748 A.2d 1031 (Md. App. 2000)
The appellant, Ronnie Soloman Ware, Sr., and the appellee, Sandra Moore Ware, were married in August 1992 and have one minor child, Rodney Soloman Ware, Jr., born on December 8, 1993.1
While the parties were living together, their monetary contributions to the marriage were substantially equal, with each earning approximately $25,000 per year when employed.2 The appellee had primary responsibility for caring for the child and keeping up the home during periods of unemployment.3
The parties separated in December 1995, after which the appellee moved into her own apartment, and the appellant often visited and stayed overnight, with the parties continuing to have sexual relations until April 1996.4 In April 1996, the appellant won the D.C. Powerball lottery, receiving an annuity of $17 million with an initial payment of $856,853.08 in May 1996 and $846,000 per year thereafter before taxes.5
On August 13, 1996, the appellee filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.6 The appellant responded with a Counter-Complaint for a Limited Divorce and later filed an Amended Supplemental Counter-Complaint for Absolute Divorce after learning of the appellee’s adultery in September 1997.7 The parties entered into a Parenting Agreement resolving child custody and visitation issues.8
A hearing was held on December 1, 1997, before Judge Theresa A. Nolan.9 On April 8, 1998, the trial court granted the appellant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery and awarded the appellee a monetary award of $1,602,588.20 and indefinite alimony of $3,500 per month.10 Hearings on child support and attorney’s fees followed, leading to a February 4, 1999 order for $1,500 monthly child support and $14,000 in attorney’s fees contributions, after which both parties appealed following the denial of modification motions on May 3, 1999.11
Whether the trial court erred in granting the appellee a monetary award which included a portion of the appellant’s lottery winnings acquired after the parties were separated?12
Maryland law requires the application of a three-step analysis when calculating a monetary award in the course of a divorce proceeding: (1) the trial court must initially characterize all property owned by the parties, however titled, as either marital or non-marital; (2) the court shall then determine the value of all marital property; and, finally, (3) the court may then make a monetary award as an adjustment of the parties’ equities and rights in the marital property.13 In balancing the equities, the court considers the eleven factors in Md. Code, § 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article, with the eighth factor given greater weight in cases of after-acquired property, and the award must be equitable, not necessarily equal.14
No. The trial court properly characterized the lottery winnings as marital property acquired during the marriage.15 After giving special weight to the eighth factor regarding how and when the property was acquired, the court awarded the appellee 20% of the value of payments received prior to divorce and 10% of future payments.16 This produced an equitable rather than equal division that accounted for the short four-month separation and continued intimate relations, distinguishing the facts from Alston.17
The trial court did not err in granting the appellee a monetary award which included a portion of the appellant’s lottery winnings acquired after the parties were separated.18
Whether the trial court erred in granting the appellee an award of indefinite alimony based on disparity of income?19
The court may award alimony for an indefinite period if even after the party seeking alimony would have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of the parties would be unconscionably disparate, per FL §11-106(c)(2).20 A finding of unconscionable disparity is reviewed for clear error, and the award for abuse of discretion.21
No. The trial court found that the appellee's projected income of $109,600 would be only 25.3% of the appellant's $432,912 after accounting for the monetary award and taxes.22 This disparity is similar to cases where indefinite alimony was upheld.23 After considering all twelve factors under §11-106(b), including the presence of a five-year-old child who would experience the disparity by going back and forth between homes, that the appellee could not reasonably exceed $25,000 annual earnings, and that the disparity did not preexist the marriage but arose from the post-separation lottery win, the court concluded the standards of living would be unconscionably disparate.24
The trial court did not err in granting the appellee an award of indefinite alimony based on disparity of income.25
Whether the trial court erred in awarding the appellee child support when the appellee’s financial statements indicated that she had excess income on a monthly basis and the minor child had no unmet needs?26
When combined monthly adjusted actual income exceeds $10,000, the court may use its discretion in setting the amount of child support under FL §12-204(d).27
No. The trial court exercised its discretion after a hearing on December 14, 1998.28 It noted that the appellant had voluntarily paid $5,000 monthly prior to orders and continued $1,500 for the child after alimony was set at $3,500.29 The court concluded that $1,500 monthly child support was reasonable and fair based on the best interest of the child and the parties' high income levels.30
The trial court did not err in awarding the appellee child support when the appellee’s financial statements indicated that she had excess income on a monthly basis and the minor child had no unmet needs.31
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the appellant to pay $14,000 towards the appellee’s attorney’s fees?32
The decision of whether to award attorney’s fees under FL §§11-110(c) and 12-103(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.33
No. The trial court found that the appellee had substantial justification for bringing the proceeding after reviewing the full record of the divorce action.34 The court ordered $14,000 after the appellee had requested nearly $50,000, reflecting a careful statutory application rather than an abuse of discretion.35
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the appellant to pay $14,000 towards the appellee’s attorney’s fees.36
Whether the trial court erred in limiting its award of attorney’s fees to only $14,000?37
The decision of whether to award attorney’s fees under FL §§11-110(c) and 12-103(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
No. The trial court properly limited the award to amounts spent on alimony and child support proceedings in accordance with the statute after the appellee requested nearly $50,000.38 The limitation reflected the statutory boundaries on recoverable fees and constituted a proper exercise of discretion in light of the substantial justification finding and the parties' respective positions.39
The trial court did not err in limiting its award of attorney’s fees to only $14,000.40