the security concern.8
Doe filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.9 His amended complaint asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging arbitrary and capricious action and violations of required procedures, along with constitutional claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, including due process and equal protection violations.10 He sought declaratory and injunctive relief for reinstatement or reevaluation but no monetary damages.11
The District Court denied the Director's motion to dismiss, granted partial summary judgment to Doe on the APA claim, and ordered reinstatement to administrative leave status with reconsideration under proper procedures.12 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings after concluding that judicial review under the APA was available.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the reviewability of the Director's termination decisions under Section 102(c).14
Whether the Director of Central Intelligence's termination decisions under Section 102(c) of the National Security Act are judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act?15
Under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), the APA does not apply to the extent that agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.16 This occurs when the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion, as explained in Heckler v. Chaney and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.17
No. Section 102(c) provides that the Director may terminate the employment of any officer or employee whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.18 This standard fairly exudes deference to the Director and appears to foreclose the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review.19 The overall structure of the National Security Act reinforces this conclusion because the Agency's efficacy depends on the reliability of its employees and employment with the CIA entails a high degree of trust.20
In the present case John Doe was terminated after the Director reviewed his records.21 The Director determined that termination was necessary and advisable in the interests of the United States pursuant to section 102(c) following the investigation into his homosexuality.22
The Director's termination decisions under Section 102(c) are not judicially reviewable under the APA.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor joined Parts I and II of the Court's opinion.24 She agreed that the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize judicial review of the employment decisions referred to in Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947.25 Section 102(c) does not provide a meaningful standard for judicial review.26
Such decisions are therefore committed to agency discretion by law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).27 She did not understand the Court to say that the exception in Section 701(a)(2) is necessarily or fully defined by reference to statutes drawn in such broad terms.28 In a given case there is no law to apply.29
Justice Scalia agreed with the holding that the Director's decision to terminate a CIA employee is committed to agency discretion by law under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).30 He reached this conclusion on broader grounds than the no law to apply test alone.31
The provision incorporates the common law of judicial review of agency action.32 That body of jurisprudence includes traditional respect for the functions of the other branches.33 The text of Section 102(c) clearly reflects such commitment to discretion, especially given the area of predominant executive authority in national security.34
Whether Section 102(c) precludes judicial review of constitutional claims arising from an employee's termination?35
Where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, its intent to do so must be clear. Absent such clear intent, colorable constitutional claims arising from agency action may be reviewed by the district court to avoid serious constitutional questions about denying any judicial forum for such claims.36
No. Nothing in Section 102(c) persuades that Congress meant to preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to that section.37 A discharged employee cannot complain that termination was not necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States since that assessment is the Director's alone.38
Constitutional claims stand on different footing.39 In the present case John Doe raised constitutional claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments alleging deprivation of property, liberty, and privacy interests as well as violations of due process and equal protection.40 The District Court must address those claims on remand with latitude to control discovery to protect national security interests.41
Section 102(c) does not preclude judicial review of constitutional claims arising from an employee's termination.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor dissented from the conclusion that constitutional claims may be brought in federal district court.43 The functions performed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence lie at the core of the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.44
The authority of the Director to control access to sensitive national security information by discharging employees deemed untrustworthy flows primarily from this constitutional power of the President.45 Congress may surely provide that the inferior federal courts are not used to infringe on the President's constitutional authority.46 Section 102(c) plainly indicates that Congress has done exactly that.47
Justice Scalia dissented from the judgment allowing review of constitutional claims.48 He argued that it is impossible for a decision to be both unreviewable and yet reviewable for constitutional defect.49 The Constitution does not require a judicial remedy for every constitutional violation.50
Members of Congress and the supervising officers of the Executive Branch take the same oath to uphold the Constitution that the Justices do.51 Congress can prescribe within broad limits that for intelligence positions the dismissal decision will be unreviewable.52 The text of Section 102(c) makes no distinction between constitutional and other claims.53