10 Wheat. 1, 48
The case originated in the United States Circuit Court for the seventh circuit and District of Kentucky.1 A judgment was rendered there, and an execution was issued to satisfy it.2 The marshal received the writ and carried out its commands by following the procedures set forth in the recent Kentucky statutes on executions.3 His return to the court reflected this adherence to state law.4
The judges of the Circuit Court divided on whether those Kentucky laws applied to the service of executions upon judgments of the federal courts.5 They therefore certified the question to the Supreme Court under the statute permitting such adjournments when the circuit judges are divided in opinion.6
Prior to reaching the certified question, the defendants raised preliminary objections to the manner in which the matter was presented.7 They argued that the proceeding had been ex parte and that the judgment, execution, and complete return should have been stated to enable the Court to decide the adjourned issues.8
Whether the statutes of Kentucky in relation to executions, passed subsequent to the Process Act, are applicable to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the Federal Courts?9
The Process Act of 1792 adopts the forms of writs, executions, and other process and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits at common law as they existed in the state courts in September 1789, subject to alterations and additions by the federal courts themselves, but not subject to subsequent alterations by state legislatures.10 The 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 supplies rules of decision only in trials at common law and does not govern the ministerial conduct of officers executing writs after judgment.11
No. The established facts establish that a judgment was rendered in the United States Circuit Court for the seventh circuit and District of Kentucky, an execution issued upon it, and the Marshal proceeded according to the late laws of Kentucky shown in the return. Those late laws postdate the Process Act of 1792.12 The rule fixes federal practice to the 1789 state baseline and reserves power to alter it exclusively to the federal courts, so later Kentucky statutes cannot bind the Marshal.13 The 34th section supplies no different result because executions involve post-judgment ministerial acts rather than trials at common law where state laws would furnish a rule of decision.14
The statutes of Kentucky in relation to executions are not applicable to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the Courts of the United States.15