480 U.S. 149 (1987)
In August 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.1 The suit challenged the Alabama Department of Public Safety's longstanding practice of excluding blacks from employment as state troopers.2 The United States joined as a party plaintiff.3 Phillip Paradise, Jr., intervened on behalf of a class of black plaintiffs.4
After a hearing the District Court found that in the thirty-seven-year history of the patrol there had never been a black trooper.5 The court also found that the Department had engaged in a blatant and continuous pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring both as to troopers and supporting personnel.6 The court issued an order requiring the Department to hire one black trooper for each white trooper hired until blacks constituted approximately 25 percent of the state trooper force.7 The order also enjoined any employment practices with the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race.8
The Department appealed.9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the hiring order in 1974.10 In 1975 the District Court found that the defendants had artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the number of new troopers hired to frustrate or delay full relief.11 The court also found that the high attrition rate among blacks resulted from selection of other than the best qualified blacks, social and official discrimination at the academy, preferential treatment of whites in training and testing, and harsher discipline of blacks.12 The court reaffirmed the 1972 order and enjoined further attempts to delay or frustrate compliance.13
In September 1977 the plaintiffs returned to the District Court seeking supplemental relief on promotion practices.14 Following discovery the parties entered a partial consent decree approved in February 1979.15 Under the decree the Department agreed to develop within one year a promotion procedure for corporal that would have little or no adverse impact on blacks and conform to the 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.16 Similar procedures were required for sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major.17 After the Department failed to meet the deadline the parties executed a second consent decree approved in August 1981.18 That decree required administration of a proposed procedure whose results would be reviewed under the four-fifths rule.19 No promotions could occur until the parties agreed or the court ruled on a method with little or no adverse impact.20
In 1983 the Department administered a corporal promotion test to 262 applicants of whom 60 were black.21 Only five blacks ranked in the top half.22 The highest black candidate was number 80.23 The United States objected to rank-ordered use of the list.24 After nine months with no promotions the plaintiffs moved to enforce the consent decrees and requested one-for-one promotions until a valid procedure was implemented.25 The District Court found the procedure had an adverse impact.26 The court ordered the Department to submit a plan to promote at least fifteen persons without adverse racial impact.27 When the Department proposed promoting four blacks and eleven whites the court on December 15, 1983, ordered that at least 50 percent of promotions to corporal be awarded to qualified black candidates.28 Similar contingent requirements applied for upper ranks until acceptable procedures were in place.29
The Department promoted eight blacks and eight whites to corporal in February 1984.30 It later submitted procedures for corporal and sergeant that the court approved, suspending the quota for those ranks.31 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's order in 1985.32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.33
Whether the District Court's order imposing a one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement as an interim measure for state trooper promotions in the Alabama Department of Public Safety is permissible under the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment?34
Government bodies may employ racial classifications to remedy unlawful discrimination when the classifications serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to that end.35 Narrow tailoring is evaluated by factors including the necessity for the relief, the efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration of the relief, the relationship of numerical goals to the labor market, and the impact on the rights of third parties.36
Yes. The order serves the compelling interest of remedying the Department's pervasive and systematic discrimination that excluded blacks from every rank for thirty-seven years and persisted through repeated court orders and consent decrees.37 The remedy is necessary because the Department ignored the 1979 and 1981 consent decrees for years, administered a test with clear adverse impact, and offered no valid promotion procedure despite an immediate need for fifteen corporal promotions.38 The Government suggested imposing heavy fines, but prior fee orders had done little to prevent foot-dragging.39
The order is flexible because it applies only when qualified black candidates exist, only when promotions are needed, and only until the Department implements a procedure without adverse impact, as demonstrated by the court's suspension of the quota after approving new procedures for corporal and sergeant.40 The 50% figure is not itself the goal; rather it represents the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved.41 The impact on white troopers is limited to postponement of future promotions rather than layoffs or discharge, and all promoted candidates must be qualified.42
The District Court's order is permissible under the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.43
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment.44 He emphasized that the case resembled Sheet Metal Workers because the Department had continued racial discrimination for many years in defiance of repeated court orders.45 Powell applied the five factors of efficacy of alternatives, planned duration, relationship to minority population percentage, waiver provisions, and effect on innocent third parties.46
He concluded that the one-for-one promotion satisfied narrow tailoring given the Department's persistent violations and the urgent need for fifteen promotions.47 Powell noted that the order was imposed only once at the corporal rank, contained waiver provisions when no qualified black candidates existed, and imposed only a diffuse burden by delaying rather than eliminating white promotions.48
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.49 He maintained that Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education supplies the controlling standard for equitable remedies in cases of proven constitutional violations.50 Stevens rejected the Solicitor General's proposed strict-scrutiny framework for judicial decrees.51
He observed that a district court possesses broad and flexible authority to remedy past wrongs once a violation has been established.52 Stevens stressed that race-conscious relief is required to eliminate the effects of deliberate segregation. The district judge's remedial choices are presumptively valid when directed against a proven violator, distinguishing such decrees from legislative or executive racial classifications.53
Justice White dissented, agreeing with much of Justice O'Connor's analysis.54 He found it evident that the District Court exceeded its equitable powers in devising the remedy in this case.55 White concluded that the one-for-one promotion quota was not manifestly necessary to achieve compliance with the consent decrees.56
He joined the view that the District Court should have considered less restrictive alternatives before imposing the racial quota.57 White emphasized that the order failed to meet the requirements for narrowly tailored relief under strict scrutiny because the District Court did not explore other means of compelling compliance.58
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Scalia
Justice O'Connor dissented.59 She argued that the order failed strict scrutiny because the District Court imposed the one-for-one quota without considering less restrictive alternatives such as appointing a trustee or imposing contempt sanctions.60 O'Connor contended that the quota was not manifestly necessary to achieve compliance with the consent decrees.61
She maintained that its suspension once a new procedure was approved revealed that the true purpose was coercion rather than eradication of delay effects.62 O'Connor insisted that any racial goal must bear a closer relationship to the percentage of eligible minority candidates and that the absence of any evaluation of alternatives rendered the remedy insufficiently tailored.63