467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984)
Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on multiple phones during the last six months of 1981.1 The taps revealed a large lottery operation involved in gambling on the volume of stocks and bonds traded on the New York Stock Exchange.2 In early January 1982, law enforcement officers simultaneously executed search warrants at numerous locations, including the homes of petitioners.3 Petitioners and 35 others were indicted and charged with violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (Georgia RICO) Act and with commercial gambling and communicating gambling information.4
Prior to the separate trial of petitioners and 13 other defendants, petitioners moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches.5 They asserted that the warrants authorizing the wiretaps were unsupported by probable cause and based on overly general information, that the taps were conducted without adequate supervision, and that the resulting searches were indiscriminate.6 The State moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress, stating that evidence which might involve a reasonable expectation of privacy of persons other than the defendants would be introduced.7
On June 21, 1982, a jury was empaneled and then excused while the court heard the closure and suppression motions.8 The trial court ordered the suppression hearing closed to all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties, and the lawyers.9 The suppression hearing lasted seven days, during which less than two and a half hours were devoted to playing tapes of intercepted telephone conversations.10 The remainder of the hearing concerned procedures used in obtaining and executing the search warrants and wiretap authorizations, the procedures followed in preserving the tape recordings, and allegations of police and prosecutorial misconduct.11
The trial court ordered ten boxes of personal, noncrime related documents suppressed but refused to suppress a comparable amount of other material.12 The case was then tried to the jury in open court, resulting in petitioners' acquittal of the charges under the Georgia RICO statute but conviction of commercial gambling and communicating gambling information.13 Prior to the trial of the remaining persons named in the indictment, the transcript of the suppression hearing was released to the public.14 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the presentation of evidence to the jury?17
Under the Sixth Amendment the accused possesses an explicit right to a public trial that extends to suppression hearings because those proceedings frequently function as the equivalent of a trial, featuring sworn testimony, factual disputes, and challenges to official conduct that implicate the same values of fairness, accountability, and prevention of perjury served by openness at the merits stage.18 Any closure ordered over the defendant’s objection must therefore satisfy the Press-Enterprise standard: an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.19
Yes. The established facts show that petitioners moved to suppress wiretap and search evidence before a jury was empaneled, that the resulting seven-day hearing included sworn witnesses, arguments of counsel, and resolution of factual questions concerning warrant procedures and alleged misconduct, and that the hearing occurred prior to any presentation of evidence to the jury.20 These characteristics place the proceeding squarely within the category of hearings to which the public-trial guarantee applies.21
The accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the presentation of evidence to the jury.22
Whether that right was violated here?23
A violation occurs when the party seeking closure fails to advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced. The closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest. The trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding and must make findings adequate to support the closure.24
Yes. The established facts reveal that the prosecutor’s proffer addressed only the risk that wiretap evidence might taint future prosecutions under Georgia law. Yet it supplied no particulars about whose privacy interests were implicated or which portions of the seven-day record would cause the harm. The trial court responded with a blanket order closing the entire hearing without exploring narrower options or making findings limited to the two-and-a-half hours of tape evidence, and the closure therefore exceeded what the asserted interest required.25
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the closure of the suppression hearing.26
Whether a new trial on the merits or some other remedy is required for any such violation?27
When a public-trial violation occurs at a suppression hearing, the remedy must be tailored to the violation.28 A new suppression hearing open to the public is the presumptive first step.29 A new trial on the merits is required only if the new hearing produces suppression of material evidence not previously suppressed or some other material change in the parties’ positions.30
No. The established facts indicate that the original suppression hearing resulted in the suppression of ten boxes of personal documents while other evidence was admitted. Petitioners were acquitted on RICO charges but convicted on gambling counts in an open trial. Unless the State alters its evidentiary presentation at a new public hearing, the same rulings are likely to recur, making an automatic new trial a windfall rather than a necessary remedy.31
A new trial on the merits is not automatically required; the appropriate remedy is a new suppression hearing, with a new trial ordered only upon a material change in the suppressed evidence.32