444 U.S. 620, 100 S. Ct. 826, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1980)
The Village of Schaumburg is a suburban community located 25 miles northwest of Chicago, Illinois.1 On March 12, 1974, the Village adopted an ordinance regulating the activities of peddlers and solicitors.2 Every charitable organization that solicits or intends to solicit contributions from persons in the village by door-to-door solicitation or the use of public streets and public ways must apply for a permit prior to such solicitation.3 The ordinance prohibits solicitation without a permit and imposes a fine of up to $500 for each offense.4
It further requires that permit applications contain satisfactory proof that at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.5 Salaries or commissions paid to solicitors and administrative expenses of the organization, including salaries, attorneys' fees, rents, telephone, advertising expenses, contributions to other organizations, and related overhead items, are excluded from the definition of charitable purposes.6
Citizens for a Better Environment is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of promoting the protection of the environment.7 It is registered with the Illinois Attorney General's Charitable Trust Division and has been afforded tax-exempt status by the United States Internal Revenue Service.8 The Village denied CBE a permit because it could not demonstrate that seventy-five percent of its receipts would be used for charitable purposes as defined. CBE then sued the Village in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.9
In its amended complaint, CBE alleged that it was organized to protect the Illinois environment.10 Its canvassers engage in door-to-door activity to distribute literature on environmental topics, answer questions, solicit contributions, and receive grievances.11 The Village's answer alleged that CBE is primarily devoted to raising funds for the benefit and salary of its employees.12 The Village also alleged that more than sixty percent of the funds collected by CBE have been spent for benefits of employees and not for any charitable purposes.13
CBE moved for summary judgment and filed affidavits describing its purposes and the activities of its canvassers.14 The affidavits stated that in 1975 the organization spent 23.3 percent of its income on fundraising and 21.5 percent on administration, with similar figures in 1976.15 The Village opposed the motion but filed no counteraffidavits.16 The District Court awarded summary judgment to CBE, declaring the seventy-five percent requirement void on its face and enjoining its enforcement.17 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in 590 F. 2d 220 (1978).18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 441 U. S. 922 (1979) to review the Court of Appeals' determination.19
Whether the Village of Schaumburg ordinance prohibiting solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least seventy-five percent of their receipts for charitable purposes violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments?20
Charitable appeals for funds on the street or door to door involve speech interests including communication of information, dissemination of views and ideas, and advocacy of causes that are protected by the First Amendment.21 Solicitation is subject to reasonable regulation but such regulation must be narrowly drawn to serve substantial governmental interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.22
Yes.2324 The 75 percent requirement imposes a direct and substantial limitation on protected activity by barring organizations whose primary purpose is research, advocacy, or public education from soliciting in the Village even when they pay only reasonable salaries.25 The Village's interests in preventing fraud, crime, and undue annoyance are only peripherally promoted by the requirement.26 Fraudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited and the penal laws used to punish such conduct directly.27 Efforts to promote disclosure of the finances of charitable organizations also may assist in preventing fraud by informing the public of the ways in which their contributions will be employed.28 No substantial relationship exists between the requirement and protection of public safety because other unchallenged provisions address felons as solicitors.29
The requirement protects privacy only indirectly by reducing the total number of solicitors rather than targeting unique residential interests, and other provisions such as no-solicitation signs provide less intrusive alternatives.30 Applied to the established facts, CBE is a registered not-for-profit environmental organization whose canvassers distribute literature and solicit contributions, yet the ordinance denied it a permit solely because it could not meet the 75 percent threshold after spending 23.3 percent on fundraising and 21.5 percent on administration in 1975.31
The ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it unduly intrudes on protected charitable solicitation without being sufficiently related to the governmental interests asserted.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the ordinance affects only door-to-door solicitation for financial contributions, leaves virtually no discretion in the hands of municipal authorities, and is rationally related to the community's collective desire to bestow its largess upon organizations that are truly charitable.33 He argued that the Court overestimates the constitutional value of such solicitation.34 He also underestimates the reasons a village board might conclude regulation is necessary, noting that a simple request for money lies far from the core protections of the First Amendment.35
Rehnquist further contended that the distinction between advocacy organizations and commercial solicitors is elusive after Virginia Pharmacy Board and that municipalities should be permitted to make objective judgments insulating residents against panhandlers, profiteers, and peddlers without violating the Constitution.36
Whether summary judgment was proper on the facial validity of the ordinance when the Village claimed unresolved factual disputes existed concerning the true character of CBE's organization?37
In First Amendment contexts, courts are inclined to disregard the normal rule against permitting one whose conduct may validly be prohibited to challenge a statute as it applies to others.38 This is because of the possibility that protected speech or associative activities may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute. A litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.39
Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly held that any issue of fact as to the nature of CBE's particular activities is not material to a facial challenge on First Amendment grounds.40 The ordinance purported to prohibit canvassing by a substantial category of advocacy-oriented charities to which the 75 percent limitation could not be applied consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.41 Because CBE challenged the facial validity of the ordinance the unresolved factual dispute concerning whether CBE itself was primarily devoted to raising funds for employees rather than charitable purposes did not prevent summary judgment.42
The Village's answer alleged that more than 60 percent of funds collected by CBE were spent for employee benefits, yet no counteraffidavits were filed to controvert CBE's affidavits showing its environmental advocacy activities and spending percentages.43
Summary judgment on the facial invalidity of the ordinance was proper because the overbreadth doctrine permitted adjudication without resolving factual disputes about CBE's internal operations.44