556 U.S. 81 (2009)
Michael Brillon was arrested on July 27, 2001, after striking his girlfriend in Bennington County, Vermont.1
Three days later he was arraigned on felony domestic assault and habitual offender charges exposing him to a potential life sentence. The court ordered him held without bail with Richard Ammons assigned as his first counsel.23
In October 2001 Ammons filed a motion to recuse the trial judge that was denied the next month with trial set for February 2002.4 Ammons moved for continuances in January and February 2002 that the trial court denied after the State objected.5 Brillon fired Ammons on February 22 leading the court to grant withdrawal three days later over the State's objection.6
A second attorney appointed the same day withdrew based on a conflict.7 Gerard Altieri was assigned as third counsel on March 1, 2002.8 At a June 11, 2002 hearing, Altieri moved to withdraw after Brillon threatened his life.9 The court granted the motion while warning Brillon of further delay.10 It appointed Paul Donaldson as fourth counsel the same day.11
Donaldson was released in November 2002 after reporting his contract had expired.12 David Sleigh was assigned as fifth counsel on January 15, 2003.13 Sleigh withdrew in April 2003 due to contract modifications.14 This left Brillon without counsel for four months until Kathleen Moore was appointed on August 1, 2003.
Moore filed a speedy trial motion in February 2004 that was denied.15 The case went to trial on June 14, 2004 resulting in Brillon's conviction and sentence of 12 to 20 years in prison.16 The trial court denied a post-trial speedy trial motion.17 The Vermont Supreme Court vacated the conviction on appeal in a 3-2 decision.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.19
Whether the three-year period between arrest and trial, including multiple changes in assigned counsel and gaps in representation, violated Brillon's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test?20
The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right requires courts to balance the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant, with delays caused by defense counsel ordinarily charged against the defendant because counsel acts as the defendant's agent.21
No. The three-year delay from Brillon's July 27, 2001 arrest until his June 14, 2004 trial was extreme and weighed heavily in his favor, yet the reasons for most of that delay stemmed from Brillon's own actions in firing counsel and from the ordinary delays caused by his successive assigned attorneys rather than from any state misconduct.22
Brillon fired Ammons on the eve of the February 2002 trial, threatened Altieri leading to his June 2002 withdrawal, and sought dismissal of Donaldson, all of which created gaps and impeded prompt trial.23 The remaining periods when Donaldson, Sleigh, and Moore sought extensions are likewise charged to Brillon because assigned counsel act on behalf of their clients.24
Although Brillon repeatedly asserted his right and suffered prejudice from lengthy pretrial incarceration, the balance under Barker does not favor dismissal when the defendant bears primary responsibility for the delay.25
The three-year period did not violate Brillon's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.26
Whether delays caused by assigned counsel are attributable to the defendant rather than the State when applying the Barker v. Wingo factors to a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim?27
Delay caused by the defendant's counsel is charged against the defendant whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned, because the attorney is the defendant's agent when acting in furtherance of the litigation, and assigned counsel are not state actors for speedy-trial purposes under Coleman v. Thompson and Polk County v. Dodson.28
Yes. The periods during which Donaldson requested additional time for discovery, Sleigh sought extensions of discovery deadlines, and Moore obtained stipulations for motion extensions must be attributed to Brillon, as these attorneys acted solely on his behalf after their appointments as replacement counsel following the withdrawals of Ammons and Altieri.29
The facts establish that the Defender General's office provided these successive attorneys under its statutory duty, yet each operated with the same duties and obligations as privately retained counsel.30 Their inability or unwillingness to move the case forward cannot be shifted to the State merely because they were publicly assigned.31
Delays caused by assigned counsel are attributable to the defendant.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Breyer would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.33 He explained that the Vermont Supreme Court did not count delays caused solely by public defenders against the State.34 Instead the court attributed delay to the State only for periods when Brillon effectively had no counsel due to contract and funding issues or when the State itself conceded responsibility.35
Breyer emphasized that the Vermont court has considerable authority to supervise the appointment of public defenders under state law.36 It therefore warrants leeway when deciding whether a particular failing is properly attributed to assigned counsel or to the defender general's office.37
Whether a defendant's conduct in repeatedly dismissing assigned counsel and creating gaps in representation should be factored into the speedy trial balancing analysis?38
A defendant's deliberate attempt to disrupt proceedings should be weighted heavily against the defendant, and the effect of earlier disruptive events must be factored into the analysis of subsequent delay under the Barker balancing test.39
Yes. Brillon's termination of Ammons four days before the scheduled jury draw, his threat against Altieri that prompted withdrawal at the June 11, 2002 hearing, and his later motion to dismiss Donaldson after the trial court had already warned him that further changes would prolong incarceration must all be weighed against him.40
These actions directly caused the initial gaps in representation and made it more difficult for the Defender General's office to secure replacement counsel.41 The facts show that but for these maneuvers the subsequent four-month gap after Sleigh's withdrawal and the overall three-year delay would not have arisen in the same form.42
A defendant's conduct in repeatedly dismissing assigned counsel must be factored into the speedy trial balancing analysis.43
Whether the record established any systemic breakdown in the public defender system that could be charged to the State?44
Delay resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public defender system could be charged to the State, but only if the record affirmatively shows institutional problems rather than ordinary difficulties in securing counsel.45
No. The record contains no evidence of any institutional breakdown in the Vermont public defender system.46 The Vermont Supreme Court itself acknowledged the absence of such a finding.47
The delays arose instead from Brillon's serial dismissals of Ammons and Altieri plus routine contract and workload issues faced by individual assigned counsel such as Donaldson and Sleigh.48 The facts confirm that the Defender General's office ultimately secured funding to appoint Moore and that the trial court promptly appointed replacement counsel each time a withdrawal occurred, without any showing of systemic failure.49
The record did not establish any systemic breakdown in the public defender system that could be charged to the State.50