490 U.S. 1 (1989)
In July 1984 Andrew Sokolow went to the United Airlines ticket counter at Honolulu Airport and purchased two round-trip tickets to Miami in the names of Andrew Kray and Janet Norian with open return dates.1 He paid $2,100 in cash from a large roll of $20 bills that appeared to contain about $4,000, gave the agent his home telephone number, appeared nervous, wore a black jumpsuit and gold jewelry, and checked none of his four pieces of luggage.2
The ticket agent alerted Honolulu police officer John McCarthy, who determined that the telephone number was listed to Karl Herman at 348-A Royal Hawaiian Avenue and that no listing existed under Andrew Kray.3 McCarthy later learned that return reservations from Miami to Honolulu had been made for July 25 with stopovers in Denver and Los Angeles.4
On July 25 Sokolow and Norian arrived in Honolulu on a flight from Miami via Los Angeles.5 DEA agents observed Sokolow appearing very nervous in the Los Angeles waiting area and again in Honolulu.6 Agents Richard Kempshall and three others approached the couple on the sidewalk outside the terminal, grabbed Sokolow by the arm, moved him back onto the sidewalk, and escorted both individuals to the DEA office after Sokolow stated his true name was Sokolow but that he was traveling under his mother's maiden name Kray.7
At the DEA office a narcotics detector dog alerted on Sokolow's brown shoulder bag.8 Agents arrested him, obtained a search warrant, and found documents but no drugs in that bag.9 The dog later alerted on a Louis Vuitton bag; agents kept the luggage overnight, obtained a second warrant the next morning, and discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine inside.10 Sokolow was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the district court denied his motion to suppress, he entered a conditional guilty plea, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether Drug Enforcement Administration agents had a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that Andrew Sokolow was engaged in criminal activity when they stopped him at Honolulu International Airport?12
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause.13 The level of suspicion required is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.14 Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not readily reduced to a neat set of legal rules and must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.15 Innocent behavior frequently provides the basis for a showing of reasonable suspicion.16
Yes. In July 1984 Andrew Sokolow purchased two round-trip tickets to Miami at Honolulu Airport paying $2,100 in cash from a large roll of $20 bills.17 He appeared nervous, wore a black jumpsuit and gold jewelry, and checked none of his luggage.18 The ticket agent alerted police, who determined the phone number was listed to Karl Herman and that Sokolow was traveling under an alias.19 On July 25, upon his return, agents observed him appearing nervous in Los Angeles and Honolulu.20
The agents grabbed Sokolow by the arm on the sidewalk and escorted him to the DEA office.21 A dog alerted on his luggage, leading to the discovery of cocaine after warrants were obtained.22 Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the combination of these factors provided the agents with reasonable suspicion.23 The short trip to a source city, cash payment, alias, nervousness, and lack of checked luggage, though each consistent with innocent travel, together warranted the stop.24
The DEA agents had a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that Sokolow was engaged in criminal activity when they stopped him.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented because the facts known to the agents did not reasonably indicate that Sokolow was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the stop.26 He emphasized that the agents relied on a drug courier profile which risks subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted detention.27 Many of the factors such as the short trip to a source city and cash payment describe a large category of innocent travelers.28
He concluded that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no specific evidence of ongoing criminal activity.29