387 U.S. 294 (1967)
On March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered the business premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland, took some $363, and fled.1
Two cab drivers followed the man, described as a Negro about 5'8" tall wearing a light cap and dark jacket, to 2111 Cocoa Lane and notified police.2 Within minutes police arrived at the house in patrol cars, knocked, and after Mrs. Hayden answered entered to search for the robber.3
Officers spread through the first and second floors and cellar.4 Hayden was found in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep and was arrested after other officers reported no other man was present.5 An officer searching the cellar for the man or the money found a jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing man was said to have worn in a washing machine.6
Another officer was attracted to an adjoining bathroom by the noise of running water and discovered a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank.7 A clip of ammunition for the pistol and a cap were found under the mattress of Hayden's bed, and ammunition for the shotgun was found in a bureau drawer in Hayden's room.8 All these items of evidence were introduced against respondent at his trial.9
A Maryland court sitting without a jury convicted respondent of armed robbery.10 After unsuccessful state court proceedings, he sought and was denied federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for Maryland.11 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether the warrantless entry into and search of a private home for an armed robbery suspect and his weapons violated the Fourth Amendment when police acted on information that the suspect had entered the house minutes earlier?14
Yes. The police were informed that the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane less than five minutes before they reached it.17 They acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them.18 Speed was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons.19
The warrantless search was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the result.21 He agreed that the warrantless entry and search for the suspect and weapons were justified by the exigent circumstances of hot pursuit.22
However, he parted company with the majority regarding the seizure of the clothing.23 In his view, the items of clothing found in the washing machine should have been excluded from evidence because the police had no warrant and there was no justification for a search of the washing machine once the suspect had been located and secured.24
The other items, including the weapons and ammunition, were properly seized and admitted into evidence.25 He therefore concurred in the affirmance of the judgment without joining the majority's broader reasoning.26
Joined by Chief Justice Warren
Justice Fortas agreed that the Fourth Amendment should not be held to require exclusion from evidence of the clothing as well as the weapons and ammunition found by the officers during the search.27 He could not join in the majority's broad repudiation of the so-called mere evidence rule.28
He would have placed the ruling on the narrow ground that the clothing was pertinent to identification of the person hotly pursued as being in fact the person whose pursuit was justified by connection with the crime.2930 He would not drive an enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment to accommodate a specific and reasonable exception.31
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the Fourth Amendment creates two faces of privacy. One creates a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the police through raids.32
A second creates a zone of privacy that may be invaded either by the police in hot pursuit or by a search incident to arrest.33 He maintained that the personal effects and possessions of the individual are sacrosanct from prying eyes and from any rummaging by police.3435
That is the teaching of Entick v. Carrington, Boyd v. United States, and Gouled v. United States.36
Whether items of clothing having only evidentiary value could lawfully be seized during a search of the home and introduced at trial?37
Yes. The jacket and trousers found in the washing machine matched the description of those worn by the robber.40 The police therefore could reasonably believe that the items would aid in the identification of the culprit.41 The clothes were not testimonial or communicative in nature, and their introduction did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself.42
The clothing was properly admitted into evidence.43
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the result. He agreed that the warrantless entry and search for the suspect and weapons were justified by the exigent circumstances of hot pursuit.
However, he parted company with the majority regarding the seizure of the clothing. In his view, the items of clothing found in the washing machine should have been excluded from evidence because the police had no warrant and there was no justification for a search of the washing machine once the suspect had been located and secured.
The other items, including the weapons and ammunition, were properly seized and admitted into evidence. He therefore concurred in the affirmance of the judgment without joining the majority's broader reasoning.
Joined by Chief Justice Warren
Justice Fortas agreed that the use of identifying clothing worn in the commission of a crime and seized during hot pursuit is within the spirit and intendment of the hot pursuit exception to the search-warrant requirement.44 That is because the clothing is pertinent to identification of the person hotly pursued as being in fact the person whose pursuit was justified by connection with the crime.45
He would frankly place the ruling on that basis.46 He would not drive an enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment to accommodate a specific and reasonable exception.
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that articles of clothing are personal effects protected by the Fourth Amendment.4748 He argued that they may not be seized as mere evidence even during a lawful entry.49
The personal effects and possessions of the individual are sacrosanct from prying eyes and from any rummaging by police. That is the teaching of Entick v. Carrington, Boyd v. United States, and Gouled v. United States.
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of items of mere evidentiary value as distinct from instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband?50
Yes. Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between mere evidence and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband.53 Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband.54 The government has an interest in solving crime by obtaining evidence that aids identification.55
The Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of items of mere evidentiary value.56
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the result. He stated that in his view the items of clothing found in the washing machine should have been excluded.57 The police had no warrant and there was no justification for a search of the washing machine.58
He therefore concurred in the affirmance of the judgment without joining the broad repudiation of the mere evidence distinction.59
Joined by Chief Justice Warren
Justice Fortas agreed that the clothing could be used but refused to join the majority's total rejection of the mere evidence rule.60 He warned that the Court today needlessly destroys root and branch a basic part of liberty's heritage.61
He would not drive an enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment to accommodate a specific and reasonable exception. He would have placed the ruling on the narrow ground that the clothing was pertinent to identification of the person hotly pursued as being in fact the person whose pursuit was justified by connection with the crime.
Justice Douglas dissented, maintaining that the Fourth Amendment protects a zone of privacy that precludes seizure of personal effects for evidentiary purposes alone.62 He argued that such evidence, though seized pursuant to a lawful search, is inadmissible.63
That is the teaching of Entick v. Carrington, Boyd v. United States, and Gouled v. United States. He emphasized that the Fourth Amendment creates two faces of privacy, one of which may not be invaded even to obtain mere evidence.64