474 U.S. 254 (1986)
In 1962, respondent Booker T. Hillery, a black man, was indicted for the murder of a white victim by a grand jury in Kings County, California.1 Before trial, Hillery moved to quash the indictment on the ground that blacks had been systematically excluded from service on Kings County grand juries.2 In support of the motion, he introduced statistical evidence showing that although blacks comprised approximately 5 percent of the county's population, no black had ever served on a grand jury there.3 The trial court denied the motion.4 Hillery was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after his initial death sentence was reduced.5
Hillery pursued appeals and collateral attacks in the California courts for the next sixteen years, raising his equal-protection challenge to the grand jury at every stage.6 The final state-court avenue was foreclosed in 1978.7 Less than one month later, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, renewing the grand-jury claim.8
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which the State, for the first time, raised the defense that the twenty-year delay in filing the federal petition had prejudiced its ability to respond.9 The court rejected that defense after finding no prejudice to the State.10 On the merits, the District Court credited statistical evidence covering the period 1950 through 1962 showing that, although blacks made up roughly 5 percent of the population eligible for grand-jury service, none had served during that span.11 The court also heard testimony from the county's Superior Court judges, who had selected the grand jurors, but concluded that this testimony did not rebut the inference of intentional discrimination.12 The District Court granted the writ and ordered the indictment set aside.13
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.14 It held that the State had waived its prejudicial-delay defense by failing to raise it earlier and agreed that Hillery had established an unrebutted prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the State's failure to timely raise in the lower federal courts the issue of prejudicial delay bars this Court from considering that defense?17
A party's failure to raise a defense in lower federal courts does not preclude this Court from addressing the issue when the record presents it and the interests of justice require resolution.18
No. The Court may address the prejudicial-delay defense even though the State first asserted it during the District Court's evidentiary hearing.19 The established facts show that Hillery filed his federal habeas petition in 1982, twenty years after his 1962 conviction and after exhausting state remedies in 1978.20 The District Court rejected the defense after finding no prejudice to the State from the delay, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on waiver grounds.21 Because the factual record developed below squarely presents the equitable question, the Court proceeds to decide whether laches or delay bars relief.22
The State's delay in raising the defense does not bar Supreme Court consideration of the prejudicial-delay issue.23
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Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion.24 He wrote separately to emphasize that the State's delay in raising the defense of prejudicial delay was itself a significant factor in the District Court's decision not to dismiss the petition on that ground.25 The State had ample opportunity to raise this defense at an earlier stage of the proceedings.26
Its failure to do so substantially undermined its claim of prejudice.27
Whether the State's delay in raising the defense of prejudicial delay constitutes a waiver of that defense under Davis v. United States and its progeny?28
Davis v. United States and related cases rest on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure, which do not govern habeas corpus proceedings; therefore, those precedents do not compel a finding of waiver in this context.29
No. The procedural-default rules of Davis do not apply because habeas corpus is governed by equitable principles and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 rather than the cited rules.30 The established facts demonstrate that the State raised the defense at the District Court hearing, albeit late, and the lower courts addressed it on the merits before the Court of Appeals alternatively held waiver.31 The Court therefore treats the defense as properly before it without finding procedural forfeiture under Davis.32
The State's delay does not constitute a waiver under Davis v. United States.33
Whether a federal court must dismiss a habeas corpus petition when the petitioner has failed to show that the State was not prejudiced by the passage of time?34
The equitable doctrine of laches requires case-by-case application; a habeas petition is not subject to per se dismissal merely because the petitioner cannot prove the State suffered no prejudice from delay.35
No. The District Court found that the State failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the twenty-year interval, and the established facts support that determination: although some witnesses had died or become unavailable, the core statistical evidence of grand-jury composition remained available and was litigated fully.36 The Court declines to adopt a rule shifting the burden to the petitioner or creating an automatic bar based solely on the passage of time.37
A federal court need not dismiss the petition for failure to prove absence of prejudice to the State.38
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Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment.39 She noted that a petitioner who received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the grand-jury claim in state court should ordinarily be barred from relitigating it on federal habeas.40 Here the District Court found no such full hearing occurred, rendering the claim cognizable.41
She agreed the remedy of reversal remains appropriate under existing precedent.42
Whether the District Court erred in concluding that respondent had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury that indicted him?43
A prima facie case of racial discrimination in grand-jury selection requires proof that the excluded group is a recognizable class, that the group was substantially underrepresented over a significant period, and that the selection procedure was susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.44
No. The District Court correctly found a prima facie case on the established facts.45 Blacks constituted approximately five percent of the eligible population in Kings County, yet no black served on any grand jury between 1950 and 1962.46 This statistical disparity over more than a decade, combined with the non-neutral selection method employed by the Superior Court judges, satisfied the Castaneda test and shifted the burden to the State.47
The District Court did not err in finding a prima facie case of racial discrimination.48
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Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell dissented on this issue.49 He contended that the statistical evidence was insufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination.50 The testimony of the Superior Court judges supplied a race-neutral explanation for the underrepresentation.51 He would have held that the underrepresentation did not establish the required prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.52
Whether the State failed to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination?53
Once a prima facie case is established, the State must demonstrate that the underrepresentation resulted from factors other than intentional discrimination; mere denials of discriminatory intent are insufficient.54
Yes. The State offered only the testimony of the Superior Court judges that they had not intentionally excluded blacks.55 The established facts show this testimony failed to explain the complete absence of black grand jurors over twelve years or to demonstrate that the selection procedure was in fact racially neutral.56 Under Castaneda, such denials do not rebut the strong inference arising from the statistical evidence.57
The State failed to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination.58
Whether a conviction obtained by a State after an indictment returned by a grand jury from which members of the defendant's race have been purposefully excluded is subject to reversal without a showing of prejudice?59
A conviction obtained after indictment by a grand jury from which members of the defendant's race were purposefully excluded violates the Equal Protection Clause and requires reversal without any showing of actual prejudice to the defendant.60
Yes. The established facts establish purposeful exclusion of blacks from Kings County grand juries at the time of Hillery's 1962 indictment.61 Under the rule reaffirmed from Rose v. Mitchell, such discrimination strikes at the structural integrity of the judicial process and the defendant's right to equal protection.62 Therefore the conviction must be set aside even though Hillery received a fair trial and the evidence of guilt was strong.63
The conviction must be reversed without a showing of prejudice.64
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Justice White dissented for the reasons stated in his Rose v. Mitchell dissent.65 He argued that a defendant challenging grand-jury composition must demonstrate prejudice from the discrimination.66 Because Hillery made no such showing, Justice White would have affirmed the conviction despite the established prima facie case of exclusion.67
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell further dissented that even if discrimination occurred, the twenty-three-year delay between conviction and federal habeas relief rendered reversal an inappropriate remedy.68 The established facts show the responsible judge had died, witnesses were unavailable, and the State would be severely prejudiced in any retrial.69 These costs outweigh any deterrent value of automatic reversal.70