135 S. Ct. 521 (2014)
Gregory Warger was riding his motorcycle on a highway outside Rapid City, South Dakota, when a truck driven by Randy Shauers struck him from behind.1 Warger claims he was stopped at the time of the accident, while Shauers claims that Warger suddenly pulled out in front of him.2 The accident resulted in serious injuries to Warger that ultimately required the amputation of his left leg.3
Warger sued Shauers for negligence in Federal District Court.4 During jury selection, counsel for both parties conducted lengthy voir dire of the prospective jurors.5 Warger's counsel asked whether any jurors would be unable to award damages for pain and suffering or for future medical expenses.6 Counsel also asked whether there was any juror who thought they could not be a fair and impartial juror on this kind of case.7 Prospective juror Regina Whipple, who was later selected as the jury foreperson, answered no to each of these questions.8
The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Shauers.9 Shortly thereafter, one of the jurors contacted Warger's counsel to express concern over juror Whipple's conduct.10 The complaining juror subsequently signed an affidavit claiming that Whipple had spoken during deliberations about a motor vehicle collision in which her daughter was at fault for the collision and a man died, and had related that if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life.11
Relying on this affidavit, Warger moved for a new trial.12 The District Court refused to grant a new trial, holding that the only evidence that supported Warger's motion, the complaining juror's affidavit, was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).13 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.15
Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror's affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror's dishonesty during voir dire?16
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that evidence about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations is inadmissible during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.17 The Rule applies during any proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir dire.18 A postverdict motion for a new trial on the ground of voir dire dishonesty plainly entails an inquiry into the validity of the verdict under the McDonough standard.19
Yes. The postverdict motion for a new trial on the ground of voir dire dishonesty plainly entails an inquiry into the validity of the verdict. Gregory Warger relied on the complaining juror's affidavit describing Regina Whipple's statements during deliberations about her daughter's accident.20 Warger used the affidavit to argue that Whipple had deliberately lied during voir dire about her impartiality and ability to award damages for pain and suffering.21 Because a successful claim under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood would require invalidating the verdict returned in favor of Randy Shauers, the proceeding constitutes an inquiry into the validity of the verdict to which Rule 606(b) applies by its plain terms.22
This understanding aligns with the common-law origins of the Rule reflecting the restrictive federal approach rather than the Iowa approach and with Congress's rejection of a narrower version of the Rule during the legislative process.23
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror's affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror's dishonesty during voir dire.24
Whether an affidavit describing a juror's statements about her personal experiences during deliberations is admissible under Rule 606(b)(2)(A)'s exception for extraneous prejudicial information?25
Rule 606(b)(2)(A) allows testimony about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention.26 Information is extraneous only if it derives from a source external to the jury.27 External sources include publicity and information related specifically to the case the jurors are meant to decide.28 Internal matters include the general body of experiences that jurors bring with them to the jury room.29
No. The excluded affidavit falls on the internal side of the line.30 Whipple's daughter's accident may well have informed her general views about negligence liability for car crashes.31 But it did not provide either her or the rest of the jury with any specific knowledge regarding Shauers' collision with Warger.32 Warger's argument that any information shared by a juror who should have been disqualified is necessarily extraneous would allow the exception to swallow much of the rest of Rule 606(b).33
This result is contrary to the restrictive federal approach adopted by Congress.34 This result is foreclosed by Tanner v. United States which treated allegations of juror incompetence or bias as internal matters subject to exclusion under the Rule.35
An affidavit describing a juror's statements about her personal experiences during deliberations is not admissible under Rule 606(b)(2)(A)'s exception for extraneous prejudicial information.36