47 Cal. 3d 112, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852 (1988)
In February 1984 Laurie Grouard Walker, a member of the Church of Christ, Scientist, began treating her four-year-old daughter Shauntay for flu-like symptoms that began on February 21.1
Four days later the child developed a stiff neck.2 Consistent with the tenets of her religion, Walker chose to treat the illness with prayer rather than medical care.3 She contacted an accredited Christian Science prayer practitioner who prayed for Shauntay and visited the child on two occasions.4 Walker also engaged a Christian Science nurse who attended Shauntay on February 27 and again on March 6 and 8.5
During the seventeen days Shauntay lay ill she lost weight, grew disoriented and irritable, and experienced a period of heavy and irregular breathing in her final days.6 She received no medical treatment at any point.7 On March 9, 1984, Shauntay died of acute purulent meningitis after a period of heavy and irregular breathing.8
The People charged Walker with involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (b), and felony child endangerment under section 273a, subdivision (1), on the theory that her criminal negligence proximately caused the child's death.9 Walker moved to dismiss the prosecution under Penal Code section 995 on the grounds that her conduct was specifically protected by law and that the charging statutes failed to provide fair notice that her conduct was criminal.10 The trial court denied the motion.11
Walker petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition and a stay under Penal Code section 999a; the petition was summarily denied.12 After the Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back with directions to issue an alternative writ, the Court of Appeal again denied relief.13 Walker filed a second petition for review, which the Supreme Court granted.14
Whether the religious exemption in Penal Code section 270 for treatment by spiritual means through prayer extends to charges of involuntary manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (b), and felony child endangerment under section 273a, subdivision (1)?15
The religious exemption in section 270 is expressly limited to that section and does not extend to other criminal statutes.16
No. The language of section 270 limits the exemption to its own provisions, as the statute specifies that the treatment constitutes 'other remedial care' as used in this section.17 In the present case, Walker provided prayer treatment to Shauntay but the charges are brought under sections 192(b) and 273a(1), which serve different purposes of protecting against grievous bodily harm rather than securing routine support.18 The legislative history of the 1976 amendment shows that the Legislature was aware of potential liability under the felony statutes but chose not to extend the exemption.19 Therefore, the exemption does not bar the prosecution.20
The purpose of section 270 is to secure support of the child and protect the public fisc, not to shield parents from liability for life-threatening neglect.21 Walker's conduct in relying solely on prayer for 17 days while the child deteriorated falls within the reach of the manslaughter and child endangerment statutes.22
The religious exemption in section 270 does not extend to the charges of involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Mosk dissented from the majority's holding that section 270 provides no defense to the felony charges.24 He argued that the majority's narrow construction of the religious exemption ignores the legislative intent to protect parents who rely on prayer in accordance with their religious beliefs.25 The exemption was meant to have broad application and should extend to the charges in this case.26
In the absence of evidence that the parents acted with criminal intent or recklessness beyond their genuine religious beliefs, Mosk would hold that the prosecution is barred.27
Justice Broussard concurred in the result on the manslaughter charge but dissented on the child endangerment charge.28 He maintained that section 270 is the statute that punishes a parent's omission to provide necessary medical attendance, while section 273a applies only to active conduct endangering the child.29 The prayer exemption in section 270 must be read into section 273a or the exemption is pointless.30
Broussard would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal with directions to grant the petition for writ of prohibition as to the section 273a charge.31
Whether prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment based on a parent's exclusive use of prayer treatment for a seriously ill child violates the free exercise clauses of the First Amendment and article I, section 4 of the California Constitution?32
The free exercise clauses protect religious belief but religiously motivated conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.33 The state's compelling interest in protecting children's lives outweighs the parents' religious beliefs when the child faces a life-threatening condition that can be treated by conventional medicine.34
No. The state has a compelling interest in protecting the lives and health of its children.35 In this case, Shauntay was gravely ill for seventeen days with symptoms that would have been apparent to any reasonable parent, and her condition would have been curable with antibiotics.36 The failure to seek medical care under these circumstances was not protected by the free exercise clauses, as parents may not martyr their children by denying them necessary medical treatment.37 The governmental interest in preserving life is adequate to justify the restriction on religious conduct.38
Walker relied on prayer as an article of genuine faith, but resort to medicine does not constitute sin for a Christian Scientist and the restriction is narrowly tailored to instances when a child's life is endangered.39
The prosecution does not violate the free exercise clauses of the First Amendment and article I, section 4 of the California Constitution.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Mosk dissented on the free exercise issue, contending that the state's interest in protecting children must be balanced against the fundamental right to free exercise of religion.41 He emphasized that the exemption was intended to protect sincere religious practice. Mosk argued that the balance should favor the parents when their conduct reflects only religious belief without additional recklessness.
In the absence of evidence that the parents acted with criminal intent or recklessness beyond their genuine religious beliefs, he would hold that the prosecution is barred by the free exercise guarantees.
Whether Penal Code sections 192, subdivision (b), and 273a, subdivision (1), when read with section 270, provide constitutionally sufficient notice that exclusive reliance on prayer treatment for a gravely ill child may constitute criminal negligence?42
Due process requires that statutes provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited.43 The statutes here clearly identify their proscriptions, and the distinguishable purposes of section 270 and the felony statutes mean that compliance with one does not create contradictory commands with the others.44
Yes. The statutes provide a standard of conduct and enforcement that satisfies due process.45 Walker was on notice that while section 270 accommodates prayer for routine care, the felony statutes protect against immediate and grievous harm, and the legislative history shows the Legislature declined to extend the exemption to those provisions.46 The objective standard for criminal negligence applies, and a reasonable person would have been aware of the risk after seventeen days of illness without medical attention.47
The purposes of the statutes are evidently distinguishable, with sections 192(b) and 273a(1) protecting against grievous and immediate physical harm while section 270 assures the routine provision of child support at parental expense.48 This distinction prevents any claim of inexplicably contradictory commands.49
Penal Code sections 192, subdivision (b), and 273a, subdivision (1), when read with section 270, provide constitutionally sufficient notice that exclusive reliance on prayer treatment for a gravely ill child may constitute criminal negligence.50
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Broussard addressed the notice issue indirectly through his statutory analysis. He emphasized that the legislative intent to provide some exemption from criminal liability is overwhelmingly clear even if the extent of that exemption is not fully delineated.51 Broussard argued that the prayer exemption of section 270 must be read into section 273a or the exemption is pointless, and applying section 273a to parents who utilize prayer treatment would defeat the legislative purpose.52
He would therefore reverse as to the child endangerment charge to honor the clear legislative accommodation of religious practice.53