497 U.S. 639 (1990)
On the night of March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Walton and his two codefendants, Robert Hoover and Sharold Ramsey, went to a bar in Tucson, Arizona, intending to rob someone at random, steal the victim's car, tie the victim up, and leave him in the desert while they fled the State.1
In the bar's parking lot the three encountered Thomas Powell, a young off-duty Marine.2 They robbed Powell at gunpoint, forced him into his car, and drove him into the desert while questioning him about his residence and money.3 When the car stopped, Walton and Hoover forced Powell to lie face down on the ground while they debated his fate.4 Walton then marched Powell into the desert, placed his foot on Powell's neck, and shot him once in the head with a .22 caliber derringer.5
Powell was blinded and rendered unconscious by the shot but was not immediately killed.6 He regained consciousness, floundered in the desert, and ultimately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia approximately a day before his body was found a week later.7 Walton later told his codefendants that he had shot Powell and that he had never seen a man pee in his pants before.8 After Walton was arrested he led police to the murder site.9
A jury convicted Walton of first-degree murder after receiving instructions on both premeditated and felony murder.10 The trial judge then conducted the separate sentencing hearing required by Arizona statute.11 The State argued that two aggravating circumstances existed: the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner and the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.12 Walton presented testimony from a psychiatrist concerning his long history of substance abuse and possible childhood sexual abuse.13 Walton's counsel argued his age of twenty as a mitigating factor.14
The trial court found beyond any doubt that Walton was the shooter, found both aggravating circumstances present, considered Walton's age and capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct along with all other mitigating factors urged by counsel, and concluded there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency before sentencing Walton to death.15 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Walton's conviction and sentence.16 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P. 2d 1017 (1989). Relying on its prior decisions, the court rejected various specific challenges to the constitutionality of the Arizona death penalty statute, some of which are pressed here, and then proceeded to conduct its independent review of Walton's sentence in order to ensure that aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and all appropriate mitigation was considered.17 Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional in an en banc decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.18
Whether every finding of fact underlying the sentencing decision in a capital case must be made by a jury rather than a judge?19
The Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.20
No. The Arizona capital sentencing scheme assigns the sentencing decision to the trial judge alone after a jury has determined guilt of first-degree murder.2122 The judge determines the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-703.23 This structure parallels Florida's scheme, which the Court has repeatedly upheld.24 The trial judge in this case found beyond any doubt that Walton was the shooter.25 The judge determined that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner and for pecuniary gain.26
The judge considered all mitigating evidence including Walton's age and substance abuse history.27 The judge concluded that no mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency before imposing death.28 The Arizona Supreme Court then conducted its own independent review to confirm the aggravating factors and the absence of sufficient mitigation.29 Because prior decisions establish that the Constitution permits a judge rather than a jury to make these findings, the Arizona procedure satisfies the Sixth Amendment.30
The Arizona capital sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment by assigning sentencing findings to a judge rather than a jury.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on this issue.32 He agreed that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury findings on aggravating circumstances.33 He joined the Court's analysis in Parts I, II, and V.34 He reserved his broader critique of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for other claims.35
Scalia emphasized that the Arizona procedure is consistent with longstanding precedent permitting judicial sentencing determinations in capital cases.36 He noted that the distinction between Florida and Arizona schemes was not constitutionally significant.
Whether an Arizona capital sentencing statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by placing on the defendant the burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency?37
A state may place the burden of proving mitigating circumstances on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence without violating the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.38
No. Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(C) and (E) place the burden on the defendant to establish mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.39 The prosecution bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.40
The trial judge considered all mitigating evidence presented by Walton, including psychiatric testimony on substance abuse and possible childhood sexual abuse as well as his age of twenty, yet found none sufficiently substantial.41 This allocation is consistent with Martin v. Ohio and Patterson v. New York, which permit states to require defendants to prove affirmative defenses.42 The statute does not exclude any category of mitigating evidence.43 The sentencer remains free to consider all relevant factors urged by the defense.44
The Arizona Supreme Court independently reviewed the mitigating evidence and reached the same conclusion.45 Because the procedure preserves the state's burden on aggravating circumstances and permits full consideration of mitigation, it does not violate the Constitution.46
The Arizona capital sentencing statute does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by placing the burden of proving mitigating circumstances on the defendant.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun dissented.4849 He argued that the preponderance standard and the requirement that mitigation be sufficiently substantial to call for leniency exclude relevant mitigating evidence from the sentencer's consideration in violation of Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma.50 He contended that the statute defines a wide range of evidence with some persuasive value that cannot be given effect.51
The preponderance standard encourages sentencers to disregard impairment evidence unless it meets a vague threshold of significance.52 The presumption of death when factors are in equipoise fails to provide the individualized assessment required by the Eighth Amendment.53 Blackmun stressed that the qualitative difference between death and other penalties demands unrestricted consideration of all mitigating evidence.
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented.54 He adhered to his view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment.55 He joined Justice Blackmun's opinion.56
He emphasized that the Court's application of Eighth Amendment doctrine in this case reflected a loss of sight of the responsibility to ensure that the ultimate sanction is imposed only in accordance with constitutional principle, particularly the requirement of individualized assessment of the character and record of the offender.57 Brennan reiterated that the death penalty treats human beings as objects and is inconsistent with civilized treatment under the Eighth Amendment.58
Whether an Arizona capital sentencing statute creates an unconstitutional presumption that death is the proper sentence?59
A statute requiring imposition of the death penalty when aggravating circumstances are found and mitigating circumstances are insufficient to call for leniency does not create an unconstitutional presumption.60
No. Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) directs the court to impose death if one or more aggravating circumstances exist and mitigating circumstances are not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.61 The trial judge applied this standard after considering all mitigating evidence and found the evidence insufficient.62
This structure is consistent with Blystone v. Pennsylvania and Boyde v. California, which upheld similar provisions that permit consideration of all mitigating evidence and do not mandate death upon conviction alone.63 The statute requires an individualized determination rather than automatic imposition of death.64 The sentencer retains discretion to find that mitigation warrants leniency.65 The Arizona Supreme Court independently confirmed that no mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial.66
Because the procedure allows full consideration of mitigation and does not create a mandatory presumption, it satisfies the Eighth Amendment.67
The Arizona capital sentencing statute does not create an unconstitutional presumption that death is the proper sentence.68
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun dissented on this issue as well.69 He maintained that the statute establishes a presumption of death once an aggravating circumstance is found.70 The requirement that mitigation be sufficiently substantial to call for leniency resolves doubtful cases in favor of death.71
This approach is inconsistent with Woodson v. North Carolina and the requirement of a reasoned moral response.72 The plurality's reliance on Blystone and Boyde was misplaced because those cases did not involve a statute that mandates death when aggravating and mitigating factors are evenly balanced.73 Blackmun concluded that the burden-shifting scheme undermines the individualized sentencing mandated by the Eighth Amendment.74
Whether Arizona's especially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstance, as interpreted by the state courts, fails to channel the sentencer's discretion as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?75
An aggravating circumstance that is facially vague may be upheld if the state appellate court has adopted a narrowing construction that provides meaningful guidance to the sentencer.76
No. Although the statutory language is facially vague, the Arizona Supreme Court has narrowed the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved circumstance by defining cruelty as the infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before death, with mental anguish including the victim's uncertainty as to his fate.7778 The court defined depravity as relishing the murder or showing indifference to the victim's suffering.79 The trial judge applied this circumstance after finding that Powell suffered mental anguish during the car ride and final march into the desert and that Walton's comment evidenced depravity.80 The Arizona Supreme Court independently confirmed the presence of cruelty based on Powell's terror and uncertainty.81
This construction is comparable to definitions approved in Maynard v. Cartwright and Proffitt v. Florida.82 Because the narrowing definitions provide guidance and the appellate court applied them to the facts, the circumstance channels discretion as required by the Eighth Amendment.83
Arizona's especially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstance, as interpreted by the state courts, channels the sentencer's discretion and satisfies the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.84
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun dissented. He contended that the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the (F)(6) factor fails to place meaningful limits on the sentencer's discretion.85 He argued that the definitions of cruelty and depravity encompass virtually every murder.86
The court has expanded the factor to cover any killing in which the victim experiences fear or uncertainty for even a brief period.87 The appellate court's application in this case did not distinguish Walton's offense from other homicides.88 Appellate reweighing could not cure the constitutional defect because the Arizona Supreme Court did not purport to resentence and because the body of precedent provided no principled narrowing.89
Blackmun concluded that the factor remains unconstitutionally vague despite the purported limiting construction.90
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented. He adhered to his view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment. He joined Justice Blackmun's opinion.
He emphasized that the Court's application of Eighth Amendment doctrine in this case reflected a loss of sight of the responsibility to ensure that the ultimate sanction is imposed only in accordance with constitutional principle, particularly the requirement of individualized assessment of the character and record of the offender. Brennan reiterated that the death penalty treats human beings as objects and is inconsistent with civilized treatment under the Eighth Amendment.